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ABSTRACT
The aftermarket business is a highly profitable activity for companies, and they
can earn considerable profits from selling spare parts. Spare parts demands are more
uncertain and intermittent in comparison with finished goods and associated work in
progress parts. In the aftermarket, the demand uncertainty of the spare parts for the
OEMs is complicated by the fact that the other competitors, known as market players
or will-fitters, supply substitutable parts usually with lower cost of production and
deliver them to the market at cheaper prices. This uncertainty makes spare parts
management challenging, and this study develops strategic approaches for spare parts
price setting and inventory level control to further exploit the benefits of the spare
parts business. This dissertation is divided into four main parts.
In the first part, a brief review of inventory system policies is provided. The
review starts with an introduction to the inventory systems terminology and follows
with a categorization of the inventory systems with the aim of developing spare parts
inventory models. Moreover, a discussion about the computations related to the (Q,r)
policy is provided. An algorithm is proposed to find the optimal re-order point/lot-size
and a Monte Carlo simulation is designed to evaluate the mathematical optimization
solutions including the new algorithm and the other classical methods. In the second
part, a literature review related to spare parts management is presented. The literature
review is organized in such a way that in the beginning the inventory control policies
are introduced. Then the perspective of uniqueness of spare parts on the inventory
management is illustrated. Next, spare parts clustering and demand are studied and
forecasting methods are reviewed. The use of Game Theory for inventory systems

planning is studied. Also spare parts pricing as a strategic method to increase the profit
of the suppliers is evaluated. In the third part, to investigate the profitability of spare
parts business, the notion of renewal cost versus the replacement cost is proposed. The
replacement cost of a product is defined as the current market price of the product and
the renewal cost of a product is the acquisition cost of spares to completely renew the
product excluding labor costs. These costs are calculated for some products with
specific characteristics, and the ratio between the renewal cost and the replacement
cost as a scale to evaluate the sustainability of the spare parts pricing is determined
which declares that the spare parts pricing is unfair. In the last part, Game Theory as a
tool to find ideal decision-making in spare parts management taking into account the
interactions among spare parts manufacturers. According to definite assumptions,
spare parts inventory games in the form of normal, cooperative and non-cooperative,
non-zero-sum, evolutionary, and competitive fringes are studied. The proposed games
study the OEMs’ decision-making on spare parts pricing strategies, inventory levels,
batch productions and re-manufacturing efforts.
The proposed strategic spare parts pricing methods as an alternative for regular
pricing can factor in customers’ willingness to purchase spare parts, demand
uncertainty, market uncertainty, competitiveness of the parts in the market, stability of
the cooperation or competition in price setting, marginal costs of designing an
agreement for cooperation, and the marginal cost of production and inventory.
Furthermore it is possible to add the notion of renewal cost and the replacement cost
ratio to the price sustainability description and to include it in the suggested strategic
pricing formulations as a factor that affects the demand and supply curves.
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CHAPTER 1

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. MOTIVATION

The aftermarket business is a highly profitable activity for the companies, and
they can earn considerable profits from selling spare parts. Spare parts functions are
different from finished goods (products to be delivered to the market) or work in
progress parts (as a source to smooth production rate) and demands for the spare parts
are more uncertain and intermittent in comparison with them. This uncertainty makes
spare parts management challenging, and companies develop strategic approaches to
exploit the benefits of the spare parts business.
In a real world situation, Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) manufacture
final products and introduce them to the market. In after-sale services, they provide
spare parts to maintain or repair the final products or equipment, which forces OEMs
to deal with high level of inventory investment for customer satisfaction in after-sales
services. For instance, GM has over 10 million square feet of spare parts storage space
in the United States with hundreds of thousands of different parts, and the value of
spare parts inventories for the United States military exceeds $100 billion (Muckstadt,
2004).
On the other hand, studies show roughly 50% of the customers of the America’s
biggest car manufacturers face unnecessary delays in after-sale services because
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dealers do not have the right spares on-hand (M. A. Cohen, Agrawal, & Agrawal,
2006). The suppliers manufacture final goods with specific level of quality and
quantity rates. Based on different factors such as the number of products sold, quality
of parts and quality of the maintenance, products will face failure, which gives rise to
the need for the spare parts to keep the products in working condition. To keep
products operative, different parts should be on-hand and each part has its own price
and criticality factor. Therefore, to ensure timely repair of these products, an extensive
supply chain system must be set up.
Spare parts, which are stocked in suppliers’ inventories, satisfy the rising
demands. Most inventory problems deal with a single supplier or decision maker who
makes decisions on the purchase/production rate under certain assumptions on the
demand, planning horizon, etc. Therefore, the resulting policies are indifferent to the
other suppliers’ decision-making. In the aftermarket, the demand uncertainty for the
spare parts for the OEMs is complicated by the fact that the other competitors, known
as market players or will-fitters, can supply similar parts, usually with lower quality
and cost of production and deliver them to the market at cheaper prices. In this
complex scenario, the OEM as a decision maker should decide on his spare parts
production and inventory policies. However, these actions or strategies are influenced
by other competitors’ strategies including pricing and quality.
A Game theoretical approach can study the interactions among spare parts
manufacturers, who are the players of the aftermarket business game, to find ideal
decision-making on inventory levels, quality, Green manufacturing and pricing
strategies. Figure 1 depicts the strategic spare part flow line (based on influence
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diagram) for the oil-leveling sensor for a BMW 320i vehicle. As we can see, the OEM
manufactures the vehicle as a parent product, which has a certain designated life cycle.
Each product, according to its complexity, consists of different numbers of parts, in
this case the car has its own major components (powertrain), main groups (engine),
subgroups (engine housing), and sub subgroups (oil pan) which each consists of
different parts and our desired part belongs to this category.

Figure 1: Strategic spare parts flow line (Oil leveling sensor-BMW 320i)

The OEM has to decide on the quality, production rate, Green manufacturing
effort that is the use of recycled parts (in general the use of manufacturing methods to
minimize emission of Greenhouse gases, use of non-renewable or toxic materials, and
waste generation) and price of the original product and introduce it to the market,
which is the initial phase of the product. Then, the product will face failure during its
working period and this failure relates to its durability or life cycle, quality, working
condition, maintenance quality or any unpredictable factors. In this phase because of
3

defects and aging, failure happens that generates the need for spare parts and OEMs
can satisfy this need, which is the repetitive phase of the product. However, other
competitors intervene into the market and diminish the market share of the OEMs by
supplying substitutable parts. This interaction creates the aftermarket game and
players of the game are OEMs and will-fitters who have different strategies to take to
manufacture and stock spare parts.

1.2. OBJECTIVES

The primary objectives of this thesis can be summarized as follows:
•

To provide a literature review covering spare parts management and
Game Theory

•

To develop a novel method to evaluate the sustainability of spare parts
prices;

•

To develop a method for the strategic spare parts pricing and inventory
level under uncertainty of the market;

•

To develop a method to determine the OEM’s spare part pricing level,
Green manufacturing effort and inventory level in competition with willfitters and uncertainty of the market type;

•

To develop a method to study the stability of the OEM’s strategic spare
parts pricing and inventory level;
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•

To develop a method to investigate the competitive or cooperative spare
parts pricing, Green manufacturing effort and inventory level strategies in
different scenarios of centralized and decentralized inventory systems;

•

To develop a method to study the OEM’s spare parts price and inventory
level determination in a price leadership market;

1.3. METHODOLOGY

The goal of this thesis is to evaluate sustainability of the spare parts pricing. This
problem will be addressed by examining a newly introduced concept of the renewal
cost vs. replacement cost of consumer products. Then we will study OEMs’ decisionmaking in aftermarket business games in six steps, and the output of research answers
fair strategic decision-making for spare parts pricing levels.
Aftermarkets in industries such as automobiles, white goods, industrial
machineries and information technology companies have become four to five times
larger than the original equipment businesses. To investigate the profitability of spare
parts business (specifically in mentioned industries) the research comes up with the
idea of renewal cost versus the replacement cost. The replacement cost of a product is
defined as the current market price of the product and the renewal cost of a product is
the acquisition cost of spares to completely renew the product excluding labor costs.
Customers purchase products from OEMs and to keep them in working condition, they
replace failure parts with spare parts. The price of products and its spares are set by
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OEMs and our study looks for fair or sustainable spare parts pricing via investigation
of replacement and renewal costs. This study follows the following procedure:
First, a review of inventory systems will be presented with the aim of developing
spare parts inventory models.
Second, we review articles related to fair spare parts pricing and provide a survey
for earlier literature to present a literature review related to the spare parts inventory
management and Game theory. This review updates previous surveys and highlights
the different issues considered and the methodologies used in spare part inventory
modeling. A categorization from the perspectives of spare parts inventory control
policies, uniqueness of spare parts, spare parts clustering and demand, inventory
systems and Game Theory and spare parts pricing will be done.
Third, we check replacement and renewal costs for some products with specific
characteristics, and compare the ratio between the renewal cost and the replacement
cost as a scale to evaluate the sustainability of the spare parts pricing.
Fourth, from Game Theoretical perspective, the market, which puts intermittent
demands on the spare parts, is a player of the aftermarket game. We will review
previous methods of modeling the market as an agent or player from different aspects
of the monopolistic or competitive situations, dummy player, and demand
distributions to select proper models for the market.
Fifth, Price adjustment and Green manufacturing effort are two factors that
contribute to fair spare parts pricing. Pricing strategy as a factor that can guarantee the
competitiveness of companies in the market will be investigated. Meanwhile, Green
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manufacturing or re-manufacturing and its implementation on the production cost and
credibility of the parts in the market will be considered in the study.
Sixth, payoffs of the OEMs and market players based on, inventory levels, remanufacturing efforts and sale price will be formulated. Then, the resulting payoffs of
the OEMs and will-fitters in cooperative or competitive environment will be studied
by using Game Theoretical methods to investigate sustainability of the spare parts
prices.

1.4. CONTRIBUTIONS

According to definite assumptions, spare parts inventory games in the form of
normal,

cooperative

and

non-cooperative,

non-zero-sum,

evolutionary,

and

competitive fringes will be investigated. The proposed games will study the OEMs’
decision-making on spare parts pricing strategies, inventory levels, batch productions
and re-manufacturing efforts. The outputs of the research contribute to spare parts
inventory games, which are finite non-zero-sum games, answers fair strategic
decision-making for spare parts pricing levels in the following format:
1. Comparison of renewal cost and replacement cost to evaluate the cost of
spare parts.
2. Spare parts inventory level decision-making in a monopolistic market; a
non-cooperative

two-person

game

that

production/purchase rate and inventory level.
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can

determine

the

3. Implication of the theory of games on spare parts inventory control
policies; a non-cooperative three-person game that can determine pricing
strategies, inventory levels and re-manufacturing efforts.
4. Evolutionary spare parts inventory games; a two-person game that can
study stable pricing strategies and quality levels.
5. Cooperative spare parts inventory games; a co-operative three-person
game that can determine cost allocations and inventory levels in case of
cooperation between suppliers.
6. Competitive fringe spare parts inventory games; a non-cooperative multiplayer game that investigates decision-making on the spare parts price and
inventory level.

1.5. THESIS OUTLINE

The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 starts with a brief
review of inventory system policies with the aim of developing spare parts inventory
models. Then, a discussion about the errors of the (Q,r) policy is provided along with
Monte Carlo simulation and proposed algorithm to find the optimal control variables.
Chapter 3 provides a discussion on the importance of the aftermarket business and its
profitability for the OEMs. A literature review related to the spare parts inventory
management and Game theory is subsequently presented. Chapter 4 describes the
novel measurement of the renewal cost versus the replacement cost. Then, the ratio
between these costs as a scale to evaluate the sustainability of the spare parts pricing is
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determined. Chapter 5 describes spare parts inventory management as the spare parts
inventory games. According to definite assumptions, spare parts inventory games in
the form of normal, cooperative and non-cooperative, non-zero-sum, evolutionary, and
competitive fringes are investigated. Conclusions are provided in Chapter 6.
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CHAPTER 2

2. INVENTORY CONTROL MODELS

2.1. INTRODUCTION

In this chapter a brief review of inventory system policies is provided. The review
starts with an introduction to the inventory systems terminology and follows by a
general categorization of the inventory systems. Inventory systems can be categorized
into deterministic and probabilistic policies and the most commonly used methods in
each group are introduced. A discussion is presented about spare parts management
and how to relate inventory control policies to spare parts management. Moreover, a
discussion about the errors of the (Q,r) policy is provided and a Monte Carlo
simulation is designed to evaluate the mathematical optimization solutions. An
algorithm is proposed to find the optimal policy for reorder points and lot-size that
minimizes the inventory cost and a comparison between the classical method, the most
reliable algorithm for (Q,r) and the newly suggested algorithm is presented.

2.2. TERMINOLOGY

An inventory system is a system that has three significant types of costs. All these
costs are controllable and can be listed as follows:
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•

The cost of carrying inventories: It is the cost of investment in inventories,
storage, handling the items, obsolescence, etc.;

•

The cost of incurring shortages: It is the cost of lost sales, loss of good
will, overtime payments, special administrative efforts (telephone calls,
memos, letters), etc.;

•

The cost of replenishing inventories: It is the cost of machine setups for
production, preparing orders, handling shipments, etc.;

These costs are typically included by most production systems. In this system
costs can be controlled by a variety of means including decision-making related to raw
materials ordering, manufacturing semi-goods and finished goods and stocking goods
which are ready for shipment.
The sum of those costs is known as the total cost. Interestingly, these costs are
closely related to each other and increase (decrease) of one of them may results in
decrease (increase) of the others. But the total cost can be controlled by means of
suitable decision-making; in this case we say that costs are controllable.
According to the different costs and their controllability, inventory systems can
be grouped into 4 types (Naddor, 1982):
•

Type 1: Where carrying and shortage costs are controllable;

•

Type 2: Where carrying and replenishing costs are controllable;

•

Type 3: Where shortage and replenishing costs are controllable;

•

Type 4: Where all costs are controllable;

Decision-making related to inventory systems seeks to minimize the total cost of
the inventory. Mainly two types of decisions are concerned:
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•

When should the inventory be replenished?
•

The inventory should be replenished when the amount of inventory
reaches to a specific level known as reorder point;

•
•

The inventory should be replenished after specific time intervals;

How much should be added to the inventory?
•

The quantity to be ordered is a fixed value known as lot-size;

•

The quantity to be ordered will bring the a mount of inventory to a
certain value known as inventory order level;

Also, the inventory problem can be considered as the balancing of the costs. For
example, in some situations when carrying cost and replenishment cost are equal and
balanced, the total cost will be minimized. When the time interval between placing an
order and its addition to the inventory known as lead-time is significant, the inventory
order level and reorder point are calculated respectively.
Based on the above discussion inventory policies can also be categorized as:
•

Zero lead-time;

•

Non-zero lead-time;

An analysis of an inventory system consists of four major steps:
•

Determination of the properties of the system;

•

Formulation of the inventory problem;

•

Development of the model;

•

Derivation of a solution of the system;

The establishment of the properties is the first step to analyze an inventory
system. The properties of each system consist of four components:
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•

Demands: What is taken out of inventory;

•

Replenishment: What is put into the system;

•

Costs: carrying, Shortage and replenishment costs;

•

Constraints: Various administrative, physical and other factors that place
limitations on the rest of the properties;

The most important component is demand, because inventories are kept to meet
the demand. Demands are not controllable in either ways of directly or indirectly,
because people who are outside the inventory system make decision on the quantity of
demands. However, the following properties related to demand can be studied:
•

When do customers place an order;

•

How much do they need;

•

Is demand is higher at the beginning of the month than the end of it;

•

Does any accurate information about future requirement exist;

•

Shortage/backorders tolerated;

Demand size is the quantity required to satisfy the demand for the inventory.
Demand size may be considered to be the same from one period to the other (constant
demand), or otherwise it can be assumed to be variable. Demand is known when there
is precise information about the demand size, and related inventory systems are called
deterministic systems. Sometimes the demand size is not known but it is possible to
find a probability distribution for them and these inventory systems are called
probabilistic systems.
In probabilistic systems, probability of the occurrence of a demand size is
assumed, or estimated. Demand rate is the demand size per unit of time. In
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probabilistic systems the average rate of demand is used. Demand pattern is the way
that demand occurs in a period of time, in other words if we consider a period of time
in which demand size occurs there are different ways of taking out the quantities and
each way in known as demand pattern.
Replenishing is the quantities that are be added to the inventory based on a
schedule according to the time they are ordered and they actually are added to the
stock. The following three elements are important to replenishment:
•

The schedule period: the time length between consecutive decisions. It can
be prescribed and in this situation the only controllable variable is
replenishment size. If it is not prescribed and there exists equal schedule
periods, it is called constant scheduling periods;

•

The replenishment size: the quantity scheduled to be added to stock.
Replenishment period is the time length in which the replenishment is
added to the stock and the replenishment rate is the ratio of the
replenishment size and its period. If replenishment period is insignificant,
the rate is infinite and can be said replenishment is instantaneous. If it is
not instantaneous, the way it is added to stock over the period is important
and studied as replenishment pattern;

•

The lead-time: the time length between placing an order and its actual
addition to the system. Lead-time most of the time is prescribed and
constant which means it is similar for each decision;

As it was mentioned before costs in inventory systems consist of carrying,
shortage and replenishment. Each of them has its own parameters:
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•

Carrying cost: The cost of carrying inventory per unit time. For many
industries the fraction of carrying inventories is about 5-25% per year.
The carrying cost has different elements including:

•

•

The cost of money tied up in inventory;

•

The cost of storage;

•

The cost of taxes on inventory;

•

The cost of obsolescence;

•

The cost of insurance of inventories;

Shortage cost: The most difficult cost to calculate is the shortage cost.
Most managers believe that it is impossible to calculate exactly the
amount of shortage and they assume this cost is infinite, so they never let
shortage occurs in the inventory. Mostly it depends on the quantity of
shortage and the duration of time in which over time the shortage exists.
The following elements are included in this type of cost:

•

•

Overtime costs;

•

Special clerical and administrative costs;

•

Loss of specific sales;

•

Loss of goodwill;

•

Loss of customers;

Replenishment cost: The replenishment cost in general can be categorized
into two groups:
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•

Costs of replenishment regarding ordering parts from the outbound agency (the ordering cost). It may include clerical and
administrative costs, transportation costs, unloading costs, and etc.;

•

Costs of manufacturing parts within the under study organization
or in-bound system (the setup cost). It may include labor setup
costs, cost of material used during setup testing, cost of shutdown
time during the setup that manufacturing stops, and etc.;

Also there are some constraints that their properties affect the inventory system.
First of all, units can be continuous or discrete. Moreover demand can have some
constraints including:
•

Making up the shortage: In some cases it is impossible to make up the loss
sales and in this situation the property of the demand has an important
effect on the shortage cost;

•

Negative demand: In some cases it is possible to return parts from the
customer which is known as the negative demand;

•

Dependent demand structure: If the demand for the next period is
dependent to the previous periods that would be very complex to analyze
the system;

Replenishment also has its own constraints. The major ones are:
•

Space constraints: The amount of space available for sorting and stocking
inventory is limited;

•

Scheduling and reviewing constraints: The scheduling and reviewing
periods can be prescribed which inserts constraints to the system;
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•

Inventory level: In some cases shortage is impossible so the level of
inventory should be specific times of the average demand to assure that
shortage is not happening;

2.3. INVENTORY SYSTEMS CATEGORIZATION

Inventory systems can be categorized according to their related demand. Based on
type of the demand including known or expected demands, inventory systems are
divided into two groups:
1. Deterministic systems:
•

Lot-size systems: Orders are placed in lots of a fixed size so the goal is
to balance carrying cost against replenishing cost. Replenishments are
made whenever the inventory level reaches to zero and since the
replenishment rate is infinite and there is no lead-time, no shortages can
occur;

•

Order level systems: Since the scheduling is prescribed the cost of
replenishment is not controllable so the goal is to balance the carrying
cost against shortage cost. Lot-size systems and order level systems are
identical except that in order level systems shortages are allowed and
there is no prescribed scheduling period;

•

Order-level-lot-size system: The cost of carrying, shortage and
replenishment can be balanced. The lot-size system is a special case of
the order-level-lot-size system when the cost of backorder is infinite;
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•

Lot-size systems with various cost properties: In these systems it has
been assumed that the cost of carrying and replenishment is not
constant. Major conditions can be listed as follows:
•

Quantity discount: Where purchasing price is not constant and it
depends on the quantity ordered and can be decreased while
number of orders increases. This discount also can be continuous
or discrete;

•

Price change anticipation: Where the price of the parts to be
replenished anticipated increasing which can motivate the
inventory systems to order them in advance and carry them. The
price change can be known (the price increases a certain amount
after specific time) or variable (the price changes in a probabilistic
manner);

•

Carrying-cost functions: Carrying cost can follow different
functions based on the types of the parts. This can be exclusively
studied for perishable parts and expensive-storage parts;

•

Deterministic systems with non-constant demand: Demands for these
systems are known but it is not constant. It can be increasing demand or
variable known demand during each period;

2. Probabilistic systems:
•

Probabilistic scheduling-period systems: In these systems demand is
not known with certainty and the goal is to determine the optimal
replenishment scheduling period and order level;
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•

Scheduling-period-order-level systems: Scheduling –period system
tries to balance carrying cost and replenishment cos. In other
words, since shortages are not allowed the order level should be
large enough to meet the maximum demand in each period. The
order-level system balances the carrying cost and backorder cost
while the replenishment scheduling period is prescribed;

•

Scheduling-period-order-level systems with lead-time: These
systems are similar to previous category except that replenishment
lead-time is considered;

•

Probabilistic reorder-point-order-level systems: In these systems
demand is not known with certainty and the goal is to determine the
optimal replenishment scheduling period and order level;
•

Probabilistic order-level system: The goal is to balance carrying
cost and replenishment while there is no lead-time;

•

Probabilistic order-level system with lead-time: It is similar to
previous system except that replenishment lead-time exists;

•

Probabilistic reorder-point system: The goal is to balance carrying
cost and backorder while there is no lead-time;

•

Probabilistic reorder-point system with lead-time: It is similar to
previous system except that replenishment lead-time exists;

•

Probabilistic reorder-point-order level system: The goal is to
balance carrying cost, backorder and replenishment cost while
there is no lead-time;
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•

Probabilistic reorder-order level systems with lead-time: It is
similar to previous system except that replenishment lead-time
exists;

2.4. DETERMINISTIC INVENTORY MODELS

The following inventory models assume that the demand is known in advance. In
this section two deterministic models which are widely used are introduced.

2.4.1. THE ECONOMIC ORDER QUANTITY MODEL (EOQ)

The application of the mathematic to the factory management can be investigated
through early work of Ford W.Harris 1913 by manufacturing lot-size determination
known as EOQ model.

2.4.1.1.

SOLUTION

Solution for this problem includes balancing the setup and carrying costs. If the
manufacturer produces more parts in each run he can reduce the setup cost more and
in contrast if he produces and stocks more parts he would spend more cash on storing
and holding parts in inventory. So the main question is how many parts to make at
once in order to compromise among the above mentioned costs. The sum of the labor
and material costs to ready a shop for manufacturing a part is defined as the setup cost.
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Larger lots will decrease the setup cost and smaller lots would decrease the inventory
cost. The balance between those two concerns can be answered by EOQ model. The
lot-size mathematical formula is derived regarding following assumptions for the
manufacturer:
•

Production

is

instantaneous:

The

entire

lot

can

be

produced

simultaneously and there is no capacity limitation;
•

Delivery is immediate: In order to satisfy the demand, there is no time lag
between production and availability of parts;

•

Demand is deterministic: The quantity and timing of the demand is certain

•

Demand is constant over time: Which means if the demand is 7 units over
a week the daily demand is one;

•

A production run needs a fixed setup cost: The setup cost is constant and
indifferent from the lot-size or the factory condition;

•

Products can be analyzed individually: Means there is only a single
product or there is no interaction between products;

2.4.1.2.

FORMULATION

The optimal production lot-size can be computed regarding mentioned
assumptions. The following parameters are needed to generate the formula.
•

D: Demand rate (in units per year);

•

c: Unit production cost excluding setup or inventory costs (in dollars per
unit);
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•

A: Fixed setup cost (in dollars);

•

h: Holding cost (in dollars per unit per year) also can be represented as an

•

Q: The lot-size or decision variable (in units);

annual interest (ir) on money tied up to the production h = ir × c;

Number of orders per year equals to D/Q and timing to place an order per year,

know as order interval equals to Q/D which is a fraction of year. The total cost per
year including inventory, setup and production costs would be formulated as follows
(the cost is a function of the lot-size):
Y Q =

hQ AD
+
+ cD
2
Q

(1)

The lot-size that minimizes the total cost is:

Q∗ =

2AD
h

(2)

2A
hD

(3)

Moreover, the optimal order interval can also be calculated T = Q/D :
T∗ =

This square root formula is known as EOQ and referred to as the economic lotsize. This formula tells us that there is a tradeoff between lot-size and inventory. Also
the sum of holding and setup costs is insensitive to lot-size:
Y∗ =

hQ∗ AD
+ ∗ = √2ADh
Q
2
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(4)

Now consider that we use an arbitrary lot-size which is different from the optimal
lot-size. The ratio of annual cost (holding and setup costs) can be written as:
1 Q/ Q∗
Y Q/
=
+
Y∗
2 Q∗ Q/

(5)

Also, this can be extended for order interval too.
Y(T/ ) 1 T / T ∗
= ( ∗ + /)
T∗
2 T
T

(6)

This tells us that 100% error in calculating the lot-size will result in 25% in
inventory cost.
One of our assumptions was that the production is instantaneous, which means
the production or replenishment is infinitely fast. Now, we can assume the production
rate (P) is finite but deterministic. This model known as economic production lot
(EPL), and the optimal level of lot-size is:

Q∗ =

2AD
D
h(1 − P )

(7)

If (P) is infinite we get the same result as before.

2.4.2. DYNAMIC LOT-SIZING

In order to implement more randomness into the inventory system mathematical
model, relaxing the deterministic demand is studied as dynamic lot-sizing.
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2.4.2.1.

SOLUTION

The solution for this problem comes with the idea of finding the batch size over a
random demand. The simplest possible solution would be producing exactly same
amount of parts at the beginning of each week. This known as lot-for-lot rule which
can be justified in some situations, but in general it forces a lot of setup cost into the
system. The other possible solution can be producing fixed amount of parts each time
the production is performed. This known as fixed order quantity and it is better than
lot-for-lot policy because less setup cost is implemented. Although it is not optimal,
cause considerable cost is forced to the system as carrying parts to next weeks. The
optimal solution is the Wagner-Whitin method and its main approach is determination
of the production batch size while demand is deterministic over the specific time
horizon but it is time-varying in each time period. A continuous time model is not
valid for a time-varying demand, so the demand should breaks into periods of days,
weeks and etc. Depending on each system different schedule might be used from daily
production for a high-volume system and fast changing demand to a monthly
production for a low-volume system and slow changing demand.

2.4.2.2.

FORMULATION

The basic goal is to satisfy the demand with minimal cost including inventory,
holding and production costs. In order to facilitate the problem solving and model
representation following notations are considered:
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•

t: Time period, the range of time periods is t=1,…,T which is the planning
horizon. It is assumed that the intervals are weekly;

•

Dt: Demand rate in week t (in units);

•

ct: Unit production cost in week t excluding setup or inventory costs (in
dollars per unit);

•

At: Fixed setup cost in week t (in dollars);

•

h: Holding cost (in dollars per unit) to carry a part from week t to week
t+1 also can be represented as an annual interest (ir) on money tied up to

•
•

the production h =

ir × c /52;

It: Inventory left over at the end of week t (in units);

Qt: The lot-size or decision variable in week t (in units);

Wagner-Whitin method states that under an optimal lot-sizing policy either the
inventory carried to week t+1 from a previous week will be zero or the production
quantity in week t+1 will be zero.
Z∗ = A
Z ∗ = min

Z(∗

= min

,
*
*

A +h D
Z∗ + A

(8)

produce in week 1
'
produce in week 2

4 12

A + - - ℎ/ 01
13 /3
4 12

∗
+ Z + A + - - ℎ/ 01
135 /3
*
⋮
*
∗
Z(2
+ A(
)
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produce in week 1

(9)
9
*
*

produce in week 28
*
⋮
*
produce in week T7

(10)

By introducing the optimal cost in week t as Z:∗ and optimal last week of

production j∗: , an algorithm would be proposed to find the lot-sizing during different
periods, Equations (8-10).

2.5. PROBABILISTIC INVENTORY MODELS

Previous models assumed that the demand is known in advance but in realistic
situations the demand is uncertain. There are two major approaches to face these kinds
of problems:
•

Model demand deterministically and then modify the solution regarding
the uncertainty;

•

Explicitly take into account the uncertainty into modeling;

Statistical inventory models are not new and they back to Wilson 1934 with two
major parts:
•

Order quantity determination, the amount of inventory that will be
purchased or produced with each replenishment;

•

Reorder point determination, the inventory level at which a replenishment
would be triggered;

Generally three major situations can be considered regarding random demands:
•

Periodic review model, in which we are interested in a single
replenishment and only determining the order quantity, is an issue. The
replenishment occurs periodically and it is known as the Newsvendor
model;
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•

Base stock model, in which the inventory replenished one unit at a time so
the target is to find the reorder point known as base stock level;

•

Continuous review, in which the reorder point r and order quantity Q are
determined during a random demand and parts arrive after a lead-time L

which may cause the stock out situation;

2.5.1. THE NEWSVENDOR MODEL

Consider a situation where there is a sale season. Demand is uncertain and occurs
prior to the sale, the inventory on shelves will be sold and if there is no part the sale
will be lost. Moreover the cost of holding the inventory till next sale is high, so unsold
items will be discounted steeply after the sale.

2.5.1.1.

SOLUTION

An appropriate production quantity would be chosen considering two sets of
information:
•

Anticipated demand;

•

The cost of production too much or too little;

In order to develop a mathematical model, some assumptions are needed
including:
•

Products are separable, there are no interactions between products;

•

Demand is random, it is characterized as a known probability distribution;
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•

Planning for a single period, inventory is not carried to the next period so
the effect of current decision on future situation is negligible;

•

Deliveries are made in advance of demand, all stock is available to meet
demand;

•

Cost of overage and underage are linear, the cost of having too much
inventory or too little is proportional to the amount of overage and
underage;

2.5.1.2.

FORMULATION

In order to facilitate the problem solving and model representation following
notations are used:
•

X: Demand which is a random variable (in units);

•

g(x): Probability density function (PDF) of demand;

•

G(x): Cumulative distribution function (CDF) of demand;

•

µ: Mean demand (in units);

•

σ: Standard deviation of demand (in units);

•
•
•

c= : Cost per unit of overage (in dollars);

c> : Cost per unit of shortage (in dollars);

Q: Production or order quantity or decision variable (in units);

To minimize sum of expected overage and shortage cost, an optimal order
quantity will be chosen which satisfies the critical fractile:
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G Q∗ = Φ A

c>
Q∗ − μ
D=
σ
cE + c>

z=A

Q∗ − μ
D
σ

(11)

(12)

Where (Φ) is the CDF of the standard normal distribution and (z) is the value in
the standard normal table or from the following formula in Excel:
Φ(z) = NORMDIST(z, 0,1, TRUE)

(13)

In general speaking, for Newsvendor models three conclusions can be made:
•

For uncertain demand, the optimal order quantity depends on the demand
probability distribution and costs of overage and shortage;

•

For normal distribution of demand, increase of mean leads to increase in
order quantity;

•

For normal distribution of demand, increasing variability of demand (i.e.
standard deviation of demand) can increase or decrease the order quantity.
If the critical fractile is greater than 0.5, the order quantity increases as the
variability of demand increases. If the critical fractile is less than 0.5, the
order quantity decreases as the variability of demand increases;

2.5.2. THE BASE STOCK MODEL

Consider a situation where there is a store who sells a particular part. Because of
some difficulties like space and delivery seller decides to place an order when one
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single part is sold. But the replenishment takes time so seller needs to carry some parts
in stock. The base stock model discusses about how much should be stocked, when the
space available is limited.

2.5.2.1.

SOLUTION

In order to develop a mathematical model by use of continuous-time framework,
some assumptions are needed including:
•

Products can be analyzed separately - there are no interactions between
products;

•

Demand occurs one at a time - there is no batch order;

•

Unfilled demand is backordered - there are no lost sales;

•

Replenishment lead-times are fixed and known - there is no randomness in
delivery lead-times;

•

Replenishments are ordered one at a time, there is no motivation such as
setup costs or minimum order size for batch replenishments;

•

Demand can be considered following a continuous distribution;

2.5.2.2.

FORMULATION

In order to facilitate the problem solving and model representation following
notations are used:
•

Q: Replenishment lead-time (in days);
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•

X: Demand during replenishment lead-time (in units);

•

g(x): Probability density function (PDF) of demand during replenishment
lead-time;

•

G(x): Cumulative distribution function (CDF) of demand during
replenishment lead-time;

•

ϴ: Mean demand (in units) during lead-time;

•

σ: Standard deviation of demand (in units) during lead-time, for Poisson

•

distributed demand, standard deviation equals to √R;

h: Cost to carry one unit of inventory for one year (in dollars per unit per
year);

•

b: Cost to carry one unit of backorder for one year (in dollars per unit per
year);

•

r: Reorder point (in units), decision variable;

•

R: r+1 inventory position (in units);

•

s: r-ϴ safety stock level (in units);

•

S(r): Fill rate (fraction of orders filled from stock);

•

B(r): Average number of backorders;

•

I(r): Average on-hand inventory level;

In base stock model, the inventory would be monitored and whenever the
inventory level or inventory position drops to the reorder point, the replenishment will

be placed. The optimal reorder point r that minimizes the inventory cost including
holding plus backorder cost is calculated as following:
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G r ∗ + 1 = G R∗ =

b
b+h

(14)

Also, we assume that (G) is normal so this formula has the same fractile structure:
G(R∗ ) = Φ A

R∗ − μ
b
D=
σ
b+h

z=A

R∗ − μ
D
σ

(15)

(16)

In base stock model, service level, backorder level and inventory level are
important and it is possible to determine each level regarding the normally distributed
demand:
•

Service level: G(R∗ ) is the fraction of the demand that can be filled from
stock, so it is called the fill rate and equals to the service level:
S(r) = G(R∗ )

•

(17)

Backorder level: This is a very important component for inventory
control, because it measures the amount of unmet demand and also relates
to the loss function. If (Φ) is the cdf and (T) is the PDF of the standard

normal distribution and (z) is the value in the standard normal table or
from the following formula in Excel:
B(r) = (θ − R)W1 − Φ(z)X + σϕ(z)

(18)

Φ(z) = NORMDIST(z, 0,1, TRUE)

(19)
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ϕ(z) = NORMDIST(z, 0,1, FALSE)

•

(20)

Inventory level: The expected on hand inventory equals to:
I(r) = r + 1 − θ + B(r)

(21)

2.5.3. THE (Q,R) MODEL

When demand for parts is inherently unpredictable (for example it is a function of
machine breakdowns) and the setup cost is significant (means one-at-a-time
replenishment is impractical), the manager should decide both how much inventory to

carry (r) and how many parts to order (Q). The solution for this problem can be
answered by (Q,r) model. Larger values of (Q) results in few replenishment but high

average inventory level, and smaller values results in low average inventory, but a lot
of replenishment per year. A higher reorder point (r) leads to high level of inventory
and low chance of Stock out and vice versa. The replenishment quantity (Q) affects

cycle stock, means holding inventory to avoid extra replenishment, the EOQ approach.
The reorder point (r) affects safety stock, means holding inventory to avoid Stock out,
the base stock model approach. The (Q,r) model is compromising among two models.

2.5.3.1.

SOLUTION

In excess of assumptions for base stock model, we need two assume one of the
following statements:
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•

There is a fixed cost for a replenishment order;

•

There is a constraint on the annual replenishment numbers;

2.5.3.2.

FORMULATION

In order to formulate the problem two different optimization functions can be
used:
•

Min (fixed setup cost + backorder cost + holding cost)

•

Min (fixed setup cost + Stock out cost + holding cost)

Backorder cost assumes a charge per unit time when a customer demand is
unmet, and Stock out cost assumes a fixed charge for each unmet demand. To develop
the model following notations are used:
•
•
•
•

D: Expected demand per year (in units);
l: Replenishment lead-time (in days);

X: Demand during replenishment lead-time (in units);

g(x): Probability density function (PDF) of demand during replenishment
lead-time;

•

G(x): Cumulative distribution function (CDF) of demand during
replenishment lead-time;

•
•

•

ϴ: Dl/365 mean demand (in units) during lead-time;

σ: Standard deviation of demand (in units) during lead-time, for normal
distribution it is √θ;

A: Setup cost per replenishment (in dollars);
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•

c: Unit production cost (in dollars per unit);

•

h: Cost to carry one unit of inventory for one year (in dollars per unit per
year);

•

k: Cost per Stock out (in dollars);

•

b: Cost to carry one unit of backorder for one year (in dollars per unit per
year);

•

Q: Replenishment quantity (in units), decision variable;

•

r: Reorder point (in units), decision variable;

•

s: r-ϴ safety stock level (in units);

•

F(Q,r): Order frequency (replenishment orders per year);

•

S(Q,r): Fill rate (fraction of orders filled from stock);

•

B(Q,r): Average number of backorders;

•

I(Q,r): Average on-hand inventory level;

In (Q,r) model following costs are included in modeling: fixed setup cost, Stock
out cost, backorder cost and holding cost.
As it was mentioned before two different approaches can be used to formulate the
problem:
•

Backorder cost approach: The total cost is the sum of setup, backorder and
inventory carrying and the goal is to make a reasonable balance between
setups, service and inventory. The optimal reorder quantity is calculated
from Equation (2). The optimal reorder point equals to (based on

backorder and holding costs) where Φ and z are calculate from Equation
(13):
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G r∗ = Φ A

b
r∗ − μ
D=
σ
b+h

z=A

•

r∗ − μ
D
σ

(22)

(23)

Stock out cost approach: The total cost is the sum of setup, stock out and
inventory carrying and the goal is to make a reasonable balance between
setups, service and inventory. The optimal reorder quantity is calculated
from Equation (2). The optimal reorder point equals to (based on

backorder and holding costs) where Φ and z are calculate from Equation
(13):

G r∗ = Φ A

r∗ − μ
kD
D=
σ
kD + hQ

z=A

2.5.3.3.

r∗ − μ
D
σ

(24)

(25)

PROPOSED ALGORITHM

The (Q,r) policy has been used in industry and widely studied in the literature
since Hadley and Whitin introduced this method in their classical textbook in 1963.
The classical method as described in previous section, optimize the inventory cost
based on the use of EOQ and base stock model to evaluate reorder point and lot-size.
However this method does not determine the optimal policy that minimizes the
inventory cost. In order to check the error of the classical method a simulation is
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designed. We assume that demand arrives as a Poisson process and arises on a unit-byunit basis. Due to use of simulation, a decision tree of the (Q,r) policy for different
values of the Q and r has been implemented and the surface of the inventory cost

is graphed. The inventory cost is convex and the result of the simulation proves that
the classical method is not able to determine the actual minimum inventory cost
(Figure 2).

Figure 2: Inventory cost vs. Q & r - D=100, A=15, h=30, b=100, L=365
Classical method: Q=10, r=15 Cost=404.3 & Optimal solution: Q=14, r=9 Cost=320.7

A new algorithm is proposed to determine the optimal reorder point and lot-size
which optimizes the cost of inventory. The suggested method is an iterative analytical
method that uses curve fitting. The inventory cost which is the sum of setup and
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purchase order cost, backorder cost, and inventory carrying cost can be written into a
mathematical formulation:
EWC Q, r X = A

D
+ bB Q, r + hI Q, r
Q

(26)

According to (Zipkin, 2000), I(Q,r) can be written as:

I(Q, r) =

Q+1
+ r − λL + B(Q, r)
2

(27)

The loss function B(r) which represents the average backorder level in a base
stock model with reorder point r, can be computed as following:
d

B(r) = - `x − (r + 1)bf(x)
e3fg

(28)

The loss function B(Q,r) for the (Q,r) model as the average of the backorder

levels of the base stock model for reorder points from (r) to (r + Q − 1):
fgh2

1
B(Q, r) =
- B(x)
Q
e3f

(29)

Now we can rewrite the cost function as Equation 30:
fgh2

D
1
EWC(Q, r)X = A + b i Q
Q

d

- `y − (x + 1)bf(y)l

e3f k3eg

fgh2

Q+1
1
+hi
+ r − λL +
2
Q

d

- `y − (x + 1)bf(y)l

e3f k3eg

(30)
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The optimal (Q,r) are the values that minimize the expected cost function. In

other words differentiating E[C(Q,r)] with respect to Q and r will determine the

optimal lot-size and reorder point.

∂EWC Q, r X
= 0 → Q∗
∂Q
∂EWC(Q, r)X
= 0 → r∗
∂r

(31)

(32)

As we can see it is difficult to calculate the derivatives analytically:

−

AD b + h ∂B(Q, r)
h
−
A
D+ =0
Q
Q
∂Q
2
(b + h)

∂B(Q, r)
+h=0
∂r

(33)

(34)

It is sometimes difficult to use exact expressions in optimizations, so various
approximation methods have been offered. In an approximation method, Zipkin
approximated B(Q,r) with the base stock backorder B(r) as Equation (18). This

simplification relaxes the (∂B(Q, r))/ ∂Q term in Equation (33). In other words, the

optimal order quantity simply is derived from Equation (2). Now, treating (Q) as a
continuous variable and replacing B(Q,r) with B(r) in Equation (34) provides the
optimal re-order point from the base stock model formulation Equations (14-16).
In our proposed algorithm, in order to solve the optimization problem without
approximation we introduce the following method:
1. Calculate Q∗o = p

qr
s

;
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2. For a given Q∗ = Q∗o Graph B(Q∗ ,r) for different values of r or generate the
trend of B(Q∗ ,r) versus r;
fgh2

1
Q

d

- `y − x + 1 b

e3f k3eg

e2tu λL
y!

k

∀ r ∈ W0, ∞

3. Fit a curve to the B(Q∗ ,r) and generate the curve fitted function fz ;
fz = Polyfit r, B Q, r ∴ fz r

4. Solve b + h

}~•
}f

(35)

(36)

+ h = 0 for r that determines ro∗ ;

∗
X < EWC Q∗o , ro∗ X stop;
5. Calculate EWC Q∗o , ro∗ X, if EWC Q∗o2 , ro2

6. Q∗o =Q∗o +1 and i=i+1 go back to 2;

In this section we prepare a sensitivity analysis on the cost function based on
variation of D, b, h, L, A and compare the result of our algorithm with the result of the
classical method which is shown as `x ` b.
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Table 1: Sensitivity analysis based on variation of annual demand (D)
D

Q`

r`

cost`

Q

r

cost

14

4

3

167.5

5

0

118.6

50

8

8

289.5

9

4

226.7

100

10

15

404.3

14

9

320.7

150

13

22

498

16

15

392.6

200

15

29

580.4

19

20

453.4

800
700
600
500
400

Zipkin

300

New Algorithm

200
100
0
14

50

100

150

200

300

Table 2: Sensitivity analysis based on variation of backorder cost (b)
b

Q`

r`

cost`

Q

r

cost

100

4

3

167.5

5

0

118.6

500

4

4

197.6

5

2

161

1000

4

5

226.5

4

3

180.3

5000

4

6

256.5

4

4

213.7

10000

4

7

286

4

4

231.6

300
280
260
240
220
200

Zipkin

180

New Algorithm

160
140
120
100
100

500

1000

5000

41

10000

Table 3: Sensitivity analysis based on variation of holding cost (h)
h

Q`

r`

cost`

Q

r

cost

15

6

4

121.8

6

1

87.8

25

5

3

150.2

6

0

110.3

30

4

3

167.5

5

0

118.6

50

3

3

236.5

4

0

146.5

80

3

2

263.5

4

0

180.8

270

220
Zipkin

170

New Algorithm
120

70
15

25

30

50

80

Table 4: Sensitivity analysis based on variation of lead-time (L)
L

Q`

r`

cost`

Q

r

cost

10

4

1

146.2

4

0

118.3

30

4

2

154.5

4

0

114.4

45

4

3

167.5

5

0

118.6

55

4

4

185.4

5

1

124.4

75

4

5

193.1

5

1

132.5

200
190
180
170
160
150

Zipkin

140

New Algorithm

130
120
110
100
10

30

45

55

42

75

Table 5: Sensitivity analysis based on variation of setup cost (A)
A

Q`

r`

cost`

Q

r

cost

5

3

3

123.9

3

1

86.3

15

4

3

167.5

5

0

118.6

20

5

3

185.7

6

0

132.1

30

6

3

214.4

6

0

155.4

40

7

3

239.2

7

0

175.8

250
230
210
190
170

Zipkin

150

New Algorithm

130
110
90
70
5

15

20

30

40

According to (Federgruen & Zheng, 1992) for a period of 30 years there has been
no efficient algorithm for calculating the determination of an optimal (Q,r) policy. In
the following we compare the result of our proposed algorithm for the continuous
review (Q,r) policy with Federgruen policy, as the most reliable algorithm, and
compare the results with the Monte Carlo simulation for the long time horizon (5000
years).
Table 6: Comparison of Federgruen Alg, Proposed Alg. and Simulation - D=50, L=1, h=10, b=25
Proposed Algorithm
A

Q

r

cost

1

7

51

5

12

49

25

23

100
1000

Federgruen Algorithm
Q

r

cost

96.15

7

50

116.1

12

48

44

171.1

23

40

38

289.3

120

15

852.5

Simulation
Q

r

95.46

7

50

95.56

115.3

12

48

115.58

44

171.1

23

44

171.24

40

38

289.3

40

38

289.48

120

15

852.5

120

15

852.24
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cost

Table 7: Comparison of Federgruen Alg, Proposed Alg. and Simulation - D=50, L=1, h=10, b=100
Proposed Algorithm

Federgruen Algorithm

Simulation

A

Q

r

cost

Q

r

cost

Q

r

cost

1

5

58

143

7

56

142

7

56

142.79

5

11

55

165.3

12

54

165.2

11

55

165.23

25

20

52

227.4

20

52

227.4

20

52

227.39

100

36

49

357.7

37

48

357.8

36

49

357.77

1000

107

40

978.5

107

40

978.5

107

40

978.44

Table 8: Comparison of Federgruen Alg, Proposed Alg. and Simulation - D=50, L=1, h=25, b=25
Proposed Algorithm
A

Q

r

1

6

46

5

11

44

cost

Federgruen Algorithm
Q

r

153

6

46

177.2

11

44

cost

Simulation
Q

r

cost

153

6

46

153.44

177.2

11

44

177.49

25

19

40

245.5

19

40

245.5

19

40

245.09

100

31

34

394.8

31

34

394.8

31

34

394.87

1000

91

4

1131.8

91

4

1131.8

91

4

1131.77

The results of our sensitivity analysis that are provided in Tables 1-5 state that the
classical method is not able to determine the minimum inventory cost and there is a
considerable difference between the optimal inventory solution and the classical
solution. However, our algorithm is able to provide the optimal re-order point and
order quantity that leads to the minimum inventory cost.
The comparisons of our new algorithm, Federgruen algorithm and the simulation
that are depicted in Tables 6-8 shows a general consistency of the optimal policy and
minimum inventory cost in two methods and simulation. There are some cases that the
suggested values for Q and r by algorithms are different from each other, but
comparison of the results with the simulation declares that the error is less than 0.5%
which is negligible.
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2.6. SPARE PARTS MANAGEMENT

In this chapter we have reviewed inventory systems with the aim of developing
spare parts inventory models. In order to achieve this goal, we need to consider spare
parts characteristics from the managerial point of view.
Spare parts management looks for achieving the original products (parent
products e.g. machines, equipment and etc.) availability at an optimum cost. The
downtime of parent products is expensive and prohibited from the point of view of
customers and non-availability of spare parts mostly contributes to 50% of the total
downtime cost. Also, the cost of spare parts contributes to more than 50% of the total
maintenance cost in most industries. Therefore, there is a paradox to complain about
non-availability of the spare parts in contrast with increasing the locked up investment
to stock spare parts to reach high level of availability.
The unique problem that deals with spare parts management is the element of
uncertainty. This uncertainty comes from when a spare part is required or when a
product fails and once it fails what is the quantity of parts required for replacement. It
is a fact that the failure of a component is unpredictable so demand for spare parts is
uncertain. On the other hand, most of the time demand for spare parts is low and spare
parts are considered as slow moving items. This leads to low level of availability of
the parts in the market and usually high lead-time of spare parts supply especially
when the complexity of parts is high. Furthermore, the number and variety of spare
parts are high (for a medium scale engineering industry can be around 15000 parts and
for a large scale industry may be around 100000 parts), and the rate of consumption of
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spare parts for some parts are high and for some parts are low. For example in a case
study for a system, over 80% of the cumulative annual demand was concentrated in
about 8% of the items and over 50% of items contributes to less than 1% of the
cumulative annual demand. In automotive industry it is common that the number of
demands per dealer per year is less than one unit for some parts. Even for items with
more than 20000 units demanded annually, considerable fraction of dealers demand
the items less than one on average per year.
Regarding aforementioned characteristics for spare parts, a good inventory
control policy should determine the ordering procedure and optimal level of inventory
to provision spare parts in a right time with efficient cost. Under these circumstances
suggested inventory control policies should factor in unpredictable demand for spare
parts known as intermittent demand, considerable lead-time to supply parts and variety
of parts. Based on these considerations suggested inventory models for spare parts
management can be divided into two groups:
1. Negligible setup cost:
•

Newsvendor inventory policy;

•

Order-up-to level inventory policy;

2. Non-negligible setup cost:
•

Two parameters policies such as (Q,r) policy;

•

EOQ based inventory policies;
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CHAPTER 3

3. REVIEW OF LITERATURE

3.1. INTRODUCTION

The spare part business is defined as the purchasing, warehousing, selling and
delivering of spare parts to customers. Extended activities including customer services
and handling warranty issues are also included within the definition of the spare part
business (Suomala, Sievänen, & Paranko, 2002). Spare parts, for many companies
producing durable products, is the most profitable function of the corporation (Wagner
& Lindemann, 2008).

WAREHOUSING

PURCHASING

SELLING

DELIVERING

Figure 3: Spare parts business activities

Despite absence of reliable data, it is acknowledged that the spare parts business
is very profitable. It is believed that spare parts contribute to one-third of the net sales
and two-third of the profits (Suomala et al., 2002). Spare parts only contributes to 10%
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of the global sales but can contribute to more than 50% of the net income for an
average industrial company (Noeuvéglise & Chevenement, 2011).
Aftermarkets in industries such as automobiles, white goods, industrial
machinery, and information technology have become four to five times larger than the
original equipment businesses. In 2001, GM earned more profit from 9 billion US
dollars sales in after-sales revenue than 150 billion US dollars income of car sales (M.
A. Cohen et al., 2006). In 2005, the supply of aftermarket parts (that covers everything
from replacement toner cartridges to engines of cruise ships) was a 400 billion US
dollar business and recently this amount has reached to 700 billion US dollar (T.
Gallagher, Mitchke, & Rogers, 2005). In 2006, the sale of spare parts and after-sales
services in the United States was at 8% of annual gross domestic product (GDP), that
means American costumers spent about 1 trillion US dollars annually on assets they
already own (M. A. Cohen et al., 2006). In 2010, according to Rolls-Royce group
annual report, Rolls-Royce engine-maker generated more than half of its revenue
(more than 5.5 billion British pounds) from service activities.
The share of a company’s spare parts revenue is an indicator to show the
importance of the spare parts business. In a case study for different firms, on average
companies generate 13.3% of their revenues from the sale of spare parts (Wagner &
Lindemann, 2008). In automotive industry, the profit margins of spare parts sales are
three to four times higher than the margins in car sales. Some firms sell their primary
products (i.e. machines) with the price close to the production cost with goal of
attracting future demands for spare parts (Dennis & Kambil, 2003).
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After-sale services are high-margin business, and they are considered as a huge
portion of corporations profits. The profit of spare parts for manufacturing and
engineering-driven firms including after-sale services is significant. It contributes to
about 25% of all revenue, although it is 40% to 50% of all profits (Dennis & Kambil,
2003).
In spite of profitability of spare parts business, it is very challenging and
expensive to handle spare parts inventory and customer satisfaction. In recent years
the value and share of the spare parts inventory in manufacturing companies has
increased significantly. Few years ago the value of the spare parts inventory for a
manufacturing company was about 2 to 10 million US dollars, but now it is about 5 to
15 million US dollars, which shows a significant increase on spare parts inventory
investment.

$2-10 MILLION
$5-15 MILLION

Figure 4: The value of the spare parts inventory for a typical manufacturing company

In aircraft industry for instance, the supply of spare parts for Boeing airplanes is a
7 billion US dollars per year business with more than 2000 suppliers. For another
instance, TNT post group uses more than 3 million square feet of warehouse space to
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handle 120,000 tons of shipments and 34.6 million orders per year for Fiat spare parts
in Europe and South America (Parker, 1999). However, it has to be mentioned that the
maturation of technologies such as the Internet, WIFI, RFID, etc. have made it easier
to track products over their life cycle, and have allowed product and component
replacements to be planned strategically instead of mostly on an as-needed or
emergency basis.
Furthermore, there are constant challenges between original equipment
manufacturers (OEM) and market players or competitors called will-fitters. The lowercost producers attack the profit of aftermarkets. Risks of after-market business for
OEM can be listed as following:
•

Buying non-OEM and used parts;

•

Refurbishing instead of replacing parts;

Traditional OEM remedies, which are discounting the price of original parts and
recovering lost profits by selling parts and services at higher margin, does not work
efficiently anymore. Although, OEMs still have some advantages, according to (T.
Gallagher et al., 2005) advantages of OEM compared to lower-cost producers are:
•

Stronger relationship with customers;

•

Better distribution system;

•

Deeper engineering resources;

•

Advanced technical support;

•

Superior quality assurance;

On average, OEMs carry 10% of their annual sales as spare parts. Most of OEMs
do not get the best out of those assets because most of the time their people and
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facilities are idle, and inventory turns is once or twice per year that means about 23%
of their parts become obsolete yearly (M. A. Cohen et al., 2006).
The major problem of the OEMs to support service parts is the high risk of
obsolescence and sudden increase of the prices. After the final phase of a product
production, demand for parts decreases dramatically, which increases the price of the
production even more than 300% (R. H. Teunter & Klein Haneveld, 2002). Spare parts
are usually manufactured along with the parent product and the OEM keeps the stock
of spares for replacement during warranty, post warranty and after sale services.
Availability of the spare parts during the product life cycle; the time span before the
end-of-production and the period between end-of-production and end-of-service is a
major factor to keep OEMs competitive in the market. For instance, in the automotive
market in Germany, the life cycle of the product is 15 years which is a long time to
stock spare parts (Inderfurth & Mukherjee, 2008).
In spite of the aftermarket’s obvious benefits, most organizations waste its
potential. Companies should use systematic approaches to increase their benefits in the
aftermarket business and this is possible by focusing on three following strategies (M.
A. Cohen et al., 2006):
•

Improve after-sales service quality levels;

•

Reduce investment in service assets;

•

Cut operating costs;

In previous survey paper in 2001 by (Kennedy, Wayne Patterson, & Fredendall,
2002) the spare parts management has been studied specifically in case of
maintenance policies, where spare parts as repairable parts are being used to maintain
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equipment in working condition. To perform the study, the authors conducted a
literature review based on the intermittent property of the spare parts demand and its
effects on proposed inventory management policies. Also, the role of the modern
technologies like Internet in tracking parts in supply chain is being notified as an
important factor to improve the material and information flow in the supply chain
management via faster and more up to date communication between customers,
retailers and manufacturers.
Spare parts or service parts are distinguished in three control situations including
(Botter & Fortuin, 2000):
•

Service parts to maintain own (production) facilities and systems;

•

Service parts to service (professional) systems installed at customer sites;

•

Service parts to repair consumer products at service workshops;

Service parts can be divided into two categories:
•

Repairable parts: Service parts that are repairable (both technically and
economically). When failure happens, failed parts are replaced with a new
part and sent to repair facility.

•

Consumables: Service parts that are not repairable (both technically and
economically). When failure happens, failed parts are replaced with a new
part and scrapped.

In this literature review, first, the importance of the spare parts business is
studied, then a review is provided to show related techniques and policies which are
applied in spare parts inventory systems. In order to set up the review, the literature
review is organized in such a way that in the beginning the inventory control policies
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are introduced. Then the perspective of uniqueness of spare parts on the inventory
management is illustrated that makes them to be distinguished from finished good
products or work in progress products. Next, spare parts clustering and demand are
studied and forecasting methods are reviewed. The use of Game Theory for inventory
systems planning is studied. Also spare parts pricing as a strategic method to increase
the profit of the suppliers is evaluated.

3.2. SPARE PARTS INVENTORY MANAGEMENT

Spare part inventory management is considered as a special case of general
inventory management with special characteristics, especially high-variety, lowvolume demand and high risk of obsolescence. The main goal is to achieve adequate
service level with minimum inventory investment and operating costs. Despite the
importance of the spare parts business, the previous literature on spare parts
management is limited.
There are some literature reviews including spare parts and maintenance models
(Kennedy et al., 2002, Nahmias, 1981, Pierskalla & Voelker, 1976) (José Roberto do
Regoa, 2011) that discussed about the maintenance inventories, the maintenance
policies including procure, inspect, and repair or replace units for stochastically failing
equipment, and finally demand forecasting and inventory control decisions on the
different life cycle Stages of spare parts.
In general categorizing, spare parts management can be divided into two major
groups:
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•

Planning and operational aspects (the determination of optimum spare
parts level) consists of demand forecasting, service levels and inventory
levels.

•

Strategic and organizational aspect consists of outsourcing, locations,
channels

of

distributions,

supply

chain

type,

information

and

communication technologies.
The need for spare parts arises when a component fails and must be replaced. The
failure rate is not deterministic and it has a link to the quality of maintenance. This, in
turn, causes an unpredictable demand for spare parts. Maintenance for each machine
can be categorized into preventive and corrective groups. From a spare parts
manufacturer’s perspective, preventive maintenance can result in periodic but
stochastic demand. On the other hand demand for corrective maintenance is
deterministic under the assumption that only one failure can occur at any instant of
time, but stochastic in the time of arrival. Therefore, in both cases the nature of
demand

is

intermittent

and

forecasting

methods

can

OVERSTOCKING

EXPENSIVE
INVENTORY

UNDER-STOCKING

POOR
CUSTOMER
SATISFACTION

predict

Figure 5: Stocking levels impact on inventory management
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demands.

In this manner stocking level affects cost and liability of the suppliers. Overstocking leads to expensive inventory planning and even obsolete inventory while
under-stocking contributes to poor customer satisfaction. The body of literature in the
field of planning is adequately extensive, while there have been few studies in the field
of strategic and organizational matters including logistic system design and strategic
concepts which lead to a service-to-profit supply chain (Wagner & Lindemann, 2008).
In order to determine the optimal level of inventory, different inventory
management concepts have been developed that can be clustered according to their
complexity as follows:
1. Simple repair shops: (Scudder, 1984) improved scheduling rules and spares
stocking policies for a repair shop supporting multi-item repairable inventory system.
2. Multi-hub systems: (Wong, Cattrysse, & Van Oudheusden, 2005) presented a
model for determining spare parts stocking level. This method applied for a singleitem, multi-hub, multi-company, repairable inventory system to minimize total system
cost. The total system cost is defined as the combination of inventory holding,
downtime and transshipment costs.
3. Closed-loop supply chains: The goal is to study the return of products as a
source of spare parts. The integration of product returns into business operations using
information management, and its implication for the IBM company has been
investigated by (Fleischmann, Van Nunen, & Gräve, 2003). (Spengler & Schrӧter,
2003) integrated production and recovery systems which benefits from an Internetbased information technology. The communication platform uses the system dynamics
to evaluate spare-parts demand for the Agfa-Gevaert and Electrocycling GmbH.
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4. Multi-echelon supply chains: Spare parts optimization as a part of
Maintenance, Repair and Operation materials (MRO) needs an integrated approach
that removes noise factors. Noise factors can be listed as the following:
•

Bad coding;

•

Lack of classification;

•

Poor network practices including uncoupled warehouses and poor relation
with suppliers;

•

Poor data integrity known as non-centralized and non-real time data;

The multi-echelon technique for recoverable item control can be used to model
the inventory and it has been tried for two realistic systems including a subway system
and a mobile telephone company in Venezuela (Diaz, 2003).
Case studies on supply chain management for spare parts have been investigated
in different industries such as:
•

The computer industry (Ashayeri, Heuts, Jansen, & Szczerba, 1996),
(Thonemann, Brown, & Hausman, 2002);

•

The airline industry (Tedone, 1989);

•

The metal industry (Suomala et al., 2002);

•

The electronics industry (M. Cohen, Kamesam, Kleindorfer, Lee, &
Tekerian, 1990);

•

Power generation (Bailey & Helms, 2007);

•

The military (Rustenburg, van Houtum, & Zijm, 2001);

Decision-making in strategy and design level focused on logistic systems, which
is a long term procedure.
56

Spare parts maintenance has four major characteristics including:
1. Criticality: The criticality of a part is related to the critical consequences of the
part failure on the whole process. Generally the criticality can be estimated by
evaluating the down time costs of the process.
2. Specificity: Spare parts can be grouped into two major sets of standard parts
which have widely usage, so there are several suppliers that provide them and specific
parts which have low volume demand, so suppliers are reluctant to stock them and
their availability is not good.
3. Demand pattern: This includes the demand size and its predictability. Demand
volume for spare parts is usually low and irregular. Predictability is related to the
failure process and can be estimated by statistical means. Parts can be grouped into
two categories of parts with random failures and parts with predictable wear patterns.
4. Value of parts: High value parts are not intended for stock holding and low
value parts have to be managed for an effective replenishment arrangement to
decrease the administrative costs of ordering.
Decision-making in level of design and strategy focuses on the effect of the
mentioned factors on logistic elements including (Huiskonen, 2001):
•

Network structure: Determines the number of echelons and their locations
in the supply chain.

•

Positioning of materials: Defines how to position materials in the network.

•

Responsibility of control: Discusses about cooperation and risk pooling
among the suppliers.

•

Control principles: Manage the material flow.
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Also there is an emphasis to consider the whole supply chain including complex
mix of materials, information and service labor in analysis. This analysis increases the
coalition among different parties at planning Stages (Dennis & Kambil, 2003).
Inventory control management can be classified into general parts and spare parts.
General parts usually have high and independent demands while spare parts have
intermittent demand (Prof. Maurizio Faccio, 2010). Since Economic Order Quantity
(EOQ) model, many inventory control policies have been developed for general parts
inventory control management. Some classical models can be listed as following:
•

Continuous review (Q,r);

•

Periodic review (T,S);

•

Base stock (B);

In (Q,r) policy, an order size of Q is placed when the inventory level reaches to

r. In (T,S) policy, at every interval time T the inventory is reviewed and replenished to

the level S . Both continuous and periodic models are useful for high and stationary

demands and the difference is that for the continuous review policies the interval time
is variable and the replenishment amount is constant while for the periodic policies it
is reverse. The base stock model is a special case of continuous review model, which

reviews the inventory level and whenever the inventory level drops to B − 1 it

places and order of single unit. This policy is useful for items with low demands,
which are similar to spare parts.

There have been considerable number of studies available for the general parts
inventory management including (Love, 1979), (Silver, Pyke, Peterson, & others,
1998), (Muckstadt, 2004), (Sherbrooke, 2004), (W. J. Hopp & Spearman, 2008).
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One of the first inventory models addressing intermittent demand was introduced
by (Williams, 1982). They considered a model similar to (Q,r) with variable interval
time based on a Gamma distribution. A periodic review model, that determines the
inventory level based on adjusted demand distribution using Bayesian method,
developed by (Popovi’c, 1987). (Aronis, Magou, Dekker, & Tagaras, 2004), (HILL,
1999) introduced a base stock model that determines the stock level based on using
Bayesian model to forecast the demand. An expert inventory management system was
developed by (Petrovic, Petrovic, Senborn, & Vujos̆ evi’c, 1990) that considers
additional subjective aspects for costs, lead-times and demand beyond traditional data.
The distribution of the time between failures is exponential and subjective questions
about reparability, repair time, cost and criticality of components are answered by
users and users will get the lot-size and the expected inventory cost. A continuous
review system (Q,r) is provided by (Jin & Liao, 2009) that minimizes the costs of
purchase, storage, failure, and revision of control parameters during time intervals
which follows an exponential distribution or constant failure rate. A similar model was
developed later, which considers the intervals between failures as a Weibull
distribution (Liao, Wang, Jin, & Repaka, 2008). An inventory control system for spare
parts was proposed by (Lonardo, Anghinolfi, Paolucci, & Tonelli, 2008) that
determines the level of spare parts by minimizing the total storage cost and assuming
the demand as a normal distribution. The solution to this inventory optimization
problem benefits from stochastic linear programming and it is validated by some tests
over real historical data related to the orders and availability of 2704 spare parts in a
period of four years that obtained from an Italian large manufacturing industry.
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A heuristic method to obtain the order point and order level in (s,S) model by
using Markov chains and assuming Poisson demand was developed by (Gomes &
Wanke, 2008). The proposed method is compared with a conventional simulation
showing that the results are the same. In spare parts inventory systems identical parts
can be used in different equipment with different down times. Therefore, demand for
spare parts can be classified into critical and non-critical demand. Based on a case
study for semiconductor equipment, a (r,r,Q) inventory model for spare parts have
been proposed that determines reorder point and reorder quantity according to
criticality of the parts. The reorder point r and the critical level are equal and once the
inventory level drops to the reorder level, new order with size Q will be released and
the remaining stock is reserved for critical demand until the inventory replenished
(Chang, Chou, & Huang, 2005). The critical or non-critical demand is assumed to be
high enough to be modeled as the normal distribution. Service parts stock management
seeks to increase availability of spare parts in the warehouses in right time and place to
satisfy customer demands. Customer satisfaction can be calculated by the first fill rate
value (FFRV). An inventory stock mix optimization problem has been formulated by
(Lonardo et al., 2008) that determines the optimal safety stock levels for the spare
parts that minimizes the total production and inventory costs while satisfying desired
FFRV. There are some theoretical inventory models for spare parts. Among them, the
most investigated policy is the so-called (S-1,S) model, a particular case of (s,S)
models, that assumes that demands arrive as Poisson process (Feeney & Sherbrooke,
1964). When transactions are greater than one, the use of compound-Poisson models
for demand has been proposed (Williams, 1984). These models are difficult to apply
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because they need assumptions to identify compound distribution parameters. In other
words one parameter is needed for exponential distribution inter-arrival times of
demand, and two parameters for the Gamma distribution for the demand size. Two
different (s,Q) inventory models, known as a simple and advanced model, for spare
parts in a confectionary producer production plant have been developed (Strijbosch,
Heuts, & Van der Schoot, 2000). For the simple model it is assumed that demand is
normally distributed over the lead-time and the advanced model utilizes the Gamma
distribution for the demand. In order to find the effective inventory policy for a mail
processing equipment manufacturer that stocks 30,000 distinct parts in a distribution
center, a constrained optimization model with the goal of total inventory investment
minimization subject to constraints on customer services has been developed (Wallace
J Hopp, Spearman, & Zhang, 1997). Because of the size of the problem, the problem
is not tractable to exact analysis and three different heuristic methods have been
proposed to solve the optimization problem. An inventory control policy of a service
part in its final phase for an appliance manufacturer is investigated (R. H. Teunter &
Klein Haneveld, 2002). An order-up-to policy has been suggested that minimizes the
total expected undiscounted costs of replenishment, inventory holding, backorder and
disposal where demand is considered as a stationary Poisson process.
Three different options are introduced by (Inderfurth & Mukherjee, 2008) to
supply spare parts during the product life cycle between end-of-production and end-ofservice. First, setting up a large order with the final lot of production, second, setting
up extra production runs, and third, implementing remanufacturing to manufacture
spare parts from used parts. The authors solved the problem by proposing Decision
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Tree, Dynamic Programming procedure and a heuristic method to find the optimal
combination of three options. In a case study for controlling spare parts inventory
level of an electronic equipment manufacturer, the optimal parameter S of an (S-1,S)
inventory system is calculated by applying a Bayesian approach to forecast demands
(Aronis et al., 2004). A heuristic method, which has close relation to the Greedy
heuristic, based on duality theory, is developed by (Morris A Cohen, Kleindorfer, &
Lee, 1989) that determine base stock policies for various spare parts in a facility that
stocks various parts for set of products. As far as the usage of equipment is changing
over time, it will result in intermittent demand for spare parts that fluctuate with time.
Therefore, demand could be considered as a non-stationary Poisson process and an
inventory policy similar to (S-1,S) inventory system has been proposed by (Bian, Guo,
Yang, & Wang, 2013). Demands for spare parts for items which are no longer
manufactured could be assumed as a Poisson process with failure rate that is
decreasing exponentially. A dynamic programming formulation is developed by (Hill,
Omar, & Smith, 1999) that determines replenishment policy which minimizes the total
discounted setup cost, production cost, inventory holding cost and backorder cost over
the time horizon. Inventory pooling known as lateral transshipments and direct
deliveries can help companies to maintain high service levels with low cost. This
strategy provides an inventory system which is insensitive to the lead-time distribution
(Alfredsson & Verrijdt, 1999). The low cost information sharing and possible quick
delivery of items with reasonable cost are two major factors that affect inventory
management. The sharing and transshipment of items most of the times reduces
overall cost of inventory systems (Grahovac & Chakravarty, 2001).
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Figure 6: Inventory management crucial factors

Common ownerships that have reliable and precise information can benefit from
pooling. For instance, a centralized inventory system that deals with several stores
with common ownership can benefit a lot from the cooperation among different stores
and retailers. In this situation cost allocation among the stores can be studied via three
criteria of stability, justifiability and computability (B. C. Hartman & Dror, 1996).
Real-life spare parts network can benefit from lateral transshipment. A partial
pooling system is developed by (Kranenburg & Van Houtum, 2009) that determines
base stock level and lateral transshipment for warehouses by exploiting a heuristic
procedure. The advantage of pooling in the area of repairable spare parts with lateral
transshipment has been investigated broadly by (Lee, 1987), (Axsäter, 1990),
(Sherbrooke, 1992), (Alfredsson & Verrijdt, 1999), (Grahovac & Chakravarty, 2001),
(Kukreja, Schmidt, & Miller, 2001), (Kukreja et al., 2001, Wong et al., 2005, Wong,
Oudheusden, & Cattrysse, 2007).
Among reviewed literatures, we can list following inventory control policies that
have been widely used in spare parts management field:
1. Order-up-to level policy (Aronis et al., 2004, Ashayeri et al., 1996, Bian et
al., 2013, M. A. Cohen & Lee, 1990, Feeney & Sherbrooke, 1964,
Fleischmann et al., 2003, Gomes & Wanke, 2008, Hill et al., 1999,
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Inderfurth & Mukherjee, 2008, F. Karsten, Slikker, & van Houtum, 2012,
FJP Karsten, Slikker, & van Houtum, 2009, Lonardo et al., 2008,
Rustenburg et al., 2001, Scudder, 1984, Tedone, 1989, R. H. Teunter &
Klein Haneveld, 2002, Thonemann et al., 2002).
2. Two parameters inventory policy (Q,r) (Chang et al., 2005, Gerchak &
Gupta, 1991, Bruce C Hartman, 1994, Jin & Liao, 2009, Liao et al., 2008,
Williams, 1982).
3. Newsvendor policy (Dror & Hartman, 2010, Bruce C Hartman, Dror, &
Shaked, 2000, Inderfurth & Mukherjee, 2008, Montrucchio & Scarsini,
2007, Müller, Scarsini, & Shaked, 2002, Q. Wang, 1991).
4. EOQ based policies (Dror & Hartman, 2010, Guardiola, Meca, & Puerto,
2009, W Heuvel & van den P, 2007, Wilco van den Heuvel, Borm, &
Hamers, 2007, S. X. Li, Huang, & Ashley, 1996, Q. Wang, 1991, Whitin,
1955).

(Q,r)
20%

Newsvendor
17%

EOQ
17%

Order-up-to
level
46%

Figure 7: The usage frequency of inventory control policies in spare parts related literatures
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3.3. SPARE PARTS VS. GENERAL PARTS

Spare parts are being used to maintain or repair the final products or equipment
which basically deals with high level of inventory investment and customer
satisfaction. Different factors make spare parts inventories different from other types
of inventories. The main factors are customers’ satisfaction, variety of different parts
and low demands that makes spare parts become unique.
The following factors affect the uniqueness of spare parts significantly (M. A.
Cohen & Lee, 1990), (M. A. Cohen, Zheng, & Agrawal, 1997), (Muckstadt, 2004),
(Kumar, 2004), (José Roberto do Regoa, 2011):
•

Delays in repairing;

•

Spare parts demand which mostly is intermittent;

•

High risk of obsolescence due to complexity of products and their life
cycles;

DELAY IN REPAIRING

UNIQUENESS OF
SPARE PARTS
INTERMITTENT
DEMAND

OBSOLESCENCE

Figure 8: Spare parts uniqueness criteria

As long as spare parts inventories are not intermediate or final products, the
policies that govern their inventories are not the same as work in progress (WIP) and
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finished goods (FG) (Kennedy et al., 2002). This difference significantly caused by
two following factors: first, their functions are different. It means, WIP exists to
smooth production rate and FG exists as a source of product to be delivered to the
customer, but spare parts exist for maintenance to keep equipment in working
condition. Second, inventory policies are different because WIP and FG rates can be
changed to adjust the production rate but the level of spare parts depends on the use of
machineries and the quality of maintenance.
Therefore demands for spare parts depend on the maintenance policy. There are
two types of maintenance policies, scheduled or preventive and unplanned repair. For
the first situation, demands are predictable but for the latter, they are unpredictable.
Meanwhile, usually the cost of stock-outs is significant so the safety stock is necessary
and the amount of stock pile can be determined according to the following
categorization (Kennedy et al., 2002):
•

Maintenance functions;

•

Management issues;

•

Age-based replacement;

•

Multi-echelon problems;

•

Obsolescence;

•

Repairable parts;

•

Special applications;

Maintenance functions are useful to give solutions to calculate optimal re-order
point and quantity of the orders. In other words, these deal with when to place an
order, how many units to be ordered while making decision between reducing the
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costs and increasing the availability (Mamer & Smith, 1982), (Seidel, 1983). Also
(Hegde & Karmarkar, 1993) have studied the support costs and system availability
from the customer point of view. In another study, providing spare parts kits based on
the ratio of the expected usage and the cost of having spares at hand is investigated by
(Robert, 1980). Furthermore, the problem of field repair kits which is providing spares
and the tools for the repairing has been studied by (Mamer & Smith, 1982).
Management issues discuss about maintenance inventory very broadly. This
comprehensive discussion starts from non-technical aspects based on (Moore, 1996):
•

Reliability;

•

Capacity objectives;

•

Systematic strategy;

•

And continues to technical aspects including:

•

Control-based forecasting;

•

Maximum likelihood estimation (Foote, 1995);

•

Recursive methods to obtain probability distribution of machine down
times (Gupta & Srinivasa Rao, 1996);

•

Population models to group parts;

•

Optimization models (M. A. Cohen, Kleindorfer, & Lee, 1986), (M. A.
Cohen, Kleindorfer, Lee, & Pyke, 1992), (Haneveld & Teunter, 1997);

•

Categorization techniques such as ABC, fast moving, slow moving and
non-moving (FSN) and vital, essential and desirable (VED) to partition
parts and criticality factor evaluations like analytic hierarchical process
(AHP) (Gajpal, Ganesh, & Rajendran, 1994);
67

Replacement the items at the end of their pre-determined interval is a simple
maintenance policy. The age replacement decision has been investigated for a system
with a single component subjects to a random failure (Michael & Derek, 1996). Also
this decision-making has been tried for extended models with many identical units by
use of the optimal stocking policy. This policy benefits from Barlow-Proschan age
replacement policy that is supported by the optimal (s,S) inventory policy (Zohrul
Kabir & Al-Olayan, 1996).
Multi-echelon problems deal with where to place spare parts. (Muckstadt, 1973)
Introduced the MOD-METRIC system. This system determines the stock level
according to two different factors:
•

Minimizing the expected backorder cost of the end product;

•

Using the average re-supply time for the end product;

Also two-level inventories’ stock level can be minimized by using heuristic
methods (Vrat, 1984). It is a fact that number of stocking policies depends on the
number of the stocking points or levels, so a branch and bound algorithm to find an
optimal policy is useful (M. A. Cohen et al., 1986, 1992). In field service management
the goal is to find a proper way to prioritize customers. In order to achieve this goal,
multi-echelon problems can be implemented where a closed queuing network model is
used to balance the high service rate to the customers while minimizing the cost of
holding down the spare parts (Papadopoulos, 1996). The influence of the limited
repair capacity on multi-echelon repairable item inventory systems has been studied
by (Diaz & Fu, 1997) that considers different repair distributions where demand for
spare parts are generated as Poisson or compound Poisson distribution.
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The repair distributions are as the following:
•

Single-class exponential: Single server with exponentially distributed
service time.

•

Single-class general: Single server with service time that is governed by
some general distribution.

•

Multi-class general: Multi servers with service time that is governed by
some general distribution.

However, the authors recommended that using the double binomial negative
distribution improves the accuracy of their model.
In order to determine the lower and upper bounds, multi-location and multiperiod inventory systems have been studied. The lower bound determination is based
on Lagrangean decomposition and an upper bound is based on dual relaxation
(Karmarkar, 1981).
Spare parts are retained in inventory as an insurance against the machine
downtimes because downtimes are expensive and processing the spares from suppliers
can be very time consuming. Obsolescence is a problem for parts that are used rarely.
The obsolescence cost is usually considered as a part of inventory holding cost and
specifically contributes to those types of spares known as insurance which have a
high probability of not being used during the system lifetime (Karmarkar, 1981,
Kennedy et al., 2002). The effects of obsolescence are studied in an EOQ model which
states that ignoring the cost of being obsolete as small as 20% would lead to an
average increase of 15% in the inventory cost (Cobbaert & Van Oudheusden, 1996).
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The ability to repair failed parts and enter them to the inventory system can be
examined via repairable items. The demand for the serviceable stock can be analyzed
with two different Poisson processes, one for repairable items and the other for nonrepairable items (Allen & D’Esopo, 1968). Ready rate as a fraction of time that the
customer back orders are zero can be used instead of expected backorder. The problem
of inventory allocation among main assembly and sub-assemblies can be solved by
using three methods (Silver, 1972):
•

Dynamic programming;

•

Marginal allocation (maximizing the ready rate);

•

Lagrange multipliers;

Backward dynamic programming with a joint probability density function for
both the demand and return can be used to calculate the optimum repair level,
purchase level and scrap-down-to level (Simpson, 1978). A queuing analysis is
implementable for the repairable inventory of a repair depot. The system service is
calculated by availability, which is the probability that the spare inventory is not
empty (Gross & Ince, 1978). The optimal level of inventory for repairable spare parts
can be studied subject to budget constraints (Kohlas & Pasquier, 1981).
The main problem of spare parts inventory and sales is that they have low level of
inventory turnover which is commonly about one to two times per year. This low rate
leads to an obsolescence of 23% of the whole inventory (G. P. Cachon & Netessine,
2006). The obsolete parts are no longer can be sold which tides up with high cost of
holding and warehouse. (Van Jaarsveld & Dekker, 2011) analyzed obsolescence of
service parts in a practical environment. The authors proposed a method to estimate
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the risk of obsolescence of service parts using the behavior of identical parts in the
past.
Spare parts management for some sort of special cases has been studied by
different researchers. These special problems consist of some rare conditions which
can be listed as the following:
•

Regular and emergency orderings, spare parts are ordered at regular
intervals and kept for emergency failurs (Kaio & Osaki, 1981);

•

Effects of job lateness on the optimum repair parts, providing repair kits
based on cyclic queue without the assumption of high availability of parts
(Gross & Ince, 1978);

•

Random number of parts, where the number of parts to be replaced is a
random variable (Bruggeman & Van Dierdonck, 1985);

•

Replenishment at the ends of phases, where parts are replace based on
time-based maintenance (Vujossevi’c, Petrovi’c, & Senborn, 1990);

•

Spare parts management for equipment with scheduled non-continuous
usage, where systems of equipment are used on a periodic scheduled basis
instead of continuous usage (Bridgman & Mount-Campbell, 1993);

3.4. SPARE PARTS CLUSTERING AND DEMAND

Optimization problem related to inventory management includes consideration of
inventory costs, and service level by selecting inventory control parameters, allocating
control resources and purchasing decisions. For this purpose, item classification is
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very useful. Classification of spare parts is an essential part of the inventory
management because it affects the methods of the demand forecasting and inventory
control policy (Huiskonen, 2001) (Boylan, Syntetos, & Karakostas, 2006).
Spare parts for industrial maintenance can be classified by Vital, Essential and
Desirable (VED) (Gajpal et al., 1994) whereas consumer goods are classified in
Pareto’s graph with categories of high, medium and low values (ABC) (Silver et al.,
1998).
In another classification, spare parts are categorized into three categories of
intermittent, slow moving and smooth by (Williams, 1982). His work has been
resumed by (Eaves & Kingsman, 2004) and categorized in more details into smooth,
irregular, slow moving, slightly intermittent and highly intermittent. The effective
classification can simplify and optimize the inventory policy. For instance, (R. Q.
Zhang, Hopp, & Supatgiat, 2001) by using a modified ABC classification reduced the
cost of inventory by 30%.
The most commonly used classification method is the ABC classification which
is useful where materials are fairly homogenous and differ from each other by unit
price or demand volume. However, the ABC classification is a one-dimensional
method that is not suitable for control policies with several factors. In this case, multidimensional classifications are useful. (Duchessi, Tayi, & Levy, 1988) introduced a
two-dimensional classification method which combines inventory cost and part
criticality as a criteria. (Flores & Whybark, 1987) introduced a multiple-criteria
classification method. (M. Cohen et al., 1990) used a general grouping method.
(Petrovi’c & Petrovi’c, 1992) developed a heuristic classification model based on
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several factors like availability of the system, essentiality, price, weight, the volume of
the part, availability of the parts in the market, and the efficiency of repair. (Gajpal et
al., 1994) improved the criticality analysis of the spare parts in the classification by
using the analytic hierarchy process (AHP).
The life cycle of the spare parts is affected by finished goods life cycle. Their life
cycle can be divided into three phases of initial, normal or repetitive and final
(Fortuin, 1980). Therefore, the demand for spare parts depends on finished goods, and
following factors would affect it (Fortuin & Martin, 1999):
•

Size and age of the final products (sales, running fleet, installation base,
etc.);

•

Products maintenance characteristics (preventive, corrective, etc.);

•

Parts characteristics and their defects (wear, accident, aging, etc.);

Demand for spare parts is volatile and unpredictable, so demand forecasting and
inventory management is very challenging (W. Wang & Syntetos, 2011). Demand for
spare parts arrives in irregular time intervals and with variable quantities. This
characteristic can be evaluated by two following factors (Prof. Maurizio Faccio,
2010):
1) ADI - average inter-demand interval: average interval between two
demands of the spare part;
2) CV - coefficient of variation: standard deviation of the demand divided by
the average demand;
According to changes in values of ADI and CV, four typologies could be
assumed (Ghobbar & Friend, 2003):
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•Slow Moving

•Intermittent

0

ADI=1.3

CV=0.49
•Erratic

•Lumpy

Figure 9 Patterns for the characterization of the spare parts demand

•

Slow moving or smooth: They have low rotation rate (ADI=0 & CV=0);

•

Intermittent: They have sporadic demand, which means there are a lot of
period without demands but variability of the demand quantity is low
(ADI=1.32 & CV=0);

•

Erratic: The variability of the demand quantity is high but the interval
time periods are constantly distributed (ADI=0 & CV=0.49);

•

Lumpy: They have high variability in both demand quantity and interval
times (ADI=1.32 & CV=0.49);

However, two additional factors should also be factored in this categorization,
which are cost and criticality. The cost of purchase and maintenance and the criticality
based on the risk of not completing a process that is assigned to equipment, are
classified into low, moderate and high (Ben-Daya, Duffuaa, & Raouf, 2000). Spare
parts demand is mostly intermittent or lumpy which means it occurs after a long
variable periods without demand. The lack of parts leads to high losses, and demand
forecasting can decrease the loss. The demand forecasting is necessary for inventory
control and planning, although it has some errors (Love, 1979). Many forecasting
methods as uncertainty reduction methods have been devised that may perform well
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when CV is low, but they perform poorly when demand is lumpy or intermittent.
Lumpy demand for spare parts has been observed in different industries such as the
automotive industry, durable goods spare parts in aircraft maintenance, and
telecommunication systems. A classical reference for demand forecasting has been
provided by (Wheelwright & Hyndman, 1998) and a related literature review has been
provided by (Boylan et al., 2006) for last fifty years. According to (Prof. Maurizio
Faccio, 2010), many different forecasting methods have been introduced in literatures
such as Single Exponential Smoothing method (SES), Croston’s method (CR),
Syntetos-Boylan Aproximation (SBA), Moving Average method (MA), Weighted
Moving Average method (WMA), Additive Winter method (AW), Multiplicative
Winter method (MW), Bootstrap method (BT), Autoregressive and Moving Average
methods (AMA), Poisson method (PM), Binomial method (BM), Grey Prediction
method (GM) and Neural Networks (NN).

SES, 6
NN, 10

BM, 1

GM, 2

PM, 1

CR, 13

AMA, 4

BT, 4
SBA, 8
MW, 4
AW, 5

MA, 3
WMA, 2

Figure 10: The usage frequency of forecasting methods in spare parts related literatures
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One item which is important for the demand forecasting is the determination of
the time bucket. The shorter time bucket results in a more intermittent demand.
Several comparisons have been performed to select proper time buckets. It can be
monthly (Eaves & Kingsman, 2004) (R. Teunter & Duncan, 2008) or weekly
(Ghobbar & Friend, 2003) and even daily (Gutierrez, Solis, & Mukhopadhyay, 2008)
and the issue of choosing the time bucket has not been discussed in the literature.
Methods used to forecast the demand and the optimal inventory level are
determined using mathematical and operations research methods (Aronis et al., 2004).
One of the most accurate methods for forecasting is the Single Demand Approach
(SDA), which computes mean and variance of the demand during lead-time by use of
three random variables. (Krever, Wunderink, Dekker, & Schorr, 2005) listed these
random variables as follows:
1. Amounts demanded during lead-time;
2. Time intervals between demands
3. Lead-time;
Classical methods of demand forecasting like exponential smoothing are being
used frequently for routine stock control systems which have large number of
products. But for low demand items with intermittent demands, they are erroneous that
result in an excessive inventory right after the demand occurs and lower before the
demand occurs, but can be modified by separating estimation of intervals (Croston,
1972). A proposed correction (A. A. Syntetos & Boylan, 2001) is known as the
Syntetos-Boylan Approximation (SBA) method. Several case studies have been done
to establish the superiority of the SBA, Croston and double exponential smoothing
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techniques (Eaves & Kingsman, 2004, Ghobbar & Friend, 2003). Moreover, other
more complicated models have been developed for the demand forecasting including;
bootstrapping technique together with autocorrelation (Willemain, Smart, & Schwarz,
2004), bootstrapping with regression analysis (Hua, Zhang, Yang, & Tan, 2006),
neural networks (Gutierrez et al., 2008) and Enhanced Fuzzy Neural Network (EFNN)
method which uses the fuzzy logic method together with the Analytical Hierarchical
Process (AHP) and Genetic Algorithm (GA) (S. Li & Kuo, 2008). Some inventory
models known as reactive (Santoro, Freire, & others, 2008) do not use directly
demand forecasting, and even for those models, a medium-term demand forecast is
needed.
Demands for spare parts can also be more and more uncertain. The main reasons
that cause this uncertainty are categorized into two groups of quick changes in
customer’s preferences (for example in fashion industry demand for a specific color
changes dramatically from time to time) and the structure of the supply chain (that
means by moving to higher levels of supply chain the pattern of the demand will be
more uncertain). This effect or phenomenon is known as Bullwip effect and several
factors like erroneous demand forecast, long lead-times, supply shortage and backlog,
price variations, etc. cause this effect (Inger, Braithwaite, & Christopher, 1995, Lee,
Padmanabhan, & Whang, 1997). One of the most important forms of the demand
variability is the simultaneous increase of the inventory level and decrease of the
customer services, the supply chain management of a system with similar
characteristic which has multi-echelons has been investigated by (Kalchschmidt,
Zotteri, & Verganti, 2003). Spare parts demand is intermittent, also called lumpy,
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sporadic and erratic. It is characterized by infrequent demands, often of variable size
with irregular intervals. Hence, researchers prefer to model demand from two
perspectives, i.e. the demand size and inter-arrival times (Aris A Syntetos, Babai, &
Altay, 2012). In this situation, the use of compound theoretical distributions that
factors in the size-interval combination is very appealing. If time is considered as a
discrete variable, demand arrives as a Bernoulli process with geometric inter-arrival
distribution. If time is considered as a continuous variable, demand arrives as a
Poisson process with exponential inter-arrival distribution. In order to model demand
for spare parts various distributions have been used to represent time intervals and
demand size. Most commonly used distributions in literatures are listed as follows:
•

The compound Poisson distribution which is a combination of a Poisson
distribution for demand occurrence and a geometric distribution for
demand size, known as Stuttering Poisson (D. J. Gallagher, 1969), (Ward,
1978), (Watson, 1987);

•

The combination of a Poisson distribution for demand occurrence and a
normal distribution for demand sizes (Vereecke & Verstraeten, 1994);

•

The combination of a Poisson distribution for demand occurrence and a
logarithmic distribution for demand sizes, known as Poisson-Logarithmic
process that yields a negative binomial distribution (NBD) (Quenouille,
1949);

•

The gamma distribution as the continuous analogue of the NBD which
covers wide range of distribution shapes (Burgin, 1975), (Burgin & Wild,
1967), (Johnston, 1980);
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•

The combination of a Bernoulli process for demand occurrence and a
Logarithmic-Poisson distribution for demand sizes, known as log-zeroPoisson (Kwan, 1991);

•

The combination of a Bernoulli process for demand occurrence and a
normal distribution for demand sizes(Croston, 1972), (Croston, 1974);

•

The Poisson distribution with unit-sized transactions (Silver et al., 1998),
(Friend, 1960);

3.5. INVENTORY SYSTEMS AND GAME THEORY

The first application of Game Theory, cooperative and non-cooperative games
goes back to (Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1953). Supply chain management has
both cooperative and non-cooperative interactions between different agents, and the
cooperative games in supply chain management are called inventory games.
Cooperative games can be categorized into deterministic and stochastic games that
(Dror & Hartman, 2010) studied through EOQ and Newsvendor policies respectively.
The EOQ model is designed for multi-item orders and known as the joint
replenishment game. The latter game is based on classic-Newsvendor policy and
known as the Newsvendor centralization game. Both of them have infinite repetition
and used for single-Stage and stationary problems.
The application of the Game Theory in production and inventory management
can be divided into two groups; players determine the condition of the market and
market equilibrium can be found by studying players’ interactions, and another group
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which consists of individual players who compete against each other; decision makers
find the optimal decisions under these conditions (Q. Wang, 1991). The author first
studied the application of static games in management science, then investigated the
discount game (both quantity and price discount) in the buyer-seller environment.
Results showed that quantity discount is always better for the seller. The rest of the
research focuses on Newsboy game for substitutable parts with stochastic demand and
in the end the market of repeated purchasing products is compared to the market of
consumer durable products.
In first category, the presented models look for the market equilibria and
investigate the existence, uniqueness and stability of the equilibrium and do not pay
attention to the optimal decisions for players. This method is called Oligopolist theory
and reviewed by (M. Shubik, 1981, 1984, 2006, M. Shubik & Levitan, 1980).
In the second category, the primary goal of the models is to find an optimal
decision of the players and (Parlar, 1988) started working on this theory by
considering two retailers who sell substitutable products with random demand, and
their goal is to order an optimal number of parts to maximize their profits.
A recent literature review has been provided by (Dror & Hartman, 2010) that
reviews the implementation of the cooperative games in inventory management.
Similarly another survey is provided by (Fiestras-Janeiro, Garcia-Jurado, Meca, &
Mosquera, 2011). According to the literature reviews, there are four different game
setups:
•

Players face deterministic demands and use economic order quantity
policies;
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•

Players face stochastic demands and utilize single-order Newsvendor
policies;

•

Players face stochastic demands and use continuous review settings
including penalty costs;

•

Players face stochastic demands with different methods of game setup
regarding spare parts application including infinite-horizon games, Erlang
loss formula and queuing systems;

Supply chain management and inventory management can benefit from Game
Theory. In general, Game Theory can improve or clarify interactions between different
groups who are competing against each other. Cooperative and non-cooperative games
are used to model several supply chains with single and multi-period settings
(Chinchuluun, Karakitsiou, & Mavrommati, 2008), (G. P. Cachon & Netessine, 2006,
Leng & Parlar, 2005). Game Theory is a useful tool to study supply chains, it can be
used for decision-making where there are conflicts between multiple entities. The
application of the Game Theory in supply chain management was first reviewed by
(G. P. Cachon & Netessine, 2006, Gerard P Cachon, 2003) in which the authors
focused on different Game theoretical methods. (Meca & Timmer, 2007) reviewed the
application of the cooperative Game Theory to supply chain management. In another
survey paper by (Gerard P Cachon, 2003, Leng & Parlar, 2005), a review based on
classification of supply chain topics has been provided. Also, (Gerard P Cachon, 2003)
presented the literature review on supply chain collaboration with contracts.
According to (Leng & Parlar, 2005) numbers of studies related to supply chain and
Game Theory have been doubled in last decade compared to previous decades.
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For instance, the Game Theory has been used to analyze detailed supply chains
(G. P. Cachon & Netessine, 2006) where cooperative and non-cooperative games are
used to solve static and dynamic games. The existence of the equilibrium in noncooperative games has been studied. Generally, extensive games have not been
considered for supply chain games and only normal forms have been considered.
In order to investigate distribution systems where supplier has finite or infinite
capacity (Dai, Chao, Fang, & Nuttle, 2005) Game Theory can also be useful. In this
case a single period game between one supplier and two retailers is considered.
Inventory control decisions can be made by retailers using Game Theory which
depends on the existence of the Nash equilibrium. When the pure strategy could not be
found, the Stackelberg method is implemented to find the optimal strategy in form of
the leader-follower game. Also, supply chain management and inventory management
for substitutable products with stochastic demand have been investigated (Avsar &
Baykal-Gürsoy, 2002). An extensive survey for supply chain games has been done by
(G. P. Cachon & Netessine, 2006) which basically looks for existence and uniqueness
of the equilibrium in non-cooperative games, however they developed different gametheoretical techniques to study four types of games including:
•

Non-cooperative static games;

•

Dynamic games;

•

Cooperative games;

•

Signaling, screening and Bayesian games;

The goal of supply chain management is higher benefits, lower costs and better
service quality and Game Theory is an effective tool to achieve this goal. In another
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review by (Leng & Parlar, 2005) supply chain games have been investigated in five
areas:
1. Inventory games with fixed unit purchase cost (including games with
horizontal and vertical competition among players, usually as a single
period game).
2. Inventory games with quantity discounts (where the buyer as a player has
an interest to increase the number of purchase quantity to benefit from
lower unit price).
3. Production and pricing competition (efficiency of the supply chain
depends on the production and pricing decisions where production
equilibrium can be found by using Game Theory and Cournot method
involving capacity decisions, service quality, product quality, and
advertising).
4. Games with specific joint decisions on inventory (where each player
should make two or more decisions at the same time).
One of the first studies of the buyer-seller interaction in supply chain was
published by (Whitin, 1955). They examined a monopolistic market position with
respect to the seller and discussed about the inventory level by using EOQ model
where demand was a linear function of price. The assumption of the market as a
monopolistic market compared to competitive market will result in different strategies
and number of research has been done by (Abad, 1988, Cheng, 1990), (Kunreuther &
Richard, 1971), (Susan X Li & Huang, 1995), (Susan X Li, Huang, & Ashley, 1995)
about monopolistic markets. (S. X. Li et al., 1996) studied the buyer-seller relationship
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in the market by constructing cooperative and non-cooperative operations which are
formulated as an EOQ inventory models with a Game Theory framework. In form of
non-cooperative game the seller acts as a leader and buyer is the follower, the
equilibrium of this game is consistent with the result of the EOQ model.
In another scenario, sellers and buyers cooperate to maximize their profits. The
comparison of results reveals that the total payoff and the order quantity are higher in
case of cooperation and the sale price is lower. In other words the quantity discount is
more beneficial in the cooperative game (S. X. Li et al., 1996).
A supplier inventory problem is investigated by assigning two-person Game
Theory solution. The supplier utility function of the game is set up from the side of the
supplier. This game has two players (supplier & customer) that has no dominant
strategy and can be solved as a mixed strategy problem (Mileff & Nehéz, 2006).
Multiple retailers who form a coalition place their joint orders to a single supplier;
this interaction has been studied as a cooperative game which is the economic lotsizing game (X. Chen & Zhang, 2007). This game has a non-empty core when
inventory holding cost and back logging cost have linear functions. This approach is
investigated based on linear programming duality which has an optimal dual solution
that contributes to an allocation as the core. In similar research, an economic lot-sizing
game has been suggested between several retailers with known demand for a limited
period of time who can reduce their cost by placing joint order (Wilco van den Heuvel
et al., 2007).
The contrast between cooperative and non-cooperative games has been
investigated by (Hart & Mas-Colell, 1997) which states that non-cooperative games
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are strategy oriented methods while cooperative games study the outcomes and decide
what is the optimal coalition to get the best payoff and distribute the cost among the
players while satisfying the non-emptiness of the core.
In order to study cooperative games in supply chain management, the literature
can be divided into two categories of deterministic and stochastic including; the
deterministic joint-replenishment game (this game is based on an EOQ model) and the
Newsvendor centralization game (this game basically relies on the classic newsvendor
setting) (Dror & Hartman, 2010).
The EOQ game first represented by (Meca, Timmer, García-Jurado, & Borm,
2004), where the cooperation between different firms is structured and the
proportional division method is used for the cost allocation. The basic inventory model
is introduced and can be extended to more precise model as an inventory model. This
method then followed by (Anily & Haviv, 2007). They considered an infinite-horizon
deterministic problem and showed that this game has non-empty core where optimal
replenishment policy is determined by power-of-two policies. Also, (Dror & Hartman,
2007) studied inventory games and cost allocation while using an EOQ model as an
inventory policy. Similarly (W Heuvel & van den P, 2007) proceed to use this method
for economic lot-size games. This method applied for a model with a fixed time
horizon, known demand for a single item in a situation where backlogging is not
allowed. (Guardiola et al., 2009) used EOQ games for production-inventory games.
Joint replenishment can be addressed by the optimal power-of-two policies, which was
introduced by (Roundy, 1985, 1986) and gives 98% cost effectiveness as the ratio of
the lowest cost to the selected cost.
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To study mentioned problem as a cooperative game, (J. Zhang, 2009) proposed a
general sub-modular setup by use of the Lagrangian dual and strong duality to
guarantee the non-emptiness of the core. In their setup, there is one-warehouse with
multiple retailer inventory models and a joint cost function. Their goal is to find the
best replenishment policy that minimizes the cost during an infinite time horizon.
The (Q,r) games first introduced by (Bruce C Hartman, 1994) were not concave
but it had non-empty core. The proof of having non-empty core for a normally
distributed demand has been investigated by (B. C. Hartman & Dror, 1996). A cost
allocation for a centralized inventory who deals with different stores with in common
ownership is studied. Three major characteristics of the game including stability
(existence of the core), justifiability (logical relation between cost and benefit), and
computability are satisfied during their analysis. (Gerchak & Gupta, 1991) applied a
continuous (Q,r) model for a single-period inventory and proved that the total benefit
is higher in the case of coalition and they applied different methods of allocation
resulting that some stores are not satisfied with the share cost. (Robinson, 1993)
showed that the best cost allocation that Gupta used is not stable and they introduced a
new policy for allocation based on Shapley value which is stable but needs
complicated computations in case of large number of players.
The Newsvendor game that considers different stores with single period demands
for single item has been studied (Bruce C Hartman et al., 2000). There was a
centralized inventory system with holding and penalty cost, the allocation cost defined
by setting a centralized inventory cooperative game which has non-empty core and the
existence of the non-empty core has been examined for demands with normal
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symmetric distribution and joint multi-variate normal distribution (Bruce C Hartman
et al., 2000). Similar studies have been conducted by (Özen, Fransoo, Norde, &
Slikker, 2008) assuming that where there are number of M warehouses and number of
N retailers, the retailers can order single products and after their demands realization
they can change their demand. In this environment the cost allocation between
retailers is investigated as a cooperative Newsvendor game. A similar game has been
presented by (Slikker, Fransoo, & Wouters, 2005) where transshipment among
retailers modeled and the game has non-empty core, means players have incentives for
cooperation. Also there are several studies that show the core of the Newsvendor game
is non-empty (Müller et al., 2002), (Slikker, Fransoo, & Wouters, 2001). (Müller et al.,
2002) proved that the Newsvendor game has non-empty core for all kind of random
demands distribution. (Montrucchio & Scarsini, 2007) examined the Newsvendor
solution for infinite number of retailers of single-item who attend a coalition and
proved the game is balanced and the core exists.
A general framework for the analysis of decentralized distribution centers with
number of N retailer and one or more central locations has been developed. The
demand is stochastic and when demand is unsatisfied the retailer can use excess stocks
at other retailers or central location. A cooperative framework for the sequential
decision-making on inventory, shipping and cost allocation is introduced which has
non-empty core and provide pure strategies based on Nash equilibrium (Anupindi,
Bassok, & Zemel, 2001). In this situation each retailer as an independent agent looks
for his own interest instead of the whole system profit. Cooperation can increase their
benefits but sometimes it conflicts with individual benefits. The game studies possible
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scenarios of cooperation and competition. The solution consists of three different
Stages of cooperation, cooperation-competition hybrid form known as coopetitive
(Anupindi et al., 2001). This solution has been extended by (Granot & Sosic, 2003)
where demand is stochastic for an identical item regarding that there is a three-Stage
decentralized inventory system where in the first Stage before realization of the
demand, each retailer orders his initial inventory level, then after realization decides
on the level of inventory that he wants to share and finally residual inventories are
allocated and transshipped for residual demands and the profit would be allocated.
Inventory centralization is not always beneficial and it can reduce the total
performance. This idea has been studied by (Anupindi & Bassok, 1999) to investigate
a car manufacturer and its two outlets and compromise when it is more beneficial for
the manufacturer to consider outlets as one (centralization) or consider them as
competitive dealers with independent demands. The study investigates the effect of
lost sales in stock-out situation on manufacturer profit. In other words, they look for
what is the effect of market search in cooperative decision-making. Market search is
the percentage of the customers who face unsatisfied order at the local retailer and
search for the product at the other retailer. Studies show that there is a threshold for
the market search and above the specific amount, coalition would result in loss of the
manufacturer or even total less payoff or benefit for the manufacturer and retailers as
the whole system. Generally, decentralized strategy would be more beneficial in case
of the high rate of market search.
In decentralized situation with stochastic demand one can compete first and then
cooperate (Anupindi et al., 2001). It means retailers compete for transshipment while
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there is a non-empty core, then they cooperate and there is a pure Nash equilibrium
and core solution. In industries like oil and gas sector there are several inventory
plants that stock spare parts to support facilities operations. In this condition, risk
pooling and cost allocation by means of centralized inventory solution can lead to
considerable savings considering ordering and holding costs. Game Theory principles
are very beneficial for this allocation. The comparison between centralized and
decentralized inventory of spare parts has been provided showing that centralized
system achieve more savings and five different approaches of cost allocation have
been investigated (Guajardo & Rӧnnqvist, 2012).
The cost allocation in the context of repairable spare parts pooling has been
studied regarding two different situations. First, participants cooperate in pooling
without having any self-interest, and in second situation they participate in the game
with interest of maximizing their benefits. Two strategies of core concept and Nash
equilibrium have been examined to investigate two different problems respectively
(Wong et al., 2007). The results show that in case of cooperation players can increase
their payoffs, also the game with imperfect information is studied which indicates that
having an agreement on downtime cost or service level can boost the required trust
among players to convince them to cooperate (Wong et al., 2007).
When cost of spare parts inventory is high, companies can reduce the cost of their
inventory by pooling their stock parts. This pooling can be defined as a cooperative
cost game which reduces expected joint holding and downtime costs (FJP Karsten et
al., 2009). The suggested non-empty core game is applicable even for the companies
with non-identical demands, base stock levels and downtime costs. To be precise it
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investigates that there is a stable allocation while there is a non-identical demand and
base stock level or there is a non-identical down time cost. When companies have nonidentical downtime costs along with non-identical base stock levels or demand rate, it
is possible to have an empty core game.
The stability of pooling arrangements is the main concern of the cooperation, and
fair distribution of holding and downtime costs among participants have been studied
by setting two different considerations; first for a setting with fixed stocking level and
then for the optimized stock level (F. Karsten et al., 2012). In both cases a stable cost
allocation has been provided which is equivalent to the result of the Erlang loss
system. Furthermore, some realistic considerations have been considered as
assumptions including; demand with Poisson process, perfect and immediate repair of
failed parts, full pooling, constant repair lead-time, and emergency procedure in case
of stock-out and infinite time horizon regarding the long life time of the machines.
The cost allocation is defined as the core of the game and five different methods
of cost allocations have been implemented, including; Egalitarian which simply
assigns equal share to each player (Tijs & Driessen, 1986), Proportional to demand
which assigns the cost share for each player based on his demand proportion (Wong et
al., 2007), Altruistic which assigns the cost share for each player based on the
proportion of his stand alone share to the total share while they are all playing alone
(Audy, D’Amours, & Rӧnnqvist, 2012), Shapely value which allocate the cost among
players based on their marginal cost of entering the coalition (Wong et al., 2007), and
Equal Profit Method (EPM) which looks for stable cost allocation with shares of as
similar as possible (EPM) (Frisk, Gӧthe-Lundgren, Jӧrnsten, & Rӧnnqvist, 2010).
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Companies who use complex machines need to stock low-demand expensive
spare parts. Those companies can cooperate with each other to meet their demands.
The cooperation can be practiced by keeping their own stock-points and let the others
to use them through lateral transshipment. A diminished total cost of spare parts
inventory is achievable and the distribution of inventory costs among companies
would be determined by using cooperative Game Theory models (F. Karsten, Slikker,
Houtum, & others, 2006).
A single firm can minimize its spare parts inventory costs by use of proper
inventory management policies. In case of existence of collective firms, the joint
inventory costs could be minimized by means of cooperation. A basic inventory model
with deterministic demands for spare parts has been provided where several shops
place their orders to a supplier in a cooperative manner. The savings of cooperation is
allocated between shops by means of cooperative Game Theory (Meca et al., 2004).
Among reviewed literatures, there are few papers that studied spare parts
inventory systems and Game Theory that can be listed as follows:
•

Repairable parts: (Wong et al., 2007), (Guajardo & Rӧnnqvist, 2012),
(FJP Karsten et al., 2009), (F. Karsten et al., 2012);

•

Consumable parts: (Meca et al., 2004);

•

Stochastic demand: Poisson process (Wong et al., 2007), (Guajardo &
Rӧnnqvist, 2012), (F. Karsten et al., 2012), Poisson process/Erlang (FJP
Karsten et al., 2009);

•

Deterministic demand: (Meca et al., 2004);
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3.6. SPARE PARTS PRICING

In some cases, number of spare parts is much larger than the primary products.
Despite low number of spare parts sale (25% of total revenue for most OEMs), they
stand for considerable portion of the suppliers profits (40-50% of all profits for most
OEMs). In this environment, the price of the parts has more effects on the profit
compared to the amount of sale or reduction in production cost.
It means the price of the parts is a main factor for profits. For instance, a
consumer durable product manufacturer increased its profit by 30% with only 2.5%
average increase of the products or an industrial equipment manufacturer benefits
from 35% increase in its profit by only 3% increasing its price level (Marn & Rosiello,
1992). Also, consistent pricing will result in better customer satisfaction and their
loyalty. The competitiveness of a company can be improved by three major activities,
including decrease of cost of production; increase of the market share; and price
adjustment known as the pricing strategy. In order to achieve a proper pricing strategy
three major fields should be studied including; pricing strategies, pricing
methodologies, and pricing tools. In a study for APL forklift manufacturer three
pricing strategies have been investigated which are cost-based (uses the cost of the
part then adding the standard mark-up value also known as cost-plus or mark-up
pricing), market-based (it is based on the market willingness to buy the product or the
comparison with other competitors prices) and value-based pricing (the customer
decides on the value of the part and based on that, the cost of production and sale can
be adjusted). Eight different methods were used including; spare parts pricing method,
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market adaptation, discount policy, life cycle pricing, kitting, price elasticity and spare
parts competition and spreadsheet were used as a tool (Cullbrand & Levén, 2012).
COMPETITIVENESS
OF A COMPANY
PRICING STRATEGY

MARKET SHARE

PRODUCTION COST

Figure 11: Competitiveness of a company influential factors

Despite the possible profit potential of selling spare parts, companies have
neglected the proper price adjustment. The empirical research on spare parts pricing
shows that only less than 20% of the companies benefit from systematic pricing
strategies (Zinoecker, 2006), (Hinterhuber, 2004). The consolidation of pricing,
production and distribution decisions in manufacturing environment has a potential to
improve supply chain efficiencies. A literature review related to strategies that
combine pricing decisions with production and inventory decisions have been
provided by (Chan, Shen, Simchi-Levi, & Swann, 2004).
An optimal control theory model has been developed by (Kim & Park, 2008) that
studies a company’s strategy to determine spare parts price and warranty issues over
the decision time horizon, i.e. the product’s life cycle plus its end of life service
period.
A market of multiple firms that face price-dependent, stochastic and substitutable
demand has been investigated by (F. Y. Chen, Yan, & Yao, 2004). They proved that
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there is a pure-strategy Nash Equilibrium that determines the joint pricing/inventory
decisions among the firms.
The simultaneous determination of pricing and inventory replenishment for a
single item in the face of an uncertain demand has been developed by (Federgruen &
Heching, 1999). They analyzed a periodic review inventory model in which demands
are stochastic and independent in consecutive periods but dependent on the item’s
price.
Traditionally, OEMs have priced the spare parts based on the upper limit of the
marketplace in which using cost-based pricing method is tempting. This method
causes diminishing revenues and margins, customer dissatisfaction, increased
competition, and lost market shares, because it leads to a lack of understanding the
potential value of the parts (Vigoroso, 2005), (T. Gallagher et al., 2005).
Spare parts consist of thousands of components, so differentiated pricing
strategies can be applied. One possible way of price segmentation is to differentiate
spare parts prices based on the amount of competition. Companies can update their
knowledge about how the spare parts are used and how the competitors enter to the
market through field engineering and customer support. According to this concept,
spare parts are divided into three groups; non-competition, some competition and
heavy competition.
According to (Docters, 2003), the first step in pricing spare parts is creating spare
parts matrix in line with part velocity (is how fast the spare parts move off from the
inventory) and proprietary position (is how unique are the spare parts means they are
inelastic when only one OEM exclusively provides them).
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Figure 12: Spare parts price matrix

Three major methods of spare parts pricing have been suggested by (Vigoroso,
2005). The first method is to categorize spare parts based on complexity and
competition. Intuitively, the spare parts with highest complexity and least competition
can have the highest prices. The second method is the consistency-oriented pricing. In
this method, spare are grouped into part families, and value driver for each family is
defined and based on the value driver a pricing logic is built. As the value driver
increases the prices increase. The third method is to price spare parts in comparison
with a new product. The upper bound for repair of machinery including the labor cost
and spare parts is about 50-70% of the new product’s price.
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CHAPTER 4

4. RENEWAL COST VS. REPLACEMENT COST

4.1. INTRODUCTION

To investigate the profitability of spare parts business, specifically in industries
such as automobiles, white goods, industrial machineries and information technology,
the research comes up with the idea of renewal cost versus the replacement cost. The
replacement cost of a product is defined as the current market price of the product and
the renewal cost of a product is the acquisition cost of spares to completely renew the
product excluding labor costs. Customers purchase products from OEMs and to keep
them in working condition, they replace failure parts with spare parts. The price of
products and its spares are set by OEMs and our research looks for fair or sustainable
spare parts pricing via investigation of replacement and renewal costs. In this chapter,
these costs for some products with specific characteristics as listed below are
calculated, and the ratio between the renewal cost and the replacement cost as a scale
to evaluate the sustainability of the spare parts pricing is determined.
•

High volume products;

•

Products with lots of components;

•

Products with a long lifetime;

One of the best products that can be fit in aforementioned characteristics is the
passenger car. In this chapter, first the procedure of the data acquisition for spare parts
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and costs calculation for two BMW car models (328i & X6) are described. Then the
same procedure is repeated for other similar consumer products and the ratio between
renewal cost and replacement cost are provided.

4.2. REPLACEMENT COSTS

The replacement cost of products is defined as the current market price of the
product. The current prices for each vehicle have been acquired in two conditions.
First the brand new price (replacement cost) and then the used vehicle price. The
prices have been determined based on the KBB website data as listed in Table 9.
Table 9: Vehicles prices
Reference

BMW 328i

BMW X6

KBB Price for used vehicle (average)

$20,169.50

$41,000.00

KBB MSRP Price for new vehicle

$43,995.00

$60,495.00

4.3. DATA ACQUISITION

In order to determine the price of the car and its parts, parts lists are collected
according to the procedure that is explained in detail in the Appendix.

4.4. COST ANALYSIS

After gathering information about parts lists for each vehicle, the price list for
each category or main group of vehicles has been developed. The total price list
determines the renewal cost of each vehicle which is provided in following sections.
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4.4.1. RESULTS PER CATEGORY

The following sections provide an overview of the collected data by dividing all
MGs into four categories which are Powertrain, Chassis, Vehicle Body and Electrical
System.

4.4.1.1.

POWERTRAIN

The vehicle’s powertrain incorporates the engine, fuel system, exhaust system,
transmission system, gearshift, and drive shaft. It consists of 10 MGs, 36 SGs, 77
SSGs, and 1,503 parts for BMW 328i and 10 MGs, 43 SGs, 85 SSGs, and 1635 parts
for BMW X6. The detailed price list is listed in Table 10.
Table 10: Powertrain price list
BMW 328i

BMW X6

Main Group

SGs

SSGs

Parts

Costs

SGs

SSGs

Parts

Costs

ENGINE

9

27

873

$29,602.39

11

27

812

$33,761.14

11

20

141

$5,124.17

9

13

125

$3,908.18

2

4

76

$2,517.79

2

7

157

$5,475.42

FUEL SUPPLY

3

5

125

$2,479.79

3

5

87

$3,086.12

RADIATOR

1

5

69

$2,102.53

1

8

116

$4,077.28

EXHAUST SYSTEM

2

4

115

$6,399.82

3

6

86

$7,843.75

ENGINE AND
TRANSMISSION
SUSPENSION

2

2

32

$514.56

2

2

29

$1,032.65

AUTOMATIC
TRANSMISSION

3

7

44

$10,337.60

4

8

116

$11,060.34

ENGINE
ELECTRICAL
SYSTEM
FUEL
PREPARATION
SYSTEM
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BMW 328i

BMW X6

Main Group

SGs

SSGs

Parts

Costs

SGs

SSGs

Parts

Costs

GEARSHIFT

1

1

2

$201.82

2

2

17

$1,181.57

DRIVE SHAFT

2

2

26

$975.28

2

3

48

$2,301.49

TRANSFER CASE EVEHICLE
TRANSMISSION

0

0

0

0

4

4

42

$4,599.73

Total Results

36

77

1503

$60,255.7

43

85

1635

$78,327.67

4.4.1.2.

CHASSIS

The chassis incorporates the front axle, rear axle, steering system, brakes, and
pedals. It consists of 5 MGs, 28 SGs, 39 SSGs, and 766 parts for BMW 328i and 5
MGs, 32 SGs, 44 SSGs, and 976 parts for BMW X6. The detailed price list is listed in
Table 11.
Table 11: Chassis price list
BMW 328i

BMW X6

Main Group

SGs

SSGs

Parts

Costs

SGs

SSGs

Parts

Costs

FRONT AXLE

2

6

141

$3,980.32

4

9

224

$10,938.62

STEERING

6

9

95

$5,670.65

7

10

128

$14,170.40

REAR AXLE

6

10

246

$8,521.11

7

11

316

$17,395.76

BRAKES

12

12

260

$9,230.76

11

11

288

$10,419.05

PEDALS

2

2

24

$279.93

3

3

20

$404.24

Total Results

28

39

766

$27,682.77

32

44

976

$53,328.07
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VEHICLE BODY

4.4.1.3.

The Vehicle body incorporates the bodywork, exterior, interior, wheels, and other
equipment. It consists of 7 MGs, 40 SGs, 116 SSGs, and 3,233 parts for BMW 328i
and 7 MGs, 43 SGs, 118 SSGs, and 3328 parts for BMW X6. The detailed price list is
listed in Table 12.
Table 12: Vehicle body price list
BMW 328i

BMW X6

Main Group

SGs

SSGs

Parts

Costs

SGs

SSGs

Parts

Costs

WHEELS

4

4

169

$2,842.14

5

6

76

$3,701.63

BODYWORK

10

27

772

$33,081.34

10

21

1161

$93,224.33

VEHICLE TRIM

18

58

1995

$26,805.39

19

63

1648

$51,883.46

SEATS

3

11

130

$12,845.62

3

15

284

$21,875.33

SLIDING ROOF
FOLDING TOP

1

1

50

$1,435.94

2

2

43

$3,057.76

EQUIPMENT PARTS

2

10

44

$484.71

2

7

44

$369.08

RESTRAINT
SYSTEM

2

5

73

$2,430.06

2

4

72

$2,591.88

Total Results

40

116

3233

$79,925.20

43

118

3328

$176,703.47

4.4.1.4.

ELECTRICAL SYSTEM

The vehicle’s electrical system incorporates the vehicle cable harness,
instruments, lighting, heater and air conditioning, audio and communication systems,
sensors and control units. It consists of 7 MGs, 43, SGs, 107 SSGs, and 1,107 parts 7
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MGs, 47 SGs, 133 SSGs, and 1460 parts for BMW X6. The detailed price list is listed
in Table 13.
Table 13: Electrical system price list
BMW 328i
Main Group

BMW X6

SGs

SSGs

Parts

Costs

SGs

SSGs

Parts

Costs

9

62

582

$9,132.70

9

59

526

$13,389.73

1

1

3

$849.32

2

2

8

$2,491.10

LIGHTING

6

8

133

$3,833.83

6

10

246

$6,380.02

HEATER AND AIR
CONDITIONING

13

16

195

$6,388.28

12

16

273

$11,405.76

9

13

132

$4,118.40

12

31

273

$15,291.19

2

4

39

$1,562.86

2

6

103

$2,683.13

COMMUNICATION
SYSTEMS

3

3

23

$1,212.85

4

9

31

$2,011.53

Total Results

43

107

1107

$27,098.24

47

133

1460

$53,652.46

VEHICLE
ELECTRICAL
SYSTEM
INSTRUMENTS,
MEASURING
SYSTEM

AUDIO,
NAVIGATION,
ELECTRONIC
SYSTEMS
DISTANCE
SYSTEMS, CRUISE
CONTROL

4.4.2. TOTAL RESULT

The BMW 328i has 29 MGs, 147 SGs, 339 SSGs, and 6,609 parts, and the total
cost of the parts of $194,961.96 versus BMW X6 which has 30MGs, 165 SGs, 380
SSGs, and 7399 parts, and the total cost of the parts of $362,011.67. In other words,
the renewal cost of each vehicle equals to the total cost of the spare parts that are listed
in Table 14.
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Table 14: Total price list
BMW 328i

BMW X6

Category

MGs

SGs

SSGs

Parts

Costs

MGs

SGs

SSGs

Parts

Costs

Powertrain

10

36

77

1,503

$60,255.75

11

43

85

1,635

$78,327.67

Chassis

5

28

39

766

$27,682.77

5

32

44

976

$53,328.07

Vehicle Body

7

40

116

3,233

$79,925.20

7

43

118

3,328

$176,703.47

Electrical System

7

43

107

1,107

$27,098.24

7

47

133

1,460

$53,652.46

Total

29

147

339

6,609

$194,961.96

30

165

380

7,399

$362,011.67

4.5. DEVELOPMENT OF THE COSTS COMPARISON

Based on this estimate of the renewal cost and replacement cost of the chosen
BMW cars, it is evident that the renewal cost of these products is excessively high.
The comparison of the replacement cost and renewal cost for other types of products
with variety of brands, models, the replacement cost and number of parts helps us to
evaluate the sustainability of spare parts prices. Therefore, in the following more
products are selected for the costs comparison. The chosen products for the study are
among following categories:
•

Passenger cars;

•

Motorcycles;

•

All-train vehicles;

•

Refrigerators;

•

Lawn mowers;
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•

Trimmers and edgers;

•

Lawn tractors;

•

Washers;

In Table 15 the comparison of the replacement cost and renewal cost for different
products are listed:
Table 15: comparison of renewal cost and replacement cost
BRAND
BMW

MODEL

Replacement cost

Renewal cost

Number of parts

X6 35i

$60,495.00

$362,011.00

7,399

328i

$43,995.00

$194,961.00

6,609

Honda

CB1000R

$10,999.00

$42,443.00

2,227

YAMAHA

V star 250

$3,990.00

$19,627.30

1,253

Suzuki

RM-Z250

$7,399.00

$32,996.00

1,271

Honda

TRX90X

$2,999.00

$13,011.00

1,027

GSS20GEWWW

$1,285.90

$5,785.75

240

GTS20ICNCWW

$580.00

$2,589.00

105

SPCM1936

$209.99

$1,016.00

180

NST2018

$59.99

$230.00

51

Craftsman

917272751

$1,614.99

$9,770.00

761

GE

WCVH6800J

$1,027.12

$7,332.50

162

GE

B&D

Figure 13 shows the ratio between renewal cost and replacement cost:

8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0

Figure 13: Ratio between renewal cost and replacement cost
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The results show us the renewal cost of products is high and the ratio between the
renewal cost and the replacement cost follows a certain pattern. The consistency of
this ratio states that most OEMs implement cost-based or mark-up pricing to retrieve
the final price of spare parts. According to (Vigoroso, 2005), cost-based pricing is
popular and most OEMs use this method for spare parts price setting. Despite
popularity of this method, it significant weak points (Hinterhuber, 2008, Kotler &
Armstrong, 2010, Nagle & Holden, 2002, Noble & Gruca, 1999). The main
disadvantages of cost-based pricing are under-pricing and over-pricing that leads to
lower-than-average profitability, and ignoring competitiveness of the parts in the
market. These factors are against the spare parts prices sustainability as a long term
profitability of the OEMs without compromising consumer loyalty and satisfaction.
This issue can be addressed in competition-based pricing or strategic pricing that will
be discussed in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 5

5. SPARE PARTS INVENTORY GAMES

5.1. INTRODUCTION

Supply chain management and inventory management can benefit from Game
Theory. In general, Game Theory can improve or clarify interactions between different
groups who are competing against each other. Cooperative and non-cooperative games
have been used to model supply chains with single and multi-period settings
(Chinchuluun et al., 2008). Game Theory is a useful tool to study supply chains, for it
can be used for decision-making when there are conflicts between multiple entities.
For instance, it has been used to analyze detailed supply chains (G. P. Cachon &
Netessine, 2006) where cooperative and non-cooperative games are used to solve
static and dynamic games. The majority of related studies focus on the existence of the
equilibrium in non-cooperative game.
Game Theory is the logical analysis of situations of conflicts and cooperation,
such situations can be defined as a game in which (Straffin, 1993):
•

There are at least two players;

•

Each player has a number of possible strategies;

•

The strategies chosen by each player determine the outcome of the game;

•

Associated with each possible outcome of the game is a collection of
numerical payoffs, one to each player;
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Game Theory studies how players should play rationally based on set strategies
and try choosing an action that gives them maximum profit. Game Theory is
categorized into non-cooperative and cooperative games. Non-cooperative games use
the notion of equilibrium to determine rational outcomes of the game. Most common
related concepts are Nash Equilibrium, dominant strategy and sub game perfect
equilibrium, which are defined as the following:
•

Nash Equilibrium: chosen strategies by the players are in Nash
Equilibrium if no player can benefit by unilaterally changing his/her
strategy;

•

Dominant strategy: dominant strategy results in the highest payoff no
matter what the strategies of the other players are;

•

Sub game perfect equilibrium: in extensive form, strategies are in the sub
game perfect equilibrium if they constitute a Nash Equilibrium at every
decision point;

In cooperative games, groups of players or all of the players form binding
agreements to make coalitions. In cooperative games, determination of the solution
concept depends on satisfying sets of assumptions known as axioms. The most
common axioms are:
•

Pareto optimality: the total utility allocated to the players must be equal to
the total utility of the game;

•

Individual rationality: the utility of each individual in coalition must be
greater than his utility when playing alone;

•

Kick-back: the allocated utility to each individual must be non-negative;
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•

Monotonicity: the allocated utility to each player should increase when the
overall utility increases;

According to definite assumptions, spare parts inventory games in the form of
normal,

cooperative

and

non-cooperative,

non-zero-sum,

evolutionary,

and

competitive fringes will be investigated. The proposed games will study the OEMs’
decision-making on spare parts pricing strategies, inventory levels, batch productions
and re-manufacturing efforts.

5.2. OEM AGAINST MARKET

5.2.1. INTRODUCTION

Spare parts, for many companies producing durable products, are the most
profitable function of the corporation. The OEM, in a competitive and uncertain
aftermarket, can benefit from Game Theory to manage his spare parts inventory. We
study the spare parts inventory game as an N-person non-zero-sum single-shot game.
Our game is restricted to a two-person (the OEM and the market), non-cooperative
game setup. The market can be considered as an unreasoning entity whose strategic
choices affect the payoff of the OEM, but which has no interest in the outcome of the
game. This is modeled as the game against nature which means the OEM plays against
the market. In our game, the OEM decides on his pricing strategy (in a competition
against will-fitters to absorb more customers) and the order-up-to stock level. The
OEM’s inventory level strategy does not have a dominant level therefore the game has
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a mixed strategy solution. The solution of the mixed strategy determines the optimal
strategy of the OEM to maximize his payoff in the aftermarket business. In other
words, the theory of games in our spare parts inventory problem provides the optimal
pricing strategy and the expected payoff distribution in relation to the expected market
demand, and the OEM chooses his level of inventory with respect to the probability of
the market’s demand.

5.2.2. INVENTORY GAME, OEM AGAINST NATURE

This game investigates spare part inventory problem as an N-person non-zerosum single-shot game. In order to achieve this goal, the problem is restricted in twoperson (the OEM and the market), non-cooperative game setup. The game has been set
up from the OEM viewpoint, which means the solution of the game gives him the
maximum payoff or minimum loss.
It has been assumed that the game is a non-cooperative game and the market is
unkind and chooses hostile strategies. In spare parts stock control literature, it has been
considered that the parts’ failures are random and the Poisson process with constant
failure rate represents spare parts demand. A more realistic modeling assumption
declares that failure rate during the products’ life span varies and it is not constant
over the product life cycle and post product life cycle. This consideration justifies the
non-stationary Poisson demand process assumption for spare parts. The OEM knows
the demands for spare parts arrive as a non-stationary Poisson process, but he is not
aware of the exact distribution of the failure intensity factors and can only forecast the
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bounds of the intensity factors. Also, the sale price changed by the OEM in
comparison to the will-fitters sale prices has an influence on the demand intensity
factors which is estimated by the OEM.
We consider the market as an unreasoning entity whose strategic choices affect
the payoff of the manufacturers, but which has no interest in the outcome of the game.
The aforementioned characteristic of the market enables us to consider the spare parts
inventory game as a game against nature. Literature related to this includes:
(Chinchuluun et al., 2008, Dror & Hartman, 2010, Meca et al., 2004, Mileff & Nehéz,
2006), but none of the research discussed the application of the game against nature in
the spare parts inventory management. One of the recent study related to the
application of the game against nature in the strategic decision-making is provided by
(Beckenkamp, 2008). The author discussed the psychological aspect of decisionmaking in games against nature where the selected strategies improve the effects of
Minimax-strategies in the cases of risk-aversion. In our study we model the spare parts
inventory management as a game against nature which means the OEM competes with
will-fitters on the sale prices, at the same time playing against the market to optimize
spare part inventory levels.

5.2.3. THE MARKET DEMAND

Spare parts demand is intermittent or lumpy which means it often occurs after a
long variable period without any demand. The lack of parts leads to high losses for
suppliers, and demand forecasting methods can decrease the loss. Demand forecasting
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is very important, although it has some errors (Love, 1979). (Wheelwright &
Hyndman, 1998) introduced a classical method for demand forecasting and (Boylan et
al., 2006) has provided a related literature review covering forecasting over the last
fifty years.
In our inventory game we assume that the OEM has limited information about the
market’s expected demand. The OEM knows that demands for spare parts arrive as a
non-stationary Poisson process with varying failure rates or intensity factors, but the
exact distribution of these factors over the time is not observed and only the upper and
lower bounds of the intensity factors are forecasted.
In the aftermarket business, other than the OEM as an original manufacturer,
there are other low cost manufacturers, known as will-fitters, who can manufacture the
same parts and deliver them to the market. Based on the sale price of the
manufacturers, the total demand for the spare parts will be allocated among suppliers.
In other words, manufacturers compete with each other on their sale prices to absorb
more customers, so the sale price is a decision variable for the OEM to optimize his
payoff in the aftermarket.
Original parts may face failure because of defects and aging, and once they fail,
demands for spare parts will arise. Due to the intermittent and slow moving
characteristics of spare parts demand, we consider the demand for spare parts as a

Poisson process. A Poisson process with an intensity factor or rate of λ is a

stochastic process in which the inter-arrival time distribution is exponential with mean

time of μ = 1/λ and the arrival distribution is Poisson with the rate of λ . If λ is

constant over time, the process is a stationary Poisson process and when λ changes
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over time, the process is a non-stationary Poisson process. In the case of spare parts
management, the rate of demand depends on three factors: quality, usage and
maintenance, which are not constant over time. Intuitively, we can assume that the
demands are a non-stationary Poisson process in which the demand rate is a function
of time λ t .

In this study, we assume that the OEM introduces a new product to the market

and he wants to forecast demands for spare parts in the next future. The OEM
considers that there are two major phases of the original parts failure: the initial phase
(introduction phase) and the repetitive phase (growth, maturity and decline phase).
Figure 14 graphs products in the market and demand for the spare parts during the
product life span for automotive electronics industry (Inderfurth & Mukherjee, 2008).

Figure 14: Demand for spare parts distribution during product life span
Modified from (Inderfurth & Mukherjee, 2008)
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Demands for spare parts arrive as a non-stationary Poisson process with two
levels of intensity factors:
•

Upper bound or `λ•‚‚ƒf b: The repetitive phase of the original parts

consists of the period right before the end of the original production and
post product life cycle as the repetitive support, which has higher failure
intensity;
•

Lower bound or λ„=…ƒf : The initial phase of the original parts consists of
the period right after the introduction of the original products to the
market as the initial support, which has lower failure intensity;

Regarding the competition among the OEM and will-fitters based on the sale
prices, and the demand intensity factors, the following parameters are known by the
OEM which is listed in Table 16:
Table 16: The market demand
†‡

Variable spare part sale price

ˆ‰ŠŠ‹Œ

Upper bound demand rate

ˆ•Ž•‹Œ

Lower bound demand rate

5.2.4. THE OEM COST FUNCTION

The OEM strategies are determination of the sale price and the spare parts stock
level in the order-up-to level inventory. The payoff of the OEM is the profit of the
OEM K z which is the difference between the cost of production and inventory K ‘

and the revenue K ’ which attained by selling spare parts. Let X be a random
variable and Pr{X=x} determines the probability that the random variable X takes on

a specific value x from some unspecified probability distribution. The expected
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value or mean of the random variable X is equal to E[X] that is calculated in
Equation (37):

d

EWXX = - x Pr{X = x}
e3

(37)

As it was mentioned in the last section, we assume that the demand arrives as a
Poisson process. The Poisson distribution is given by Equation (38):

p x =

λT e e2t(
x!

(38)

Where the mean E[X], from Equation (37) is found to be λT . It is assumed that

λ is the average annual demand for spare parts or the intensity factor and T is the

average lead-time measured in years. The origin of the single-item inventory theory is

a queuing theorem of Palm’s (Sherbrooke, 2004). If the demand for an item is a

Poisson process with an intensity factor of λ and if the lead-time for each failed unit
is independently and identically distributed according to any distribution with mean

T years, then the steady-state probability distribution of the number of failure units

in the lead-time has a Poisson distribution with mean λT . The most common
inventory policy for low demand, high cost repairable items is the order-up-to level

policy that is a one-for-one policy with a stock level of S and re-order point of
S−1 .

There are two principal measures of item performance (i) the fill rate which is the

percentage of demands that can be met at the time they are placed, and (ii) the
backorders which is the number of unfilled demands that exist at a point in time. The
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expected fill rate and number of backorders are non-negative quantities, and they are
calculated as Equations (39) and (40). Moreover, the expected number of parts in
inventory is derived as Equation (41).
Expected fill rate:
–2

EFR S = - Pr{X = x}
e3E

(39)

Expected backorder:
d

EBO S = - x − S Pr{X = x}
e3–g

(40)

Expected inventory:
–

EI S = - S − x Pr{X = x}
e3E

(41)

The goal is to reach a low level of the backorder or a high level of fill rate with
minimum investment on inventory. We must calculate the cost of production and
inventory, as well as the revenue from selling the products. Equation (42) gives us the
cost of production and inventory:
K‘ = c‚ × S + p × EBO S + h × EI S

(42)

Equation (43) gives us the revenue of selling products:
K’ = c> × D × EFR S
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(43)

Equation (44) gives us the OEM payoff:
K z = K’ − K ‘

(44)

As we can see the cost of production and inventory and the revenue of selling
products are functions of the sale price and inventory levels, which are the strategic
actions of the OEM. Moreover there are different parameters that affect the cost of
production and inventory. The parameters in Equation (42) and (43) are listed in Table
17.
Table 17: Cost of production and inventory parameters
—

Notation

Parameter definition

˜

Demand (in units per period)

†™
™

Spare parts inventory level (in units)
Variable cost of production (in dollars per unit)

š

†‡

Penalty cost (in dollars per unit per period)
Holding cost (in dollars per unit per period)
Sale price (in dollars per unit)

5.2.5. THE GAME SETUP

Game Theory is applied to determine the sale price and the spare part stock level
for an OEM who manufactures single-item spare parts, keeps them in inventory with
order-up-to level inventory policy and sells them to the market. The game is set up
between the OEM and the market and the solution of the game maximizes the profit of
the OEM in the buyer-seller environment. The game has been set up from the OEMs
perspective, which means the solution of the game gives him the maximum payoff or
minimum loss. In order to achieve this goal, the problem is restricted to a two-person,
non-cooperative game setup. Players choose their strategies simultaneously and the
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game is a static game that can be modeled and solved by finding the Nash
Equilibrium. This configuration requires the following assumptions:
•

Players play simultaneously;

•

The OEM possesses the information of the original parts failure rates and
can predict the allocated demand rates including: the upper bound

intensity factor `λ•‚‚ƒf b and the lower bound intensity factor λ„=…ƒf with

respect to his selected sale price;
•

The market as a nature has two choices of Poisson process demand types
with upper and lower bounds intensity factors;

•

•

•

The probability that the market plays with lower bound demand is › or
P Market r•žŸ

¡

;

Respectively the probability that the market plays with upper bound
demand would be 1 − › ;

The OEM has several strategies which are order-up-to inventory levels (as
discrete numbers) that varies from 1 to N;

The game setup can be shown in strategic or matrix form. Table 18 gives us the
information of the game setup in the matrix form. This matrix known as the payoff
matrix and the value of each cell is the payoff the OEM:
Table 18: The payoff matrix of inventory game
Market (Nature)
Dlower

Dupper

KB(S1,Dlower)

KB(S1,Dupper)

OEM

Order-up-to level
S1
…

…

…

SN

KB(SN,Dlower)

KB(SN,Dupper)
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Regarding the probability of market decision-making P Market r•žŸ

¡

, the

expected utility of the OEM will be calculated from Equation (45):

EX OEM o = P Market r•žŸ ¡ × U OEM o , Market r•žŸ ¡ + P Market r¢££ ¡
× U OEM o , Market r¢££ ¡ i: order − up − to levels = 1, … , N

(45)

Equation (46) tells us that the total probability of market decision-makings equals
to 1.
P Market r•žŸ

¡

+ P Market r¢££

¡

=1

(46)

The investigation of the payoff matrix declares there is no dominant strategy in
this game that leads to lack of a pure strategy. Therefore, the game has a mixed
strategy solution, which depends on the probability of the market’s demand.

5.2.6. THE MIXED STRATEGY SOLUTION

In Game Theory, a game has a mixed strategy solution where a player has to
choose his/her strategies over available sets of available actions randomly. A mixed
strategy is a probability distribution that assigns to each available action a likelihood
of being selected. In 1950, John Nash proved that each game (with a finite number of
players and actions) has at least one equilibrium point known as Nash Equilibrium.
This saddle point exists whenever there is a dominant strategy. In this game this can
be explained based on the OEM payoff matrix where there is a specific level of
inventory for the OEM that satisfies Equation (47). In case of existence of this specific
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level of inventory, the selected inventory level would be the dominant strategy for the
OEM:
K z so∗ , D„=…ƒf > K z `so , D•‚‚ƒf b

§Kz `so∗ , D•‚‚ƒf b > K z `so , D•‚‚ƒf bª
∀ so & i

(47)

In the decision-making problem, since there is no dominant level of inventory the
OEM is making a choice between different alternatives. If the payoff for each
alternative is known, the decision is made under certainty. If not, the decision is made
under uncertainty. The major solution for decisions under uncertainty and risks are
expected utility (EU) and subjective expected utility (SEU). Given a choice of an
action and different possible payoffs in nature, SEU is calculated by multiplying the
payoff for each option by the subjective probabilities. The decision maker chooses an
action with the highest expected utility. The subjective expected utility (SEU)
determines the inventory level for the OEM.

5.2.7. NUMERICAL STUDY

In order to demonstrate the decision-making of the OEM based on the implication
of the game against nature and the mixed strategy solution, we consider a single-item
spare part inventory game. The sample parameters of our spare parts management
system are listed in Table 19. Also we assume that the average lead-time T equals to 1.
Table 19: Parameters of the sample spare part inventory
—

Notation

Dlower: ˆ•Ž•‹Œ & Dupper: ˆ‰ŠŠ‹Œ

Parameter value
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—

Dlower: ˆ•Ž•‹Œ & Dupper: ˆ‰ŠŠ‹Œ

™

40

Notation
˜

†™
š

†‡

Parameter value

Decision variables (1 to 10)

60
5
Decision variables (90 to 130)

As mentioned in previous section, the OEM decision variables are the spare part
order-up-to level and the sale price. Demand for spare parts arises when the original
parts fail, then the emerging demand would be allocated among the OEM and willfitters in the aftermarket business. The main factor that affects the allocation of the
demand among the suppliers is the spare part sale price. We assume that the OEM can
forecast the demand bounds (including the lower bound intensity factor and the upper
bound intensity factor) with respect to its sale price. In Table 20 the forecasted
demand rates versus the spare part sale prices are depicted.
Table 20: Parameters of the sample spare part inventory

Spare part sale price: †‡
90

Upper bound demand rate: «¬™™-®
5.5

Lower bound demand rate: «¯°±-®

100

5

3

110

4.5

2.5

3.5

120

4

2

130

3.5

1.5

At each sale price level, the expected utility of the OEM for 10 different levels of
inventory as a function of the probability that the market chooses to play with the
lower bound intensity factor in the aftermarket business P Market r•žŸ

¡

has been

calculated. According to the results of the game against nature, the optimal decision
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variables of the OEM are determined. Table 21 shows the result of our spare part
inventory game:
Table 21: Parameters of the sample spare part inventory
Spare part sale
price

Optimal order-upto levels
(higher-lower)

Share of lower
order-up-to level

Guaranteed
payoff

Maximum payoff

90

7- 6

76%

2

59

100

6- 5

88%

18

90

110

6- 5

91%

26

115

120

5- 4

78%

24
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130

4- 3

83%

14

130

As we can see the Minimax of the OEM payoff or the guaranteed payoff of the
game reaches to its maximum level at the sale price of 110. In other words, the
optimal sale price for the OEM is 110 and the optimal inventory policy is to keep the
order-up-to level of the spare part inventory at 6 and 5 for the 9% and 91% times of
the production horizon respectively. Figure 15 depicts the trend of the OEM’s
guaranteed payoff versus the sale price.

OEM's Guaranteed Payoff

30
25
20
15
10
5
0
90

100

110

120

130

Sale Price
Figure 15: The OEM’s guaranteed payoff vs. The sale price

In the following the detailed description of the optimal solution of the game is
presented. In Table 22, the resulting expected fill rate, expected backorder and
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expected inventory level with respect to different values of the stock levels for the
lower bound and upper bound of the demand are listed.
Table 22: Numerical example for a single-item inventory
2.5

Mean annual demand (λ)
Average lead-time (T)
Item cost (†™ )

4.5

1

1

40

40

S

EFR(S)

EBO(S)

EI(S)

EFR(S)

EBO(S)

EI(S)

0

0.00

2.50

0.00

0.00

4.50

0.00

1

0.08

1.58

0.08

0.01

3.51

0.01

2

0.29

0.87

0.37

0.06

2.57

0.07

3

0.54

0.41

0.91

0.17

1.75

0.25

4

0.76

0.17

1.67

0.34

1.09

0.59

5

0.89

0.06

2.56

0.53

0.62

1.12

6

0.96

0.02

3.52

0.70

0.32

1.82

7

0.99

0.01

4.51

0.83

0.15

2.65

8

1.00

0.00

5.50

0.91

0.07

3.57

9

1.00

0.00

6.50

0.96

0.03

4.53

10

1.00

0.00

7.50

0.98

0.01

5.51

According to EBO(S), EI(S) and related stock levels, the cost of inventory
including the holding and backorder costs is calculated. Figure 16 shows the OEM’s
inventory cost versus the spare part order-up-to levels.
300.00

OEM's Inventory Cost

250.00
200.00
150.00

lambda=2.5

100.00

lambda=4.5

50.00
0.00
0.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 6.00 7.00 8.00 9.00 10.00
Order-up-to Level
Figure 16: The OEM’s inventory cost vs. the order-up-to level
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Figure 17: The OEM payoff distribution vs. the probability of the lower bound intensity factor

The expected utility of the OEM for 10 different levels of inventory as a function
of the probability that the market chooses to play with the lower bound intensity factor
in the aftermarket business P Market r•žŸ

¡

has been calculated. The results are

depicted in Figure 17 where the OEM payoff distribution is graphed vs. the probability
of the lower bound intensity factor.
According to the results of the SEU, the optimal decision variables of the OEM
are determined that maximizes his payoff in the aftermarket game. This decisionmaking is the inventory policy of the OEM that states the OEM should change his
inventory level based on the probability of the market’s intensity factor or demand:
•
•

A1: If 0<P Market r•žŸ

¡

<0.03 then select the inventory level of 8;

A2: If 0.03< P Market r•žŸ

¡

<0.45 then select the inventory level of 7;
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•
•
•

A3: If 0.45< P Market r•žŸ

¡

A5: If 0.98< P Market r•žŸ

¡

A4: If 0.72< P Market r•žŸ

¡

<0.72 then select the inventory level of 6;
<0.98 then select the inventory level of 5;
<1.00 then select the inventory level of 4;

The lowest point in the upper envelope of the expected payoff involves an
inventory level of 6 and an inventory level of 5. According to the results of mixed
strategy for that 2 × 2 matrix game, the optimal decision variables of the OEM are
determined. The solution of the mixed strategy states that the OEM should switch

between inventory levels of 6 and 5 with probability of 9% and 91% respectively. The
resulting mixed strategy guarantees the payoff of 26 for the OEM in the long run.
On the other hand, the OEM has an opportunity to invest in performing a
comprehensive market survey and precise data analysis to develop an accurate demand
forecasting for the spare parts. Let us assume this investment costs the OEM
C~=fƒ²³>:o´µ . The method that is provided in our study helps the OEM to make decision

to whether perform more precise demand forecasting. Equation (48) could evaluate the
effort of the OEM to invest on extra demand forecasting:
if max K z − GT K z > C~=fƒ²³>:o´µ then invest on extra demand forecasting

(48)

Where GT K z is the result of the mixed strategy solution for the OEM’s payoff.

In our proposed numerical study the max K z is equal to 115 and GT K z equals to

26. Therefore, as long as C~=fƒ²³>:o´µ is less than 89, extra effort on demand forecasting
would be a rational activity.

In order to examine the accuracy of the Game theoretical solution, a Monte Carlo
simulation has been developed which relies on random sampling to obtain numerical
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results. The simulation runs many times to obtain the payoff of the OEM with respect
to uncertainty of the market.
The simulation follows the following particular pattern:
1. Defining a domain of possible inputs;
2. Generating random inputs from a given probability distribution (uniform
distribution) over the domain;
3. Implementing the spare part inventory policy and performing a
deterministic computation over the inputs;
4. Aggregating the results;
The goal of the simulation is to show the comparison of the Game Theory
approach and any other inventory and production policy.

Figure 18: Simulation results - The OEM payoff vs. the probability of the lower bound intensity factor
Comparison of General Policies & Game Theory
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In figure 18, the payoff of the OEM vs. the probability of the lower bound
intensity factor while implementing Game Theory solution and some other inventory
policies (General Policies; including different levels of order-up-to level inventory
with different strategies of keeping inventory for example setting order-up-to level to
4 and 8 and switching among them with probability of 30% and 70% respectively and
etc.) is depicted. As we can see Game Theory approach guarantees the payoff of 26 for
the OEM by switching among order-up-to levels of 6 and 5 with probability of 9% and
91% respectively.
The performance of the Game Theory approach is graphed in Figure 19 where
general policies are considered as implementing order-up-to level of 5 and 6 with
different strategies to keep the inventory such as 30% lower level and 70% upper level
and etc. The results of the Monte Carlo simulation states that Game Theory approach
allocates guaranteed payoff to the OEM in an uncertain market situation.

Figure 19: Simulation results - The OEM payoff vs. the probability of the lower bound intensity factor
Comparison of General Policies (identical levels with different strategies) & Game Theory
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5.3. OEM AGAINST WILL-FITTER

5.3.1. INTRODUCTION

This spare part inventory game is an N-person non-zero-sum single-shot game.
The model is restricted to a non-cooperative three-person (two manufacturers and the
market) game. The market is an unreasoning entity whose strategic choices including a
bargain seeker or a price taker affect the payoff the manufacturers. The will-fitter has a
fixed pricing strategy but the OEM can decide on his sale price to compete with the
will-fitter. This interaction is modeled as the game against nature which means the
manufacturers play against the market. The game is designed from the OEM
viewpoint and it has no dominant strategy. A mixed-strategy solution that determines
optimal strategies of the OEM to maximize his payoff in the aftermarket business is
developed. An alternative scenario, where the OEM can implement re-manufacturing
processes to manufacture more sustainable parts with cheaper costs, is also considered
to determine the optimal re-manufacturing effort.

5.3.2. INVENTORY GAME, OEM AND WILL-FITTER AGAINST NATURE

The goal of this section is to investigate the inventory game in the case of an Nperson non-zero-sum single-shot game. In order to achieve this goal, the problem is
restricted to a non-cooperative three-person game. The game has three players: the
OEM (who has a flexible sale-pricing strategy, and he can be a traditional
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manufacturer or a re-manufacturer), the will-fitter (who has a solid sale-pricing
strategy, and he is only traditional manufacturer) and the market. The game has been
set up from the OEM stand point which means the solution of the game gives him the
maximum payoff or minimum loss.
We assume that the game is a non-cooperative game and the market is unkind and
chooses hostile strategies. The manufacturers can only forecast the market base of
spare parts. Moreover, they know that the market consists of two types of customers:
•

Price takers, who purchase the parts with available prices in the market;

•

Bargain seekers, who are searching for less expensive prices;

We consider the market as an unreasoning entity whose strategic choices affect
the payoff the manufacturers, but which has no interest in the outcome of the game.
The aforementioned characteristic of the market enables us to consider the spare parts
inventory game as a game against nature. In our study we model the spare parts
inventory management as a game against nature which means the manufacturers of the
spare part compete with each other and meanwhile play against the market.

5.3.3. THE MARKET DEMAND

In our spare part inventory game, we assume that the manufacturer has only
limited information about the market’s expected demand. The market has two options,
i.e. present itself as either a price taker or as a bargain seeker. These strategies can
vary randomly, so there is a probability that the market chooses the price taker action
or switches to the bargain seeker action. Demand for the products follows a general
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linear demand function (Trivedi, 1998, Wu, 2012). In other words, demand from the
manufacturer i, Do is a general linear demand function of his own selling price po

and his competitor selling price `p· b where i=1, 2 (number of the manufacturers) and

j=3-i. Equation (51) develops the demand function, where parameter ao is the market

base for the product, the parameter ¸ is the self-price elastic coefficient and the
parameter β is the cross-price elastic coefficient. This formula represents that the

demand for the products depends on its own sale price and its competitor’s sale price.
Unlike demands for finished goods, the total demand for spare parts will remain
unchanged. We assume that the part’s demand is mostly dependent on its own sale
price, so we consider that α > β > 0 which means that the demand for parts is more
sensitive to changes of the self-price sale as Equation (49):
Do = a o −∝ `po − p· b + β p· − po

∀ i = 1,2 and j = 3 − i

(49)

5.3.4. THE OEM COST FUNCTION-TRADITIONAL MANUFACTURER

The aim of this game is to develop an inventory control policy for the OEM. In
the case of traditional manufacturing, the OEM manufactures parts directly from the
raw material, so the control policy is the determination of the pricing strategy and
levels of inventory. In this setup, the OEM is flexible to change his sale price to
optimize his profit, while his competitor has a solid sale-pricing strategy.
Spontaneously, this price change will affect his level of inventory. In order to develop
the OEM pricing strategies, we consider three standard pricing strategies, which are
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listed as the following. The OEM can switch among them to increase his profit in the
aftermarket business competition.
•

Regular pricing (RP), in this strategy the OEM selects his sale price,
regardless of his competitor’s sale price;

•

Matching price (MP), in this strategy the OEM matches his sale price with
his competitor’s sale price;

•

Price guarantee (PG), in this strategy the OEM’s sale price is n%

cheaper than his competitor’s sale price;

The payoff or profit of the OEM is the payoff of the game and it is the profit of

the OEM or K z which is equal to the difference between the cost of production and

inventory or K ‘ and the revenue from selling parts or K ’ which is acquired by

selling products. The cost of production and inventory K ‘ is calculated based on a
very basic inventory model known as the EOQ model which is formulated in Equation

(1). Also, this formulation in an optimized solution provides the optimal lot-size (s ∗ ).
Equation (2) determines the optimal lot-size.
Equation (50) determines the revenue of selling products:
K’ = p × D

(50)

And Equation (51) calculates the OEM payoff:
K z = K’ − K ‘

(51)

As we can see the OEM’s payoff is a function of the demand and the optimal
inventory level or lot-size, which are the strategic actions of the players. Moreover,
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there exist different parameters that affect the cost of production and inventory. Table
23 lists required parameters to calculate the payoff of the game:
Table 23: Cost function parameters and variables
—

Notation

Parameter definition

¼

Market base demand for the product (in units)

‡

Demand (in units per period)

š

†

Variable cost of production (in dollars per units)

Spare parts inventory level (in units)

½

Holding cost (in dollars per unit per period)

P

Variable sale price (in dollars per unit)

N

Price guarantee percentage

Setup cost (in dollars)

5.3.5. THE OEM COST FUNCTION FOR THE RE-MANUFACTURER

We consider the re-manufacturing as the process of re-using used products and
use them to manufacture new parts. According to (Savaskan, Bhattacharya, & Van
Wassenhove, 2004, Savaskan & Van Wassenhove, 2006), we assume that there is no
difference between the re-manufactured and ordinary manufactured parts. Remanufacturing requires the collection of the used products, which is known as reverse
channels. We assume that the recycling processes insert a total collection cost, and the
scaling parameter B can estimate it (Savaskan et al., 2004, Savaskan & Van
Wassenhove, 2006). Furthermore, the OEM can decide to re-manufacture whole or
some part of his production. This decision-making is known as re-manufacturing
effort which is indicated as the re-manufacturing effort parameter ¾ that varies

between zero and one; 0 < τ < 1.

The spare parts inventory control policy for the OEM in the case of remanufacturing is the determination of pricing strategy, levels of inventory, and
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decision-making on re-manufacturing effort. By considering the re-manufacturing
process, the cost of production and inventory will change. Equation (52) provides this
cost.
K‘ =

hs ∗ AD
τ
+ ∗ + c 1 − τ + cf τ D + B
2
s
2

(52)

Table 24 lists additional required parameters to calculate the payoff of the game
in case of re-manufacturing:
Table 24: Re-manufacturing parameters
À

Notation

Parameter definition

ÁŒ

Re-manufacturing effort

Â

Variable cost of re-manufacturing (in dollars per units)
Collection scaling parameter

5.3.6. THE GAME SETUP

Using Game Theory, we determine the spare parts inventory control policy for the
OEM who manufactures a single part and sells it to the market, while competing with
a will-fitter who manufactures the same part. This inventory game is set up from the
OEMs viewpoint. The inventory game is set up between the OEM and the market and
the solution of the game maximizes the profit of the OEM in the buyer-seller
environment. Players choose their strategies simultaneously and the game is a static
game and it is solved by finding Nash Equilibrium. The following procedure describes
the interaction between two manufacturers:
•

Will-fitter chooses his sale price regardless of the market;
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•

OEM has an option to decide on his decision variable to choose the right
sale price;

•

The resulting sale prices generate demand distribution among the
manufacturers;

The assumptions are:
•

Players play simultaneously;

•

The OEM possesses only the information of the part’s market base;

•

The market as a nature has two options of acting as either price taker or a
bargain seeker;

•

The probability that the market plays as a price taker is P;

•

Intuitively, the probability that the market plays as a bargain seeker would
be 1-P;

•

The OEM has three strategies of pricing (regular price (RP), matching
price (MP) and price guarantee (PG));

•

The OEM also can decide on his re-manufacturing effort percentage
(GMEP);

The game setup can be shown in matrix form. Table 25 gives us the information
of the game setup in the matrix form. This matrix is known as payoff matrix and the
value of each cell is the payoff of the OEM in the aftermarket game:
Table 25: The payoff matrix of inventory game
Market (Nature)
Price Taker

Bargain Seeker

RP

KB(SRP, DPT)

KB(SRP, DBS)

MP

KB(SMP, DPT)

KB(SMP, DBS)

PG

KB(SPG, DPT)

KB(SPG, DBS)

GMEP

OEM

Pricing Method
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Regarding the probability of market decision-making (price taker probability), the
expected utility of the OEM is calculated from Equation (53):
EX OEM >¡ = P M rÃÄ U OEM >¡ , M rÃÄ + P M r•Å U OEM >¡ , M r•Å ∀ r: RP, MP, PG

(53)

Equation (54) tells us that the total probability of market decision-makings equals
to 1.
P M rÃÄ + P M r•Å = 1

(54)

The investigation of the payoff matrix declares there is no dominant strategy in
this game that leads to lack of a pure strategy. Therefore, the game has a mixed
strategy solution, which depends on the probability of the market’s choices (the price
taker or the bargain seeker) that varies the allocated demands among manufacturers.

5.3.7. THE MIXED STRATEGY SOLUTION

The mixed strategy solution follows the mixed strategy solution description that
has been discussed in the section 5.2.6. In order to illustrate the decision-making of the
OEM based on the mixed strategy solution, we consider an inventory game with a
single Stage demand, which has the following parameters (Table 26).
Table 26: Sample parameters to illustrate the mixed strategy solution of the game
Notation

¼

Parameter value

†

10

Æ

9.5

†®

12

š

50
3
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½

Parameter value

P1

25

P2

20

n

10

α

0.5

β

0.3

Notation

50

Assume all the parameters are the same for both manufacturers except their sale
prices. The goal of the OEM is to maximize his payoff based on his competition with
the will-fitter and the market choices. The expected utility of the OEM as a function of
the market decision-making probability to play with price taker action is calculated. In
the discussion that follows, the OEM inventory control policy is explained for the remanufacturing situation.

Figure 20: The OEM (Re-manufacturer) payoff distribution vs. The probability of the market's price
taker action

Figure 20 shows the OEM payoff distribution vs. the probability of the market's
price taker action or P(M rÃÄ ) in case of re-manufacturing. We assume that there are
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five possible re-manufacturing effort percentages (RMEP) available that the OEM can
decide to select among them. For instance, if the OEM chooses RMEP of 10, it means
he manufactures 10% of his production out of re-manufacturing processes. In this
decision-making problem, the OEM makes a choice between different alternatives. If
the payoff for each alternative is known, the decision is made under certainty. If not,
the decision is made under uncertainty. The major solution for decisions under
uncertainty and risks are expected utility (EU) and subjective expected utility (SEU)
determines the pricing strategies and re-manufacturing efforts of the OEM as follows:
•

A1: If 0<P(M rÃÄ )<0.30 then select the price guarantee strategy with remanufacturing effort of 100 and related inventory level;

•

A2: If 0.30<P(M rÃÄ )<0.62 then select the price guarantee strategy with remanufacturing effort of 75 and related inventory level;

•

A3: If 0.62<P(M rÃÄ )<0.88 then select the matching price strategy with remanufacturing effort of 50 and related inventory level;

•

A4: If 0.88<P(M rÃÄ )<1 then select the regular price strategy with remanufacturing effort of 25 and related inventory level;

Based on the chosen strategies, the optimal payoff and inventory level for the
OEM are derived which are depicted in Figure 21. The lowest point in the upper
envelope of the expected payoff involves MP strategy with RMEP of 50 and RP
strategy with RMEP of 25. According to the results of mixed strategy for that 2 × 2

matrix game, the optimal decision variables of the OEM is determined. The solution of
the mixed strategy states that the OEM should switch randomly among MP strategy
with RMEP of 50 and RP strategy with RMEP of 25 with probability of 74% and 26%
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respectively. The resulting mixed strategy guarantees the payoff of 33.08 for the OEM
in the long run.

Figure 21: The OEM (Re-manufacturer) payoff and inventory level vs. The probability of the market's
price taker action

5.3.8. NUMERICAL STUDY

In this section the spare parts inventory management of the OEM during 1-year of
production has been investigated. We assume that each year of production consists of
6 periods and the manufacturers possess the market’s base demand for the spare parts
during these periods. It is assumed that the market’s base demand follows a uniform
distribution which is known by the manufacturers. Figure 22 shows the market’s base
expected demand in 1-year of production.
In order to generate the payoff matrix for the game in 6 periods, it is assumed that
the production, inventory and market conditions are not changing during 1-year of
production and the required parameters are consistent with the values that are listed in
Table 26.
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Figure 22: The base market demand in 1-year of production

The strategy of the OEM is to maximize his payoff by choosing the best sale
price, re-manufacturing effort and inventory level. The expected utility of the OEM
with respect to the probability of the market’s price taker action P can be calculated in
each period. Table 27 lists the optimal pricing strategies and re-manufacturing efforts
of the OEM.
Table 27: The OEM (Re-manufacturer) strategies of the game
1-Year Production Periods

1

2

3

4

5

6

RP

0.88<P<1
GMEP=25

0.78<P<1
GMEP=50

0.85<P<1
GMEP=25

0.8<P<1
GMEP=50

0.8<P<1
GMEP=50

0.78<P<1
GMEP=50

MP

0.62<P<0.88
GMEP=50

0.65<P<0.78
GMEP=75

0.65<P<0.85
GMEP=50

0.7<P<0.8
GMEP=75

0.65<P<0.7
GMEP=75
0.7<P<0.8
GMEP=50

0.7<P<0.78
GMEP=75

PG

0<P<0.3
GMEP=100
0.3<P<0.62
GMEP=75

0<P<0.65
GMEP=100

0<P<0.45
GMEP=100
0.45<P<0.65
GMEP=75

0<P<0.7
GMEP=100

0<P<0.6
GMEP=100
0.6<P<0.65
GMEP=75

0<P<0.7
GMEP=100

OEM

Pricing
Method
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This decision-making provides the OEM payoff distributions and inventory levels
that have been depicted in Figure 23 (the results for re-manufacturer is provided). The
strategies of the OEM during these periods are listed in Table 27.
As we can see the SEU and mixed strategy solutions can determine the OEM’s
decision-making on spare part pricing, inventory level and RMEP while the OEM
implements the very basic inventory policy that is introduced as the EOQ. In next
section we show that the same strategic problem solving is still useful for more
complicated inventory control policies. Perhaps one of the most commonly used
inventory policy for spare part management is the reorder point and order size policy
known as (Q,r). We assume that demand for spare part arrives as a Poisson process, in
batches of size one. The mean arrival rate is known by the manufacturers and they
manage their inventory based on a (Q,r) policy, introduced in chapter 2.

Figure 23: The OEM (Re-manufacturer) maximum expected utility vs. Price taker demand probability
for each period
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By consideration of the following parameters, the cost function of the OEM is
calculated based on our proposed algorithm in the section 2.5.3.3. In our numerical
study we assume that the annual demand rate for spare part is a=30, lead-time L=45
days, holding cost h=30, backorder cost b=100, setup cost=15, cost of production
c=12, cost of re-manufacturing cr=10.5 and cost of collecting used parts B=110.
Figure 24 shows the OEM payoff distribution vs. the probability of the market's
price taker action or P(MrÃÄ ) in case of re-manufacturing. We assume that as before
there are five possible re-manufacturing effort percentages (RMEP) available that the
OEM can select them.

Figure 24: The OEM (Re-manufacturer) payoff distribution vs. The probability of the market's price
taker action

The subjective expected utility (SEU) determines the pricing strategies and remanufacturing efforts of the OEM as follows:
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•

A1: If 0<P(M rÃÄ )<0.40 then select the price guarantee strategy with remanufacturing effort of 75 and related inventory level;

•

A2: If 0.40<P(M rÃÄ )<0.5 then select the matching price strategy with remanufacturing effort of 50 and related inventory level;

•

A3: If 0.5<P(M rÃÄ )<1 then select the regular pricing strategy with remanufacturing effort of 25 and related inventory level;

Based on the chosen strategies, the optimal payoff and re-order point and order
lot-size for the OEM are derived and are depicted in Figure 25.

Figure 25: The OEM (Re-manufacturer) payoff and inventory level vs. The probability of the market's
price taker action

The lowest point in the upper envelope of the expected payoff involves MP
strategy with RMEP of 50 and RP strategy with RMEP of 25. According to the results

of mixed strategy for that 2 × 2 matrix game, the optimal decision variables of the
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OEM is determined. The solution of the mixed strategy states that the OEM should
switch randomly among MP strategy with RMEP of 50 and RP strategy with RMEP of
25 with probability of 0.5 and 0.5 respectively. The resulting mixed strategy
guarantees the payoff of 91 for the OEM in the long run.
In order to examine the accuracy of the Game theoretical solution, a Monte Carlo
simulation has been developed which relies on random sampling to obtain numerical
results. The simulation runs many times to obtain the payoff of the OEM with respect
to uncertainty of the market.
The simulation follows the following particular pattern:
1. Defining a domain of possible inputs;
2. Generating random inputs from a given probability distribution (uniform
distribution) over the domain;
3. Implementing the spare part inventory policy and performing a
deterministic computation over the inputs;
4. Aggregating the results;
The goal of the simulation is to show the comparison of the Game Theory
approach and any other inventory and production policy. In figure 26, the payoff of
the OEM vs. the probability of the market’s price taker action while implementing
Game Theory solution and some other inventory policies (General Policies; including
different pricing strategies, inventory level and re-manufacturing effort) is depicted.
As we can see Game Theory approach guarantees the payoff of 33.08 for the OEM by
switching randomly among MP strategy with RMEP of 50 and RP strategy with
RMEP of 25 with probability of 74% and 26% respectively.

141

Figure 26: Simulation results - The OEM payoff vs. The probability of the market's price taker action
Comparison of General Policies & Game Theory

Figure 27: Simulation results - The OEM payoff vs. the probability of the lower bound intensity factor
Comparison of General Policies (identical prices with different strategies) & Game Theory
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The performance of the Game Theory approach is graphed in Figure 27 where
general policies are considered as implementing the same pricing strategies, same remanufacturing efforts with different strategies to keep the inventory. The results of the
Monte Carlo simulation states that Game Theory approach allocates guaranteed payoff
to the OEM in an uncertain market situation.

5.4. EVOLUTIONARY SPARE PARTS INVENTORY GAME

5.4.1. INTRODUCTION

The OEM, in a competitive and uncertain aftermarket, can benefit from Game
Theory to manage his spare parts inventory. We study the spare parts inventory game
in the case of an N-person non-zero-sum repeated game where players play
simultaneously. This game is restricted to a two-person (the OEM and the will-fitter),
cooperative and non-cooperative game setup. The game has two players
(manufacturers) who manufacture the same spare parts. Based on their sale prices,
they have an option to design a contract and cooperate with each other or compete
with each other in the aftermarket without creating any agreements. The pricing
strategies have been investigated through repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma spare parts
inventory game and the stability of the cooperation or defect in sale price
determination has been studied through evolutionary stable strategy analysis of the
two famous games of Prisoners’ Dilemma and Stag Hunt. Moreover, the
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implementation of the re-manufacturing in manufacturing processes to increase the
profitability of the spare parts inventory games is investigated.

5.4.2. REPEATED INVENTORY GAME

Every game with finite numbers of players and actions has at least one Nash
Equilibrium. For all the games, the Nash Equilibrium is Pareto optimal except for the
Prisoners’ Dilemma. In 1950 Melvin Dresher and Merrill Flood at the RAND
Corporation devised a game known as the Prisoners’ Dilemma that is a non-zero-sum
game with an equilibrium which is unique but fails to be Pareto optimal. In the years
since 1950 this game has become known as the Prisoners’ Dilemma and it is the most
widely used and studied game in the social science.
The general form of the Prisoners’ Dilemma has been depicted in Figure 28.
•Player 1: C
•Player 2: C

•Player 1: C
•Player 2: D

(R,R)

(S,T)

(T,S)

(U,U)

•Player 1: D
•Player 2: C

•Player 1: D
•Player 2: D

Ñ+Î
2
Figure 28: The general form of Prisoners’ Dilemma
ÇÈÉÊËÌËÈÉÍ: Î > Ï > Ð > Ñ & Ï >

There are two players and they can decide to cooperate or defect. According to
their chosen strategies, there are four different possible payoffs of the game including:

144

•

Both players cooperate (CC): both players will get the reward of the
cooperation (R);

•

Player 1 cooperates and player 2 defects (CD): player 1 will get the sucker
payoff (S) and player 2 will get the temptation payoff (T);

•

Player 1 defects and player 2 cooperates (DC): player 1 will get the
temptation payoff (T) and player 2 will get the sucker payoff (S);

•

Both players defect: both players will get the uncooperative payoff (U);

Many social phenomena seem to have the Prisoners’ Dilemma at their core. In the
case of our inventory game, there are two spare parts manufacturers, deciding to cut
their sale prices or not. If the will-fitter does not cut the prices, the OEM can attract
more customers by cutting prices. If the will-fitter cuts its prices, the OEM had better
cut prices in order not to lose its own customers. If both manufacturers cut prices, both
will get lower benefits than if neither of them had cut prices.
In this inventory game, we assume that manufacturers have to decide on their sale
prices and inventory levels as long as there is a demand for spare parts. In other words,
they have to repeat playing the inventory game to satisfy demands for spare parts. In
repeatedly play, the hope of arriving at the mutually beneficial outcome (CC) rather
than reaching to a less profitable outcome (DD), encourages the manufacturers to
cooperate.
In fact, this idea is under influence of a logical domino-type argument. Suppose
players know this game lasts for 100 times, in the last game the strategy (D) dominates
the strategy (C) because there is no future to induce mutual cooperation. The plays fall
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backwards like dominos, and affect previous games and even the first game must be
(DD).
Now, let’s assume because of the intermittent and uncertain characteristic of the
demand for spare parts, manufacturers do not know how many games will be played.
According to (Martin Shubik, 1970), after each play of Prisoners’ Dilemma, the next
play will occur with probability (p).
Manufacturers follow the strategy of Grim Trigger, means both players cooperate
until one player defects, and then both players defect. If manufacturers never choose
the strategy (D), the payoff for each player is calculated from Equation (55):
R + pR + p R + p5 R + ⋯ =

R
1−p

(55)

If one player decides to defect in the mth game, the resulting payoff for each
player can be calculated from Equation (54).
R + pR + p R + ⋯ + pÓ2 R + pÓ T + pÓg U + ⋯ =

R − pÓ R + 1 − p pÓ T + pÓg U
1−p

(56)

Hence, manufacturers should never choose the strategy (D) as long as

Equation 55 ≥ Equation 56 for all values of m . In other words, it makes

sense for the manufacturers to choose the strategy (C), if the probability of the playing
the next game (p) is larger than a threshold value.
The threshold can be calculated from Equation (57):
p>

T−R
T−U
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(57)

5.4.3. EVOLUTIONARY STABILITY AND BOUNDED RATIONALITY

In Game Theory it has been assumed that players are capable of unlimited acts of
reasoning. In such a situation, once they find the solution to a game, they play that
strategy from then on. In real world players will not find the solution immediately and
they spend a lot of time and energy to find the solution. These types of players, who
have to make mistakes to find the optimal solution, are considered bounded rational.
Making mistakes and the trial-and-error procedure is part of their learning how to
play, and while they are in learning phase they are out of the equilibrium. The game
during out of equilibrium situation can be described via a dynamic system known as
the replicator dynamic. Dynamic replicators are used to describe the evolution of
systems and evolution of players’ behavior in games. Bounded rational players, who
obeying replicator dynamics, find the equilibrium called an evolutionary stable
strategy (ESS).
Replicator dynamics says that if a player earns above-average payoff, its
percentage in the whole population increases and if a player earns below-average its
population will decrease. In our evolutionary game we assume that manufacturers,
who are bounded rational players, have two strategies:
•

Cooperate: Selecting the sale prices according to an agreement with the
other player to increase the total payoff;

•

Defect: Selecting the sale prices according to an individual better off
payoff, or cutting sale prices to increase the resulting payoff;

The investigation of the game will determine the stable strategies of the players.
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5.4.4. THE MARKET DEMAND

The life cycle of the spare parts is affected by finished goods life cycle. Their life
cycle can be divided into three phase: initial, normal or repetitive and final (Fortuin,
1980). Hence demands for spare parts depend on finished goods, and following factors
would affect the demand (Fortuin & Martin, 1999):
•

Size and age of the final products (sales, running fleet, installation base,
etc.);

•

Products maintenance characteristics (preventive, corrective, etc.);

•

Parts characteristics and their defects (wear, accident, aging, etc.);

Spare parts demand is intermittent or lumpy which means it occurs after a long
variable periods without demand. The lack of parts leads to high losses, and demand
forecasting can decrease the loss. The demand forecasting is very important, although
it has some errors (Love, 1979). A classical method for demand forecasting has been
done by (Wheelwright & Hyndman, 1998) and a related literature review has been
provided by (Boylan et al., 2006) for last fifty years.
In some related literatures, the demand for the manufacturers follows a general
linear demand function (Trivedi, 1998)(Wu, 2012). In other words, demand for the
supplier i, X o is a general linear demand function of his own sales price Po and his

competitor sales price `P· b where i=1,2 (number of the manufacturers) and j=3-i.

In our study we suppose that the manufacturers can forecast the market’s

expected demand for spare parts over the normal or repetitive phase of the product life
cycle (Fortuin, 1980) which is the market base for the products, that is parameter (X).
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The total market demand equals to the summation of the market demand for both
manufacturers as it is shown in Equation (58).

X = - Xo
o3

∀i = 1,2

(58)

In order to simulate stochastic behavior of the demand, we assume that the
demand distribution is Poisson. In other words, the mean of total market demand is
known and the standard deviation of the demand σ can be calculated from Equation
(59).
σo = ÖXo

(59)

We assume that the market is a bargain seeker that means she purchases the
products with lower prices. This characteristic will determine the demand allocation
for the manufacturers.

5.4.5. THE MANUFACTURER COST FUNCTION-TRADITIONAL MANUFACTURER

The aim of our game is to develop a pricing strategy and an inventory control
policy for the manufacturer of the spare parts. In case of traditional manufacturing, the
OEM and will-fitter both manufacture parts directly from the raw material, so the
control policy would be the determination of the pricing strategy and inherently the
level of inventories. The payoff of the manufacturers is the payoff of the game and it

would be the profit of the manufacturers `πo b which is the difference between the cost
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of production and inventory `Y o b and the revenue `Ro b which attained by parts sales.
We suppose that the manufacturers follow the Newsvendor inventory control policy.
Based on Newsvendor system we follow the listed assumptions:
•

Products are separable (in this study we consider a single-item inventory);

•

Planning is done for a single period;

•

Demand is random;

•

Deliveries are made in advance of demand;

•

Costs of overage or shortage are linear;

To develop the model, manufacturers produce Qo units and the demand is X o

units. Based on Newsvendor inventory policy, introduced in the section 2.5.1, the cost
of production and inventory `Y o b is calculated. Equation (60) shows the derived
formula to calculate the cost of inventory.
hÙ

d

Y Q = C=o Ø Qo − Xo g Xo dXo + C>o Ø Xo − Q o g Xo dXo
o

hÙ

E

(60)

The optimal production quantity Q∗o is derived from Equation (61). Equation

(62) gives us the revenue of parts sales Ro and Equation (63) gives us the

manufacturers’ payoffs `πo b:

G Q∗o =

C>o
C=o + C>o

Ro = Po Xo
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(61)

(62)

πo = Ro − Y o

(63)

As we can see the manufacturers’ payoffs are functions of demand, production
level (optimal inventory level) and sales prices which are the strategic actions of the
players. Moreover, there are different parameters that affect the cost of production and
inventory and sales revenues as listed in Table 28:
Table 28: Cost function parameters and variables
Ú

Notation

Parameter definition

Û™

Production rate (in units)
Cost of production (in dollars per units)

P

Sale price (in dollars per units)

Û°

Overage cost or holding cost (IÜŠ (in dollars per unit)

Û‡
Ý

ir

Shortage cost (P-ÜŠ (in dollars per unit)
Interest rate (percentage per year)

Þ

Standard deviation of demand (in units)

G(X)

CDF of demand

g(X)

PDF of demand

Mean of demand (in units per period)

5.4.6. THE MANUFACTURER COST FUNCTION FOR THE RE-MANUFACTURER

We consider Green manufacturing as the process of re-manufacturing used
products and use them as new ones as it was discussed in the section 5.3.5. By
considering re-manufacturing process, the shortage cost will be changed and can be
calculated from Equation (62). The cost of production and inventory will change
which is written as Equation (63).
The cost of shortage in the case of re-manufacturing:
C>o = P − ßCfo τ + C‚ 1 − τ à
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(64)

The cost of production and inventory Y o :
hÙ

d

Y Q o = C=o Ø Qo − Xo g Xo dXo + C>o Ø Xo − Q o g Xo dXo + B
E

hÙ

τ
2

(65)

Parameters are being used to calculate the cost of production and inventory while
using re-manufacturing are listed in Table 29:
Table 29: Green manufacturing parameters
á

Notation

Parameter definition

Û®

remanufacturing effort

Æ

variable cost of remanufacturing (in dollars per units)
Collection scaling parameter

5.4.7. THE GAME SETUP

In this setting, Game Theory is applied to determine the inventory control policy
for manufacturers who manufacture a single-item spare part and sell it to the market
while they can cooperate or compete with each other. Our spare part inventory game
has two players who have two different strategies: cooperation and defect. Decisionmaking on sale price (and re-manufacturing effort in the Green manufacturing
situation) is/are their strategies which determine their production quantities and
inventory levels. The market has a cyclic demand which is stochastic, and in each
period the mean of demand is known. The total demand has to be distributed among
players and manufacturers’ pricing strategies affect their allocated demand. We
assumed that the market is a bargain seeker which means it purchases from the
supplier who offers lower prices. In this environment manufacturers can cooperate
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with each other or compete with each other that means each of them has two
strategies:
•

Strategy 1: Cooperate, manufacturers set their sale prices in such a way
that gives them the highest profit;

•

Strategy 2: Defect, manufacturers cut their sale prices in such a way that
attracts more demand share;

The inventory game is a two-person non-zero-sum static game, so we are looking
for the Nash Equilibrium as the solution of the game. Based on the players strategies
(cooperate or defect) different payoffs would be assigned for each supplier. The payoff
matrix is depicted in Table 30:
Table 30: The payoff matrix of inventory game
Will-fitter

OEM

COOPERATE
(C)
COOPERATE
(C)
DEFECT
(D)

π CC, π CC

π DC, π DC

DEFECT
(D)

π CD, π CD

π DD, π DD

Evolutionary Game Theory is used to study the evolutionary stability of strategies
followed by two manufacturers. The concept of ESS was proposed by (Maynard
Smith, 1974, J Maynard Smith & Price, 1973, John Maynard Smith, 1993). Later on
(Taylor & Jonker, 1978) proposed a dynamic equation known as the dynamic
replicator that reflects the dynamics and interactions between players in the game.

Assuming that the probability that the OEM cooperates is α and β is the

probability that the will-fitter cooperates, replicator dynamics are given in Equations
(66) and (67):
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i

dα
= αWU ãä‘ cooperate − Average OEMX
l
dt
Average OEM = αU ãä‘ cooperate + 1 − α U ãä‘ defect

dβ
= βåU …o„„2~o::ƒf cooperate − Average will − fitteræ
i
l
dt
Average will − fitter = βU …o„„2~o::ƒf cooperate + 1 − β U …o„„2~o::ƒf defect

(66)

(67)

Where U Ó³´•~³²:•fƒfÙ cooperate is the expected utility of the manufacturer1

(i=1 OEM & i=2 will-fitter) when he cooperates and Average manufacturero is the
average payoff for manufacturer1 . The stable states of the replicator dynamic

equations are the Nash Equilibrium known as evolutionary equilibriums (EE). When

dα/dt = 0 and dβ/dt = 0 the EE are pure strategies of E1=(1,1), E2=(1,0), E3=(0,1),

E4=(0,0) and the fifth EE point is the mixed strategy solution that is driven as
Equation (68):
Eç = è

π DC − π DD
π CD − π DD
,
é
π CD − π DD + π DC − π CC π DC − π DD + π CD − π CC

(68)

According to (Friedman, 1991) the stability of EE can be analyzed by the Jacobi
matrix which can be derived from Equation (69). The stability of the EE depends on
the sign of Jacobi matrix eigenvalues. If both eigenvalues are negative the EE is the
stable strategy otherwise that would be an unstable strategy.
∂ dα
í A D
∂α dt
J = ìì
∂ dβ
ì A D
ë∂α dt
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∂ dα
A Dð
∂β dt ï
∂ dβ ï
A Dï
∂β dt î

(69)

5.4.8. NUMERICAL STUDY

In this section the inventory management of the manufacturers during 1-year of
production has been investigated. We assume that the manufacturers possess the
market base demand for the product during the production year. In order to generate
the payoff matrix for the game, it is assumed that the production, inventory and
marketing conditions are not changing during the production horizon and the required
parameters are consistent with Table 31. We suppose all the parameters are the same
for both manufacturers.
Table 31: Sample parameters used to generate the payoff matrix
traditional manufacturer
Û™

Notation

Parameter value
10

P

Decision variable

Û°
ir

25

Ý

0.048
50

We assumed that the market is a bargain seeker, so based on strategies on sale
prices in cooperation and competition the total demand will be distributed among
manufacturers. This can be listed as below:
•

CC or DD: Demands for spare parts are distributed among manufacturers
equally;

•

CD or DC: Demands for spare parts are distributed among manufacturers
unequally, the manufacturer who cuts the prices will attract all the
customers to himself;
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In other words, when both players cooperate or defect, the annual mean of
demand for each of them is 25 units and once each of them cut prices, he attracts the
whole demand which means the annual mean of demand for him would be 50 units.
Figure 29 depicts the distribution of the demand in case of cooperation and defect.

Figure 29: PDF of market demand

The determination of the sale prices generates the demand distribution among
manufacturers. Based on resulting demands, manufacturers decide on their inventory
levels which allocate their profits in the aftermarket game.
We first need to determine rational pricing strategy for the manufacturers. The
minimum sale price that makes the spare parts inventory game profitable for the
manufacturers is equal to 15.13, which is defined as the marginal cutting sale price.
Next, we need to find the minimum cooperative sale price that establishes the spare
parts inventory game as a Prisoners’ Dilemma. The minimum cooperative sale price is
equal to 16.72. However, in order to maintain the Prisoners’ Dilemma condition, the
reward of the cooperation should be less than the temptation payoff (R<T). Hence, the
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maximum cooperative sale price is equal to 18.68. Now, we can setup a repeated
Prisoners’ Dilemma spare parts inventory game.
According to Equation (57), we can graph the threshold of the possibility of the
future game vs. the maximum cooperative sale price which states that manufacturers
should never defect as long as the probability of the future game is greater than the
calculated thresholds (Figure 30).

Probability of Next Game

0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
16.7

17.2

17.7

18.2

18.7

Sale Price
Figure 30: Probability of the next play vs. Cooperative Sale Price

The resulting payoff of the spare parts inventory game for each manufacturer is
depicted in Figure 31.
90

Payoff

80
70
60
50
40
16.7

17.2

17.7

18.2

Sale Price
Figure 31: Payoff vs. Cooperative Sale Price
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18.7

Now we can investigate the evolutionary spare parts inventory game. For the
traditional manufacturing, the resulting payoff matrix is symmetrical because we
assumed that the production and inventory costs are the same for both manufacturers.
The symmetrical payoff matrix is:

π CC = π CC

π CD = π DC

π DC = π CD

π DD = π DD

Stability of the evolutionary equilibrium (EE) points depends on the sign of the
}

}ñ

ß à as the stability term, the result of the analysis is represented as Table 32:
òñ
ò:

Table 32: The local stability of EE
EE

Stability term

-(óô ÜÜ –óô õÜ)

Û

—

ö÷ø-ù

−

(óô Üõ –óô õõ)

`óô ÜÜ – óô õÜb` óô Üõ – óô õõb
óô ÜÜ – óô õÜ − óô Üõ – óô õõ

To investigate the evolutionary stable strategies, two experiments have been
considered (the first experiment is the experiment with minimum acceptable sale price
and the second one is the experiment with maximum acceptable sale price). The
simulation software (Sandholm & Dokumaci, 2007) is used to study the evolutionary
dynamics of two manufacturers’ strategies in the market. The experiments are logistic
systems based on decision-making to cooperate or defect by selecting related sale
prices. By using the software the phase diagram of each experiment has been obtained
as Figure 32. The colors in the contour plot represent speeds of motion under the
dynamic: red is fast and blue is slow. In the first experiment, the tendency to leave the
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cooperation is fast and as sale price increases this movement becomes slower till it
reaches to its slowest speed in the second experiment.

Figure 32: Phase diagram of experiments (1 & 2)

Also, the characterizations of the stability of EE for each experiment are listed in
Table 33. The results of the ESS analysis are consistent with the results of the repeated
Prisoners’ Dilemma stating that as the sale prices increase, manufacturers stay in
cooperation with less future play probability. However, the results of the ESS state
that the Nash Equilibrium of the game is (DD), which means both players defect, and
the equilibrium point is evolutionary stable (ES).
Table 33: The ESS analysis of the experiments (1 & 2)
S:Stable - U:Unstable - NE:Nash Equilibrium
EXPERIMENTS
1

2

P

D=15.13 & C=16.72

D=15.13 & C=18.68

Payoff

10

10

EE

NE

S/U

NE

S/U

E1

U

U

E2

U

U

E3

U

U

E4

●

E5

NA

S

●
NA
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The increase of the sale price above the value of the maximum cooperative sale
price would change the game type from Prisoners’ Dilemma to Stag Hunt game.
Basically, Stag Hunt studies the conflicts between safety and cooperation. The general
form of the Stag Hunt game is depicted in Figure 33.
•Player 1: C
•Player 2: C

•Player 1: C
•Player 2: D

(R,R)

(S,T)

(T,S)

(U,U)

•Player 1: D
•Player 2: C

•Player 1: D
•Player 2: D

ÇÈÉÊËÌËÈÉÍ: Ï ¨ Î Õ Ð ¨ Ñ
Figure 33: The general form of Stag Hunt

This game has two Nash Equilibriums and it has a mixed strategy solution. In
other words, this game has two ES equilibriums (including cooperation and defect)
and it has unstable mixed strategy equilibrium. The midpoint sale price is the sale
price that leads to a mixed strategy with 50% chance of cooperation or defect, in other
words, it is the sale price that makes the value of α and β equal to 50%. Two different
Stages of sale prices can be considered for this spare parts inventory game including:
•

If maximum cooperative sale price û sale price ü midpoint sale price:

manufacturers should cooperate with each other with probability range of
0g to 50%;
•

If midpoint sale price û sale price: manufacturers should cooperate with

each other with probability range of 50 to 1002 %;
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Figure 34: Phase diagram of experiments (3 – 5)

In the following, three different sale prices have been provided that can be
investigated via ESS analysis. By using the software the phase diagram of each
experiment has been obtained as Figure 34. The tendency to join the cooperation has
its slowest speed in the third experiment and as the sale price increases the speed of
this tendency becomes faster and it reaches to the fastest movement in the fifth
experiment. Also, the characterizations of the stability of EE for each experiment are
listed in Table 34.
Table 34: The ESS analysis of the experiments (3 – 5)
S:Stable - U:Unstable - NE:Nash Equilibrium
EXPERIMENTS
3

4

5

P

D=15.13 & C=18.69

D=15.13 & C=19.1

D=15.13 & C=25

payoff

11.37

49.54

215.35

EE

NE

S/U

NE

S/U

NE

S/U

E1

●

S

●

S

●

S

E2

U

U

U

E3

U

U

U

E4

●

S

●

S

●

S

E5

(0.02,0.98)

U

(0.50,0.50)

U

(0.94,0.06)

U
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Now, we can study the situation where the manufacturers can implement remanufacturing strategy. This game is also symmetrical. The minimum sale price that
makes the spare parts inventory game profitable for the manufacturers is calculated as
14.76, which is equal to the marginal cutting sale price. In Figure 35 the effect of the
re-manufacturing effort on minimum profit is depicted.
50

Minimum Payoff

0
0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

-50
-100
-150
-200

Re-manufacturing Effort

Figure 35: Minimum payoff vs. Re-manufacturing effort

The result shows us that implementing re-manufacturing effort of 17% can
guarantee the minimum payoff with value 10 with sale price of 14.76.

Probability of Next Game

0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
16.3

16.8

17.3

17.8

18.3

Slae Price
Figure 36: Probability of the next play vs. Cooperative Sale Price
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In order to satisfy the Prisoners’ Dilemma constraints, the minimum cooperative
sale price changes to 16.3 and the maximum cooperative sale price changes to 18.24.
Now, we can setup a repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma spare parts inventory game.
According to Equation (57), we can graph the threshold of the possibility of the future
game vs. the maximum cooperative sale price which states that manufacturers should
never defect as long as the probability of the future game is greater than the calculated
thresholds as Figure 36. The resulting payoff of the spare parts inventory game for
each manufacturer is depicted in Figure 37.
100
90

Payoff

80
70
60
50
40
16.3

16.8

17.3

17.8

18.3

Sale Price
Figure 37: Payoff vs. Cooperative Sale Price

To investigate the evolutionary stable strategies, two experiments have been
considered (the first experiment is the experiment with minimum acceptable sale price
and the second one is the experiment with maximum acceptable sale price). The phase
diagram of each experiment has been obtained as Figure 38. In the sixth experiment,
the tendency to leave the cooperation is fast and as sale price increases this movement
becomes slower till it reaches to its slowest speed in the seventh experiment.
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Figure 38: Phase diagram of experiments (6 & 7)

Also, the characterizations of the stability of EE for each experiment are listed in
Table 35.
Table 35: The ESS analysis of the experiments (6 & 7)
S:Stable - U:Unstable - NE:Nash Equilibrium
EXPERIMENTS
6

7

P

D=14.76 & C=16.3

D=14.76 & C=18.24

Payoff

10

10

EE

NE

S/U

NE

S/U

E1

U

U

E2

U

U

E3

U

U

E4

●

E5

NA

S

●

S

NA

The increase of the sale price above the value of maximum cooperative sale price
would change the game type from Prisoners’ Dilemma to Stag Hunt game. In the
following, three different sale prices have been provided that can be investigated via
ESS analysis. The phase diagram of each experiment has been obtained as Figure 39.
The tendency to join the cooperation has its slowest speed in the eighth experiment
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and as the sale price increases the speed of this tendency becomes faster and it reaches
to the fastest movement in the tenth experiment

Figure 39: Phase diagram of experiments (8 – 10)

Also, the characterizations of the stability of EE for each experiment are listed in
Table 36.
Table 36: The ESS analysis of the experiments (8 – 10)
S:Stable - U:Unstable - NE:Nash Equilibrium
EXPERIMENTS
8

9

10

P

D=14.76 & C=18.25

D=14.76 & C=18.66

D=14.76 & C=25

Payoff

11.49

49.65

224.14

EE

NE

S/U

NE

S/U

NE

S/U

E1

●

S

●

S

●

S

E2

U

U

U

E3

U

U

U

E4

●

S

●

S

●

S

E5

(0.02,0.98)

U

(0.50,0.50)

U

(0.94,0.06)

U

5.5. COOPERATIVE SPARE PARTS INVENTORY GAME

5.5.1. INTRODUCTION
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In this spare part inventory game, we study the inventory game in case of an Nperson and non-zero-sum game where players play simultaneously. Our game is
restricted in three-person (there are three manufacturers who can manufacture a
substitutable spare part), cooperative game setup. In our problem, we investigate the
cooperation of manufacturers while there is a cost asserted as a binding agreement
cost. Determination of decision-making on cooperation or defect depends on spare
part sale price variations and the cost of binding agreement which are investigated as
the Prisoners’ Dilemma and Stag Hunt game. Meanwhile different methods of benefit
allocation among cooperative manufacturers are investigated. Moreover, a centralized
inventory configuration for manufacturers who decide to rely on a cooperative
inventory system is designed and a comparison between inventory levels and cost of
inventory for two different cases of centralized and decentralized inventory
configuration is studied. To investigate the effect of the Green manufacturing on cost
of inventory we assume that one of the manufacturers can implement remanufacturing to produce spare parts and the role of re-manufacturing on payoffs of
the manufacturers in cooperative inventory games is investigated and the optimal level
of re-manufacturing effort is calculated.

5.5.2. COALITION AND BENEFIT ALLOCATION

In spare parts management, the variability of the demand affects the safety stock
and increase the average inventory cost. In this situation, risk pooling as a method to
protect against demand variability can decrease the average inventory. In spare parts
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business when there exists several companies that provide the same parts who may
have different high and low demands can take advantage of cooperation. Risk pooling
benefits from the aggregating demand across different manufacturers that results in
less volatile demand size and decrease the inventory cost. The profit of reduction in
cost of inventory should be allocated among the participants while the companies’
profit share may vary in relation to their demands behavior (Guajardo & Rӧnnqvist,
2012). The cost allocation in general parts inventory systems has been studied
adequately (Dror & Hartman, 2007, Gerchak & Gupta, 1991, Gupta & Srinivasa Rao,
1996, Bruce C Hartman et al., 2000, Robinson, 1993). However, the body of research
for the cost allocation in spare parts inventories is not extensive. The first study has
been carried out by (Wong et al., 2007) and recently series of related research has been
provided by (F. Karsten et al., 2012, FJP Karsten et al., 2009).
The goal of this section is to investigate the spare parts inventory problem as an
N-person non-zero-sum game where players (manufacturers) can cooperate or
compete with each other through cooperative or competitive sale prices strategies.
Manufacturers must play simultaneously, and in the case of cooperation, they have to
decide how to allocate the profit of the resulting coalition. In order to achieve this
goal, the problem is restricted to three-person game, and it is investigated through
cooperative game setup. The game has three players including three manufacturers
who manufacture a single-item substitutable spare part and compete with each other in
the market. Also, in another consideration, it is possible for manufacturers to
implement re-manufacturing effort into the manufacturing processes to increase their
profit.
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5.5.3. THE MARKET DEMAND

In this study it has been assumed that the OEM only has limited information
about the market’s expected demand. Original parts may face failure because of
defects and aging, and once they fail, demands for spare parts will arise. Therefore,
demands for spare parts depend on the following three factors:
•

Quality of parts;

•

Usage rate of products;

•

Maintenance quality of products;

Due to the nature of characteristics of spare parts demand, spare parts demand
arrival is considered as a Poisson process with a constant intensity factor or rate of
λ . The demand for the manufacturers follows a general linear demand function as

discussed in the section 5.3.3 where i=1,2,3 (number of the manufacturers) and j=4-i.

So the demand function can be written as Equation (68), where parameter λo is the

market base for the product, the parameter α is the self-price elastic coefficient and the

parameter β is the cross-price elastic coefficient.

This formula represents that the demand for the products depends on its own sale

price and its competitor sale price. We assume that the product’s demand is mostly
dependent on its own sale price, so we consider that α > β > 0 which means that the
demand for products is more sensitive to changes of the self-price sale.
We suppose that the manufacturers can only forecast the original products failure
rate or intensity factor that determines the expected demand for spare parts, which is
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parameter λ . In other words the mean of the market demand for spare parts is
derived based on Equation (70).

Do = λo −∝ ý N − 1 po − þ- p k ≠ i
≠ j and N = 3

+ β ýþ- p k ≠ i − N − 1 po

∀ i, j = 1,2,3 and i
(70)

5.5.4. THE MANUFACTURER COST FUNCTION-TRADITIONAL MANUFACTURER

The aim of our game is to develop an inventory control policy for the
manufacturers and study the cooperation between them and discuss about the profit
allocation among cooperative players. In case of traditional manufacturing, the
manufacturers manufacture products directly from the raw material, so the control
policy is the determination of the sale price strategies and inherently the level of

inventory. The payoff of the manufacturers is the profit of the manufacturer `K z o b

which is the difference between the cost of production and inventory `K ‘ o b and the
revenue `K ’ o b which attained by selling products.

The goal is to reach a low level of the backorder or a high level of fill rate with

minimum investment on inventory as it was discussed in the section 5.2.4. We must
calculate the cost of production and inventory, as well as the revenue from selling the
products. Equation (42) gives us the cost of production and inventory, Equation (43)
gives us the revenue of selling products and Equation (44) gives us the revenue of
selling products.
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As we can see the cost of the production and inventory is a function of demand
and inventory level, which are the strategic actions of the players. Moreover there are
different parameters that affect the cost of production and inventory. The parameters
in Equation (42) are listed in Table 37.
Table 37: Cost of production and inventory parameters
˜

Notation

Parameter definition

†™

Spare parts inventory level (in units)

™

Variable cost of production (in dollars per unit)

š

Penalty cost (in dollars per unit per period)
Holding cost (in dollars per unit per period)

Similarly the revenue of selling products is also a function of demand and
inventory level. The parameters in Equation (43) are listed in Table 38:
Table 38: Revenues of selling products parameters
—

Notation

Parameter definition

†‡

Variable cost of sells (in dollars per unit)

Demand (in units per period)

5.5.5. THE MANUFACTURER COST FUNCTION FOR THE RE-MANUFACTURER

We consider Green manufacturing as the process of re-manufacturing as it was
discussed in the section 5.3.5. By considering re-manufacturing process, Equation (71)
gives us the cost of production and inventory:
K‘ = `c‚ 1 − τ + cf τbS + p × EBO S + h × EI S + B

τ
2

(71)

Parameters are being used to calculate the cost of production and inventory while
using Green manufacturing are listed in Table 39:
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Table 39: Green manufacturing parameters
á

Notation

Parameter definition

Û®

remanufacturing effort

Æ

variable cost of remanufacturing (in dollars per units)
Collection scaling parameter

5.5.6. CENTRALIZED VS. DECENTRALIZED

Inventory pooling known as lateral transshipments and direct deliveries can help
companies to maintain high service levels with low cost. The effectiveness of the
spare parts inventory pooling or resupply has been investigated by (Muckstadt, 2004)
who provides examples of systems using centralized and decentralized strategies. The
author declared that in centralized arrangements companies can decrease the amount
of inventory and safety stocks to one third of the decentralized situation.
In our study, we assume that companies can cooperate with each other in two
different inventory systems coordination:
•

Decentralized;

•

Centralized;

In the decentralized coordination, each manufacturer has his own production and
inventory system, while in the centralized coordination, cooperative manufacturers run
a single inventory system to meet their cumulative demand.

5.5.7. COOPERATION AND BENEFIT ALLOCATION
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Companies who use complex machines need to stock low-demand expensive
spare parts. Those companies can cooperate with each other to meet their demands. A
diminished total cost of spare parts inventory is achievable and the distribution of
inventory costs among companies would be determined by using cooperative Game
Theory models (F. Karsten et al., 2006).
We assume that manufacturers can cooperate with each other based on their
product sale price. Also, in the case of centralized inventory system they can rely on a
single inventory system for their coalition. Hence, basically manufacturers have two
strategies to take:
•

Cooperate: Make a coalition and establish the product sale price based on
the coalition agreement to have an equally distributed market demand;

•

Defect: Decrease the sale price to encourage the market to purchase the
product from them;

In a cooperative game, communication between players is allowed, so they can
agree to reach a better outcome than Nash Equilibrium. Cooperative games can be
studied in characteristic function form. Our game in characteristic function form is a
set of N players and a function π which assigns a number π(S) to any subset S C N.

The number K z (S) assigned to the coalition (S) is interpreted as the amount that

players in the set (S) could win if they formed a coalition. A game in characteristic
form is said to be super-additive when K z S ∪ T ≥ K z S + K z T for any two

disjoint coalition S and T .

For a coalition S C N, we refer K z S to the optimal expected payoff if all players

in coalition S would implement cooperation. N is the grand coalition (N=3) where
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all 3 players cooperate with each other and K z N is its optimal expected payoff. For a

given benefit allocation we refer Vo to the benefit or payoff allocated to player i.
5.5.8. THE CORE OF THE GAME

A benefit allocation vector V = V , … , V´ is said to be in the core of the game if

it satisfies constraints formulated in Equations (72 – 74) (Rapoport, 1970, Martin
Shubik, 1985)(Guajardo & Rӧnnqvist, 2012).
Vo ≥ K z (i) ∀i ∈ N
-

o∈–

(72)

Vo ≥ K z (S) ∀S ∈ N

(73)

Vo = K z (N)

(74)

-

o∈

Constraint 1 or Equation (72) corresponds to the individually rational condition,
which says that the benefit allocated to each player i must not be greater than its standalone payoff. Constraint 2 or Equation (73) corresponds to a stability condition
(coalition rationality), which states that there is no subsets of players such that if they
would form a coalition separate from the rest they would perceive less benefit than the

allocation (V). Constraint 3 or Equation (74) corresponds to the efficiency condition
(collective rationality), which states that the sum of the benefits allocated to all the
players equals the optimal payoff of the grand coalition, and thus it takes full
advantage of cooperation. The core of the game is the set of all vectors (V) satisfying
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three aforementioned constraints. In other words, a payoff allocated vector in the core
assures that the savings of cooperation are achieved and makes all players to stay in
the grand coalition, without incentives for a player to stay alone or within a smaller
coalition.

5.5.9. BENEFIT ALLOCATION METHODS

In the case of coalition players can increase their payoffs or benefits. In this
section we introduce two different methods for the benefit allocation among players of
the game.

5.5.9.1.

SHAPLEY VALUE

Shapley (Shapley, 1952) suggested a solution concept for cooperative games
which provides a unique imputation and represents payoffs distributed fairly by an
outside arbitrator. The Shapley value is determined based on three axioms:
•

The symmetries in payoffs (Axiom 1);

•

Irrelevance of a dummy player (Axiom 2);

•

The sum of two games (Axiom 3);

Axiom 1 implies that if some players have symmetric roles in payoff then the
Shapley values to these players should be the same. From Axiom 2, the Shapley value
to the player who adds nothing to any coalition should be determined as zero. Axiom 3
says that if two games have the same player set, then the characteristic value of the
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sum game for any coalition should be the sum of the characteristic values of two
games. Based on the three Axioms, Shapley determines the unique values that is

derived from Equation (75) in which S denotes a coalition and |S| is the size of S

(Leng & Parlar, 2005).

Vo = -

o∈–

5.5.9.2.

|S| − 1 ! N − |S| !
WK z S − K z S − i X
N!

(75)

BARGAINING SET

In a cooperative game if players desire the stability offered by the core, they will
be unable to reach an agreement, so they have no choice but to relax their stability
requirements. The bargaining set is a solution that allows players to reach an
agreement while guaranteeing some stability (Aumann & Maschler, 1961, Davis &
Maschler, 1962).
In a game with coalition structure, an objection of player i against player j is a
pair (P,Y) where:
•
•
•

P C N is a coalition such that i ∈ P and j ∉ P;

Y ≤ K z P (Y is a feasible payoff distribution for the players in P);

∀k ∈ P, Y ≥ V and Yo > Vo (player i strictly benefits from Y, and the
other members of P do not do worse in Y than in V);

An objection (P,Y) of player i against player j is a potential threat by coalition

P , which contains i but not j , to deviate from V . The goal is not to change S ,

but to obtain a side payment from j to i to modify V .
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An counter-objection to (P,Y) is a pair (Q,Z) where:
•
•
•
•

Q C N is a coalition such that i ∈ Q and j ∉ Q;

Y is a feasible payoff distribution for the players in Q ;

Zh ≤ K z Q

∀k ∈ Q, Z ≥ V

the members of Q get at least the value in V ;

∀k ∈ Q ∩ P, Z ≥ Y

the members of Q which are also members of P

get at least the value promised in the objection ;

In a counter-objection, player j must show that it can protect its payoff K z j in

spite of the existing objection of i .

A game with coalition structure the vector V = V , … , V´ is stable if for each

objection at V there is a counter-objection. The pre-bargaining set preBS is the set of

all stable members of V = V , … , V´ , so core N, K z , S CpreBS N, K z , S .
Let I N, K z, S = VϵV

rational payoff vector in V

, ,–

, • ,–

Vo ≥ K z {i} ∀i ∈ N

be the set of individually

. The bargaining set BS is defined by Equation (76):

BS N, π, S = I N, π, S ∩ preBS N, π, S

(76)

5.5.10. THE GAME SETUP

Game Theory is applied to determine the inventory control policy for
manufacturers who manufacture a single part and sell it to the market while they can
cooperate or compete with each other. Our inventory game has two players who have
two different strategies: coalition or competition. Decision-making on sale price (and
re-manufacturing efforts in a Green manufacturing situation) involves strategies which
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determine their production lot-size and inventory levels. The market has a cyclic
demand which is stochastic, and in each period the market base for the spare part for
each manufacturer is known and the distribution of the demand is Poisson. The total
demand has to be distributed among players and manufacturers’ sale price strategies
affect their allocated demand. In this environment manufacturers can cooperate with
each other or compete with each other that means each of them has two strategies:
•

Strategy 1: Coalition, manufacturers set their sale prices in such a way that
gives them the highest profit;

•

Strategy 2: Competition, manufacturers set their sale prices in such a way
that attracts more demand share;

The inventory game is a three-person non-zero-sum game, so we are looking for
Nash Equilibrium as the solution of the game. Based on the players strategies
(cooperate or defect) different payoffs would be assigned for each manufacturer. The
payoff matrix is depicted in Table 40.
Table 40: The payoff matrix of inventory game
MANUFACTURER 3
(C)

(D)

MANUFACTURER 1

MANUFACTURER 2

MANUFACTURER 2

(C)

(D)

(C)

(D)

(C)

K z CCC, K z CCC, K z 5 CCC

K z CDC, K z CDC, K z 5 CDC

K z CCD, K z CCC, K z 5 CCD

K z CDD, K z CDD, K z 5 CDD

(D)

K z DCC, K z DCC, Kz 5 DCC

K z DDC, K z DDC, K z 5 DDC

K z DCD, K z DCD, K z 5 DCD

K z DDD, K z DDD, K z 5 DDD

Moreover we assume that in the case of cooperation, each manufacturer must

invest on the cooperation agreement with the value K
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ã

.

Also, it has to be mentioned that the payoff matrix has been provided for two
different scenarios of centralized and decentralized inventory management. In the
centralized strategies, cooperative manufacturers run a single inventory system to meet
their cumulative demand while in decentralized situation each manufacturer has his
own inventory system.
Investigation of the payoff matrix tells us, changes in the value of the cooperation

agreement or K

ã

determines the type of the spare parts inventory game. In other

words, the aforementioned value changes the type of the game from Stag Hunt game
to Prisoners’ Dilemma and non-emptiness of the core of the game which affects the
cooperation of the manufacturers. The following procedure determines the type of the
game and the non-emptiness of the core:

•

If K

ã

Kz

≤ Min K z
Kz

− K z rrr
− K z rrr
−

5

K z 5rrr

the cooperative strategy is feasible for

manufacturers, otherwise there is no motivation for cooperation;

•

If K

ã

Kz

rr

≤ Max K z r

r
5
K z rr

− K zrrr
− K zrrr
−

K z5rrr

the cooperate strategy dominates the

defect strategy, or the game has a Nash Equilibrium which is the
cooperate;

•

Kz

rr

If Max K zr

r
5
K zrr

− K z rrr
− K z rrr
−

K z 5rrr

≤K

ã

Kz

≤ Min K z
Kz

5

− Kzr
− Kz
− Kz

5

r

r

the game

has two Nash Equilibriums which are the cooperate and the defect or the
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game is a Stag Hunt game, but according to the cooperation agreement
manufacturers can benefit more through cooperation;

•

If K

ã

Kz

≥ Min K z
Kz

5

− Kzr
− Kz
− Kz

5

r

r

the game has a Nash Equilibrium which

is the defect or the game is a Prisoners’ Dilemma game, but according to
the cooperation agreement manufacturers can benefit more through
cooperation;

•

If K

ã

≤ Min

` •
` •
` •

g •
g •
g •

b2` •
b2` •
b2` •

g •
g •
g •

b

b!
b

the essential constraint of

the core of the game is satisfied;

5.5.11. NUMERICAL STUDY

In this section the inventory management of the manufacturers during 1-year of
production has been investigated. We assumed that the manufacturers possess the
market base demand for the product during the production year. In order to generate
the payoff matrix for the game, it is assumed that the production, inventory and
marketing conditions are not changing during the production horizon and the required
parameters are consistent with Table 41.
We suppose all the parameters are the same for all manufacturers except fill rates

and the lead-time T is 1-year.
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Table 41: Sample parameters used to generate the payoff matrix
Traditional manufacturer
Notation

ˆ

Parameter value

ÁŠ

3

"

70

Cooperate:150 & Defect:100

α

0.005

Š

Á#

40

2

β

0.003

EFR

M1= 0.79, M2=0.89, M3=0.99

First, we start with the decentralized coordination where manufacturers are
traditional manufacturers. The resulting payoff matrix is depicted in Table 42. The
core of the game is non-empty and in the normalized form the resulting imputation
ratios for the manufacturers are [0.5386 0.5293 0.5138].
Table 42: The payoff matrix of inventory game - Decentralized coordination & Traditional
manufacturer

MANUFACTURER 1

MANUFACTURER 3
(C)

(D)

MANUFACTURER 2

MANUFACTURER 2

(C)

(D)

(C)

(D)

(C)

153.2,162.6,114.3

132.1,54.4,57

132.1,122.3,-35

99,31,-35

Demand

3,3,3

2.6,3.8,2.6

2.6,2.6,3.8

2.2,3.4,3.4

Inventory

5,6,8

5,7,8

5,6,10

4,7,9
31,25,-34

(D)

54.3,122.3,57

N:0 44,30,-71

N:0 44,98,-34.3

Demand

3.8,2.6,2.6

3.4,3.4,2.2

3.4,2.2,3.4

3,3,3

Inventory

6,6,8

6,7,7

6,5,9

5,6,8

Investigation of the payoff matrix provides the following information:
•

If K

ã

If K

ã

≤ 122.2 the cooperative strategy is feasible for manufacturers,

otherwise there is no motivation for cooperation;

•

≤ 73 the cooperate strategy dominates the defect strategy, or the

game has a Nash Equilibrium which is the cooperate;
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•

If 73 ≤ K

ã

≤ 98.9 the game has two Nash Equilibriums which are (i)

cooperate, and (ii) defect, or the game is a Stag Hunt game, but by a
cooperation agreement manufacturers, can gain additional benefits;

•

If K

ã

≥ 98.9 the game has a Nash Equilibrium which is the defect or the

game is a Prisoners’ Dilemma game, but according to the cooperation
agreement manufacturers can benefit more through cooperation;

•

If K

ã

≤ 94.15 the essential constraint of the core of the game is

satisfied;

In Figure 40 the maximum expected payoff of the game for each manufacturer
based on bargaining set and Shapley value has been depicted.

Figure 40: Manufacturers’ maximum expected payoffs - Decentralized coordination
Traditional manufacturers

Then, we investigate the centralized coordination where manufacturers are
traditional manufacturers. The resulting payoff matrix is depicted in Table 43. The
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core of the game is non-empty and in the normalized form the resulting imputation
ratios for the manufacturers are [0.5304 0.5402 0.5335].
Table 43: The payoff matrix of inventory game - Centralized coordination & Traditional manufacturer
MANUFACTURER 3
(C)

(D)

MANUFACTURER 1

MANUFACTURER 2

MANUFACTURER 2

(C)

(D)

(C)

(D)

(C)

N: 1&2&3 638.3

N:1&3 280.4,54.4

N:1&2 343.5,-34.8

N:0 99,31,-34.3

Demand

9

5.2,3.8

5.2,3.8

2.2,3.4,3.4

Inventory

17

12,7

9,10

4,7,9

(D)

N:2&3 280.4,54.3

N:0 44,30,-71

N:0 44,98,-34.3

N:0 31,25,-34

Demand

5.2,3.8

3.4,3.4,2.2

3.4,2.2,3.4

3,3,3

Inventory

12,6

6,7,7

6,5,9

5,6,8

Investigation of the payoff matrix provides the following information:
•

If K

ã

If K

ã

≤ 181.76 the cooperative strategy is feasible for manufacturers,

otherwise there is no motivation for cooperation;

•

≤ 73 the cooperate strategy dominates the defect strategy, or the

game has a Nash Equilibrium which is the cooperate;

•

If 72 ≤ K

ã

≤ 158.36 the game has two Nash Equilibriums which are (i)

cooperate, and (ii) defect, or the game is a Stag Hunt game, but by a
cooperation agreement manufacturers, can gain additional benefits;

•

If K

ã

≥ 158.36 the game has a Nash Equilibrium which is the defect or

the game is a Prisoners’ Dilemma game, but according to the cooperation
agreement manufacturers can benefit more through cooperation;

•

If K

ã

≤ 141.7 the essential constraint of the core of the game is satisfied,

so this game does not match the Prisoners’ Dilemma, and it remains as a
Stag Hunt game while 73 ≤ K

ã
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≤ 141.7;

In Figure 41 the maximum expected payoff of the game for each manufacturer
based on bargaining set and Shapley value has been depicted.

Figure 41: Manufacturers’ maximum expected payoffs - Centralized coordination
Traditional manufacturers

Now, we can consider the effect of re-manufacturing. It is assumed that only one
of the manufacturers can switch to re- manufacturing to benefit more in their payoffs.
The required parameters are listed in the Table 47:
Table 44: Sample parameters used to generate the payoff matrix
Green manufacturer
á

Notation

Parameter value

Û®

0<À<1

Æ

25
50

First, we study the decentralized coordination where there is a Green
manufacturer. The resulting payoff matrix is depicted in Table 45. The optimal level
of GMEP is 30%. The core of the game is non-empty and in the normalized form the
resulting imputation ratios for the manufacturers are [0.5386 0.5293 0.5138].
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Table 45: The payoff matrix of inventory game - Decentralized coordination & Green manufacturer

MANUFACTURER 1

MANUFACTURER 3
(C)

(D)

MANUFACTURER 2

MANUFACTURER 2

(C)

(D)

(C)

(D)

(C)

153.2,162.6,132.3

132.1,54.4,75

132.1,122.3,-12.3

99,31,-14

Demand

3,3,3

2.6,3.8,2.6

2.6,2.6,3.8

2.2,3.4,3.4

Inventory

5,6,8

5,7,8

5,6,10

4,7,9

(D)

54.3,122.3,75

44,30,-55.7

44,98,-14

31,25,-16

Demand

3.8,2.6,2.6

3.4,3.4,2.2

3.4,2.2,3.4

3,3,3

Inventory

6,6,8

6,7,7

6,5,9

5,6,8

Investigation of the payoff matrix provides the following information:
•

If K

ã

If K

ã

≤ 122.2 the cooperative strategy is feasible for manufacturers,

otherwise there is no motivation for cooperation;

•

≤ 73 the cooperate strategy dominates the defect strategy, or the

game has a Nash Equilibrium which is the cooperate;

•

If 73 ≤ K

ã

≤ 98.9 the game has two Nash Equilibriums which are (i)

cooperate and, (i) defect, or the game is a Stag Hunt game, but by a

cooperation agreement manufacturers, can gain additional benefits;

•

If K

ã

≥ 98.9 the game has a Nash Equilibrium which is the defect or the

game is a Prisoners’ Dilemma game, but according to the cooperation
agreement manufacturers can benefit more through cooperation;

•

If K

ã

≤ 94.15 the essential constraint of the core of the game is satisfied,

so this game does not match the Prisoners’ Dilemma, and it remains as a
Stag Hunt game while 73 ≤ K

ã

≤ 94.15;

In Figure 42 the maximum expected payoff of the game for each manufacturer
based on bargaining set and Shapley value has been depicted.
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Figure 42: Manufacturers’ maximum expected payoffs - Decentralized coordination
Green manufacturer (M3)

Then, we investigate the centralized coordination where there is a Green
manufacturer. The resulting payoff matrix is depicted in Table 46. The optimal level
of GMEP is 30%. The core of the game is non-empty and in the normalized form the
resulting imputation ratios for the manufacturers are [0.5338 0.5436 0.5295].
Table 46: The payoff matrix of inventory game - Centralized coordination & Green manufacturer
MANUFACTURER 3
(C)

(D)

MANUFACTURER 1

MANUFACTURER 2

(C)

MANUFACTURER 2

(C)

(D)

(C)

(D)

N: 1&2&3 651.1

N:1&3 293.9,54.4

N:1&2 343.5,-12.3

N:0 99,31,-14

Demand

9

5.2,3.8

5.2,3.8

2.2,3.4,3.4

Inventory

17

12,7

9,10

4,7,9

(D)

N:2&3 293.9,54.3

44,30,-55.7

44,98,-14

N:0 31,25,-16

Demand

5.2,3.8

3.4,3.4,2.2

3.4,2.2,3.4

3,3,3

Inventory

12,6

6,7,7

6,5,9

5,6,8

Investigation of the payoff matrix provides the following information:
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•

If K

ã

≤ 186 the cooperative strategy is feasible for manufacturers,

otherwise there is no motivation for cooperation;
•

If K

ã

≤ 73 the cooperate strategy dominates the defect strategy, or the

game has a Nash Equilibrium which is the cooperate;

•

If 73 ≤ K

ã

≤ 162.6 the game has two Nash Equilibriums which are the

cooperate and the defect or the game is a Stag Hunt game, but according
to the cooperation agreement manufacturers can benefit more through
cooperation;

•

If K

ã

≥ 162.6 the game has a Nash Equilibrium which is the defect or

the game is a Prisoners’ Dilemma game, but according to the cooperation
agreement manufacturers can benefit more through cooperation;

•

If K

ã

≤ 139.5 the essential constraint of the core of the game is satisfied,

so this game has no Prisoners’ Dilemma type and it remains as a Stag
Hunt game while 73 ≤ K

ã

≤ 139.5;

Figure 43: Manufacturers’ maximum expected payoffs - Centralized coordination
Green manufacturer
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In Figure 43 the maximum expected payoff of the game for each manufacturer
based on bargaining set and Shapley value has been depicted.
In Table 47 the cumulative payoff, the cumulative inventory level and GMEP for
the Green manufacturer of the game for different combinations of decentralized,
centralized, traditional and Green manufacturing are listed.
•

Decentralized, traditional manufacturer main manufacturer (DC-T);

•

Decentralized, Green manufacturer main manufacturer (DC-G);

•

Centralized, traditional manufacturer main manufacturer (C-T);

•

Centralized, Green manufacturer main manufacturer (C-G);
Table 47: The cumulative payoff
DC-T

DC-G

C-T

C-G

TOTAL PAYOFF

430.1

448.1

638.3

651.1

TOTAL INVENTORY
LEVEL

19

19

17

17

GMEP

0

30

0

30

5.6. SPARE PARTS’ PRICE LEADERSHIP

5.6.1. INTRODUCTION

In the aftermarket business, the supply of spare parts can be investigated through
the life span of the parent product. In other words, the spare part supply can be
categorized into two periods of the time span before end-of-production of parent
product and the time span after that period. In first period, OEMs have a monopolistic
market for their aftersales services but in the second period there is a competition
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among OEMs and will-fitters. Game Theory can improve or clarify interactions
between different manufacturers who are competing against each other based on
determination of sale prices to attract more market demand share. In our study, we
consider the OEM as the price leader and the will-fitters as fringe and the spare part
inventory game is setup as a competitive fringe game. The solution of the game
determines the OEM sale price decision-making and inventory level.

5.6.2. COMPETITIVE FRINGE SPARE PART INVENTORY GAME

Spare parts are manufactured along with the original or parent product. The
manufacturer keeps the inventory of spare parts for after sale services during warranty
period, rendering period, and post warranty period. Availability of the spare parts
during the life span of the product affects the competitiveness of the OEM in the
market, meanwhile there are some legal obligations for the OEM to supply spare parts
during that period in some countries. In other words, the OEM should supply spare
parts for the parent product during product life cycle and the time span between endof-production and end-of-service. For instance, in automobile industry in Germany,
the life span of the products is 15 years (Inderfurth & Mukherjee, 2008).
Normally there is a monopoly for the OEM to supply spare parts during the
product life cycle. By the beginning of the end-of-production, other manufacturers
who can produce the same parts, known as will-fitters, enter to the aftermarket and
absorb some share of the demand for spare parts. When a monopoly ends, the OEM
maintains a cost advantage over later manufacturers. The OEM becomes a dominant
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firm: a price-setting firm that competes with price taking firms. The small price taking
firms that compete with a dominant firm are called the competitive fringe.
In other words, the dominant-firm model of price leadership assumes that there is
a main manufacturer known as OEM and many small manufacturers known as willfitters whose production rates are not large enough to affect the sale price. According
to (Scherer & Ross, 1970), “Dominant firm price leadership occurs when an industry
consists of one firm dominant in the customary sense of the world i.e. controlling at
least 50% of the total industry output plus a competitive fringe of firms, each too small
to exert a perceptible influence on price through its individual output decisions”.
When will-fitters in the fringe acting as price takers, the OEM is left as the only player
who is able to set price and maximize the profit subject to its residual demand curve.

5.6.3. THE MARKET DEMAND

In many markets, the successful manufacturer has the skill to plan its
production/inventory in advance to take benefit of the predicted demand conditions. In
fact, a considerable amount of time and money is spent to forecast the demand. In a
competitive market, the transmission of the information from demanders to suppliers
is not efficient. The dominant firm has an incentive to invest in demand information,
and the size of the competitive fringe depends on information costs and demand
variability. In other words, the competitive fringe shrinks when the information cost
and demand variability increase.
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During the product life cycle, the OEM manages its spare parts production and
inventory economically in a monopolistic market. Moreover, the demand for spare
parts is predictable because of existence of the customer linkage, current information
on performance of the market demand for the parent product and up-to-date time
series data (Inderfurth & Mukherjee, 2008). Once the OEM stops the production of the
parent product, the time span between end-of-production and end-of-service, there is
no demand for the parent product but spare parts should be supplied as the
replacement parts for the existing products. Spare parts management in this phase
become challenging because of the demand uncertainty and emergence of the willfitters into the market.
Spare parts demand is intermittent and due to the nature of characteristics of spare
parts demand, we can consider the demand for spare parts as a Poisson process as it
was discussed in the section 5.2.3. The OEM can forecast the parent products failure
rate or intensity factor that determines the expected overall demand for spare parts,
which is parameter λ . We suppose that the sale price affects the overall market

demand. Once the OEM raises the price, some customers will leave the market and

their demand is met from refurbished parts by third parties. The overall market

demand is a function of sale price c> and the parent product failure rate λ as it is
formulated in Equation (77) that provides the market demand curve. The OEM differs

from a monopolist in one respect. If the monopolist raises the sale price, some
customers will leave the market. However, if the OEM raises the price, there is a
possibility that a price increase encourages some customers to start buying from the
will-fitters. So the OEM must factors in the reaction of the will-fitters.
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Q r = f c> , λ

(77)

5.6.4. THE MANUFACTURER COST FUNCTION

The manufacturers cost function includes cost of production, holding cost and
backorder cost. The OEM strategies are determination of the sale price and the spare
parts stock level in the order-up-to level inventory that it was discussed in the section
5.2.4. In this section, implementation of the order-up-to level inventory policy is
explained and the marginal costs of production and inventory for the manufacturers
(MCo ∀i ∈ {OEM &will − fitters}) are provided.
We must calculate the cost of production and inventory. Equation (78) gives us
the cost of production and inventory in which expected backorder (EBO) and expected
inventory (EI) are calculated from Equations (40 & 41):
MC1 = c‚o × S1 + p1 × EBO S1 + h1 × EI S1

(78)

The profit or the payoff the manufacturers is calculated as the difference between
revenue from selling parts and cost of production and inventory which is described in
Equation (79) in which expected fill rate (EFR) is calculated from Equation (39):
Π1 = c> × Q1 × EFR S1 − MC1

(79)

As we can see the cost of the production and inventory is a function of demand
and order-up-to level which is the strategic actions of the players. Moreover there are
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different parameters that affect the cost of production and inventory. The required
parameters are listed in Table 48.
Table 48: Cost of production and inventory parameters
˜

Notation

Parameter definition

†™
™

Variable cost of production (in dollars per unit)

*

Sale price (in dollars per unit)

Spare parts inventory level (in units)

š

†‡

Penalty cost (in dollars per unit per period)
Holding cost (in dollars per unit per period)

Demand

We suppose that both the OEM and will-fitters are applying one-for-one policy
for their spare parts inventory management. According to the formulation and
parameters that are introduced in this section, the marginal costs of the manufacturers
are calculated.

5.6.5. THE GAME SETUP

In our study, the spare part inventory control is modeled as a dominant firm with
a competitive fringe game where the OEM plays as the dominant firm and the willfitters are playing as the competitive fringe. This game is the combination of the
monopoly and perfect competition games. As in perfect competition, it is rational to
assume that the small firms or will-fitter are price takers. However, it is not rational to
neglect the impact of the OEM price setting. Therefore, the OEM sets the market price
and the will-fitters form their inventory decision-making considering this market price.
The OEM is Strategic, means it takes into account the impact that its actions have on
the will-fitters’ actions. The will-fitters are Non-strategic.
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The equilibrium of the dominant firm-competitive fringe determines the
manufacturers spare part inventory policy including the OEM price setting and
allocation of the market demand among the manufacturers and consequently the level
of inventory.
The solution of the game can be described in three steps as follows:
•

Find the residual demand;

•

Find the OEM’s optimal quantity supply;

•

Find price and will-fitters quantity supply;

The residual demand equals to the difference between market demand and willfitters marginal cost when price is:
•

Below the intersection of market demand and will-fitters marginal cost;

•

Above the vertical intercept of will-fitters marginal cost;

Otherwise the residual demand equals to the market demand. Intersection of the
market demand and will-fitters marginal cost is calculated from Equation (80):
Q r c> = Q ‘

Ÿ+

c> ∴ solve for c> → c>∗ = c>

(80)

Vertical intercept of the will-fitters marginal cost is derived from Equation (81):
Q‘

Ÿ+

c> = 0 ∴ solve for c> → c>∗ = c>

(81)

So the final residual demand is calculated from Equation (82):

Residual Demand = ,

Q r c> − Q ‘
Q r c>
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Ÿ+

c>

if c> ≤ c> < c>
otherwise

-

(82)

The OEM’s optimal quantity supply Qãä‘ is determined by MR = MCãä‘ .

MR , is the inverse residual demand with double the slope. Therefore, the OEM will

allocate Qãä‘ units out of the overall market demand to itself. The price setting c>∗

is given by substituting Qãä‘ into the inverse residual demand MR . Finally, the

will-fitters quantity supply Q ./ is given by the will-fitters marginal curve at the
setting price c>∗ .

5.6.6. NUMERICAL STUDY

In this section the spare part inventory management of a single-item for the
manufacturers during 1-year of production has been investigated. We assume that the
OEM possesses the market demand intensity rate during the time span after product
life cycle. The game has two types of players: the OEM and will-fitters and the
solution of the dominant firm-competitive fringe game provides price setting and
inventory policy for the manufacturers.
We suppose that will-fitters are acting as fringe altogether, and each manufacturer
implements its own inventory and production settings. These required parameters for
the OEM and will-fitters are listed in Table 49. Both manufacturers have the same
lead-time and fill rates.
Table 49: Sample parameters used to generate the marginal costs
Notation
ÁŠ

OEM

Will-fitter

Š

8

10

80

100

Á#

1.6

2

Decision
variable

Price taker

"
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Notation

OEM

Will-fitter

T

1

1

EFR

>0.8

>0.8

The overall market demand arrives as a Poisson process and the intensity rate of
the demand is a function of the sale price that is given as an arbitrary function
(Equation 83):
Qr =

02²1
E.ç

(83)

The cost of production and inventory for the OEM and will-fitters are calculated
based on implementing order-up-to level inventory policy and the results are listed in
Table 50:
Table 50: The manufacturers’ costs

2Ü•5••26577‹Œ

Initial cost

2Ü342

1

29.1

36.38

2

41.33

51.66

3

54.19

67.63

4

67.72

84.65

5

78.76

98.46

6

89.96

116.03

7

101.23

126.53

8

112.53

140.66

9

123.83

154.78

10

133.65

167.07

S

9.83

12.29

In figure 44 the trend of the suppliers’ inventory costs vs quantity supply is
depicted. As we can see, it is practical to consider this trend linear, which results in a
constant marginal cost. The solution of the game is represented in figure 45 and
explained as the three following steps:
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180
160

Inventory Cost

140
120
100
80

OEM

60

Will-fitters

40
20
0
0.00

2.00

4.00

6.00

8.00

10.00

Quantity Supply

Figure 44: The Dominant firm-competitive fringe inventory costs vs. quantity supply

Step1: Find the residual demand

W0,4X

Residual Demand = 8 17 − 9:
0.5

if c> ≥ 15

otherwise

;

Step 2: Find the OEM’s optimal quantity supply
Inverse Residual Demand =
MR =

15.124
−Q + 17

15.124
−0.5Q + 17

if 0 ≤ Q < 4
'
otherwise

if 0 ≤ Q < 4
'
otherwise

MR Q = MCãä‘ Q ∴ solve for Q → Q∗ãä‘ = 5

Step 3: Find price and will-fitters quantity supply
Replace Q∗ãä‘ in Inverse Residual Demand ∴ 17 − 0.5Q∗ãä‘ → c>∗ = 14.5

Replace c>∗ in MC…~ ∴ Q∗…~ = 0
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Optimal Price

Figure 45: Price-supply diagram

After determination of the price setting, and the optimal quantity of the
manufacturers we can refer to the marginal cost function and determine the allocated
order-up-to levels for each manufacturer. Table 51 lists the optimal sale price, quantity
supply and levels of inventory for the OEM:
Table 51: The optimal spare part inventory policy
Notation

OEM

Á#

5

Q

14.5

<

8

S

12.5

So the OEM enters the parts to the market with a price that makes the will-fitters
to drop out of the market and leave all of the demand to the OEM. The potential
supply of fringe is irrelevant and the OEM becomes a monopoly. In another scenario
we assume that the OEM still follows order-up-to level inventory policy and fringe
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firms supply spare parts to the market with a given quantity-price function or supply
curve that is known by the OEM. In other words, the overall market demand rate is
Qr = 30 − c> and the will-fitters supply curve is ßQ…~ =

²1 2 =
E.>

à which are predicted

by the OEM. The solution of the game is represented in figure 46 that results in

Q∗ãä‘ = 10.26 , Q∗…~ = 3.23 , c>∗ = 16.59 and the demand rate that is satisfied

through refurbishment is 16.51.
40
35
30
25
Price

OEM's Marginal cost
Will-fitters Supply

20

Overall Market Demand
15

OEM's Marginal Revenue
Residual Demand

10
5
0
0

5

10

15

20

25

30

Quantity Supply

Figure 46: The competitive fringe price-supply diagram

In next section we investigate the effect of holding cost on pricing strategy. In
table 52, the changes of the OEM’s holding cost and its effect on the price setting,
OEM’s marginal cost, allocated demand rate, optimal sale price, average inventory
level, cost and profit are listed.
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Table 52: The effect of holding cost on pricing strategy
h

MC

QOEM

QWF

Price

AIL

Cost

Profit

0.40

11.77

10.60

3.04

16.44

3.67

147.87

5.79

0.80

11.87

10.49

3.11

16.49

3.77

147.49

6.98

1.20

11.97

10.38

3.17

16.54

3.87

147.29

7.90

1.60

12.07

10.26

3.23

16.59

3.97

147.28

8.53

2.00

12.17

10.15

3.29

16.64

4.08

147.45

8.89

2.40

12.27

10.03

3.36

16.69

4.18

147.80

8.98

2.80

12.37

9.92

3.42

16.74

4.29

148.33

8.78

3.20

12.47

9.81

3.48

16.79

4.40

149.04

8.31

3.60

12.57

9.69

3.54

16.84

4.51

149.93

7.58

4.00

12.67

9.58

3.61

16.89

4.62

150.99

6.57
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CHAPTER 6

6. CONCLUSION

The comparison of the renewal cost and replacement cost of different products
with variety of prices and parts declares that the cost of the renewal of the products is
significantly higher than the replacement cost. This implies that the price of the spare
parts is much more than the cost of the parent products and the ratio between the
renewal cost and the replacement cost follows a certain pattern. The consistency of
this ratio states that most OEMs implement cost-based or mark-up pricing to retrieve
the final price of spare parts. The main disadvantages of cost-based pricing are underpricing and over-pricing that leads to lower-than-average profitability, and ignoring
competitiveness of the parts in the market. These factors are against the spare parts
prices sustainability. This issue has been addressed as a competition-based pricing or
strategic pricing by setting up the spare parts inventory games that are listed in Table
53.
Table 53: List of spare parts inventory games
Game

Players

Cooperation

1

OEM Against Market

OEM & Market

Non-cooperative e

2

OEM Against Will-fitter

OEM, Will-fitter & Market

Non-cooperative

3

Evolutionay Spare Parts
Inventory Game

OEM and Will-fitter

Cooperative/Non-cooperative

4

Cooperative Spare Parts
Inventory Game

3-Manufacturer

Cooperative

5

Spare Parts‘ Price Leadership

OEM & Will-fitters

Non-cooperative
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In the first game, Game Theory is applied to determine the sale price and the
spare part stock level for an OEM who manufactures single-item spare parts, keeps
them in the inventory with order-up-to level inventory policy and sells them to the
market. This non-cooperative game has two players: the OEM and the market. In the
aftermarket business, other than the OEM as an original manufacturer, there are other
low cost manufacturers, known as will-fitters, and they compete with each other on
their sale prices to absorb more customers. The OEM possesses the information of the
original parts failure rates and can predict the allocated demand rates including: the
upper bound intensity factor and the lower bound intensity factor with respect to its
selected sale price. The market can be considered as an unreasoning entity whose
strategic choices affect the payoff the OEM, but which has no interest in the outcome
of the game. In this game there is no dominant level of inventory for the OEM, so the
game has the mixed strategy solution. The solution of the mixed strategy provides the
OEM’s optimal sale price and the OEM’s expected payoff distribution in relation to
the market’s expected demand. The OEM chooses his optimal level of inventory with
respect to the probability of intensity factors that the market can choose among them.
Furthermore, the comparison of the maximum attainable payoff and guaranteed payoff
in the uncertain situation would justify the OEM’s extra investment on the demand
forecasting efforts.
The second game studies the spare parts inventory problem as an N-person nonzero-sum single-shot game. This non-cooperative game has three players: the OEM,
the will-fitter and the market. The manufacturers can only forecast the market’s base
demand for the parts during the production horizon. The game has been modeled as a
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game against nature which means the manufacturers play against the market. In this
game there is no dominant level of inventory for the OEM, so the game has the mixed
strategy solution. The solution of the mixed strategy determines the strategy of the
OEM to maximize his payoff in the aftermarket business. The strategies of the OEM
are the determination of the level of inventory and sale prices in traditional
manufacturing system. Furthermore, in another consideration, we implement the remanufacturing processes in the inventory game in which the OEM has an ability to
produce the whole or some part of his production out of the recycling process or remanufacturing. In this environment, the solution of the game provides the remanufacturing effort and the cost of collection of reusable products for the OEM. In
other words, the theory of games in our spare parts inventory problem provides the
expected payoff distribution in relation to the probability of the market’s expected
actions. The OEM chooses his optimal level of inventory, pricing strategy and remanufacturing effort with respect to the probability of the demand distribution.
The third game investigates the spare parts inventory problem as an N-person,
non-zero-sum and repeated game. This cooperative/non-cooperative game has two
players: the OEM and his competitor known as the will-fitter. It has been assumed that
the original product is in its normal or repetitive phase. In this phase, demands for
spare parts are stochastic and repetitive which arrive as a Poisson process. The
manufacturers are implementing the Newsvendor inventory policy to stock spare parts
for the upcoming demands over the production horizon. Manufacturers must decide on
their pricing strategy and respectively their level of inventory to optimize their payoff
in the aftermarket. The pricing strategies have been investigated through repeated
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Prisoners’ Dilemma game and ESS analysis where there is a transition from Prisoners’
Dilemma to Stag Hunt games. Moreover, the effect of the re-manufacturing is
investigated as an option for the manufacturers to manufacture more sustainable parts
and increase the profitability of the spare parts business. Based on the results that have
been provided in previous sections we can present the following conclusions:
1. The minimum sale price that makes the spare parts inventory game
profitable for the manufacturers is derived which is defined as the
marginal cutting sale price.
2. The minimum cooperative sale price that establishes the spare parts
inventory game as a Prisoners’ Dilemma is derived.
3. The maximum cooperative sale price is derived which states that
manufacturers should never defect as long as there is a probability for the
future game.
4. The results of the ESS state that the Nash Equilibrium of the Prisoners’
Dilemma spare parts inventory game is (DD), which means both players
defect, and the equilibrium point is evolutionary stable (ES).
5. The increase of the sale price above the value of the maximum
cooperative sale price changes the game type from Prisoners’ Dilemma to
Stag Hunt game.
6. The Stag Hunt spare parts inventory game has two Nash Equilibriums and
it has a mixed strategy solution. In other words, this game has two ES
equilibriums (including cooperation and defect) and it has unstable mixed
strategy equilibrium.
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7. In Stag Hunt game, as sale price increases the chance of cooperation
increases.
8. The optimal re-manufacturing effort is derived and implementation of the
re-manufacturing states that manufacturers can reach to similar payoffs as
the traditional manufacturing processes by inserting lower sale prices. In
other words, implementation of the re-manufacturing can guarantee more
sustainable parts both environmentally friendly wise and price wise while
satisfying the expected payoff for the manufacturers.
The fourth game investigates the cooperation of the spare parts’ manufacturers in
a three-person (there are three manufacturers who can manufacture a substitutable
spare part) cooperative game setup. In this game, manufacturers can decide to
cooperate with each other on sale prices and acting in a centralized inventory system
while there is a cost asserted as a binding agreement cost. Determination of decisionmaking on cooperation or defect depends on spare part sale price variation and the
cost of binding agreement which are investigated as the Prisoners’ Dilemma and Stag
Hunt game. Two different methods of Shapley value and Bargaining set are
implemented to allocate benefits of cooperation among cooperative manufacturers.
Moreover, a centralized inventory configuration for manufacturers who decide to rely
on a cooperative inventory system is designed and a comparison between inventory
levels and cost of inventory for two different cases of centralized and decentralized
inventory configuration is studied. To investigate the effect of the Green
manufacturing on cost of inventory, it has been assumed that one of the manufacturers
can implement re-manufacturing to produce spare parts and the role of re-
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manufacturing on payoffs of the manufacturers in cooperative inventory games is
investigated while the optimal level of re-manufacturing effort is calculated. The
results of the game can be listed as follows:
1. The variation of sale prices and cost of cooperation agreement changes the
type of the inventory game from Prisoners’ Dilemma to Stag Hunt game
which changes the Nash Equilibrium of the game.
2. Our method first checks the non-emptiness of the core of the game. Then
it determines whether manufacturers should cooperate or defect for given
sale prices and variation of the cost of cooperation agreement.
3. The centralized inventory system configuration provides more profit for
the manufacturers with less inventory level.
4. In the centralized configuration there will be no Prisoners’ Dilemma game
and the game stays as the Stag Hunt game.
5. Re-manufacturing improve the total profit of the manufacturers while the
inventory level stays the same.
In the last game, the competition of the OEM and will-fitters in the aftermarket
business during the time span between end-of-production and end-of-service of the
original or parent product is investigated. Unlike the period during the product life
cycle, there is no monopoly for the OEM to supply spare parts after the end-ofproduction cycle. In this period other competitors enter to the market and compete
with the OEM to absorb more market demand share for the spares. Spare parts demand
is intermittent and the demand arrival is considered as a Poisson process. The OEM
can forecast the parent products failure rate or intensity factor that determines the
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expected overall demand for spare parts. The sale price affects the overall market
demand. Once the OEM raises the price, some customers will leave the market and
their demand is met from refurbished parts by third parties and the rest of customers’
demands are allocated among the OEM and will-fitters. In this environment the OEM
is considered as the dominant firm and will-fitters are considered as fringes. The
interaction of the spare parts suppliers is studied as the competitive fringe game. In
first scenario, both groups of manufacturers implement order-up-to level inventory
policy to manage their spare parts stock levels that results in constant values marginal
costs. Hence, the OEM enters the parts to the market with a price that makes the willfitters to drop out of the market and leave all of the demand to the OEM. The potential
supply of fringe is irrelevant and the OEM becomes a monopoly. In another scenario it
has been assumed that the OEM still follows order-up-to level inventory policy and
fringe firms supply spare parts to the market with a given quantity-price function or
supply curve that is known by the OEM. The price leadership solution determines the
optimal sale price and inventory level for the OEM.
This research has introduced several game theoretical approaches to study OEM’s
decision-making on inventory levels, Green manufacturing and pricing strategies. The
suggested strategic spare parts pricing methods factor in the customers’ willingness to
purchase the spare parts, the demand uncertainty, the market uncertainty, the
competitiveness of the parts in the market, the stability of the cooperation or
competition in price setting, the marginal costs of designing an agreement for
cooperation, and the marginal cost of production and inventory. The consideration of
aforementioned factors in spare parts price setting is a convincing reason for the
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OEMs to replace cost-based pricing with strategic pricing to gain more profits in the
aftermarket business. However, the ratio between the renewal cost and the
replacement cost of the products can be distinguished as a factor to count the fairness
of the pricing. Because of the high ratio for the selected products, it is evident that the
spare parts pricing is unfair. Hence, it is possible to add this ratio to the price
sustainability description and include it into strategic pricing formulations as a factor
that affects the demand and supply curves.
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APPENDIX

7. DATA ACQUISITION

ONLINE DATABASE: The main source of gathering information is an unofficial
online database which is RealOEM.com. Despite being an unofficial website, there is
very accurate and up-to-date parts information in this website. It is possible to find a
specific car on this website via two ways, one is selecting a car using its model and
other detailed specification, and the other way is to search a car through its vehicle
identification number (VIN) which is used in this study.

Figure 47: Subassembly diagram and corresponding parts list
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After the vehicle has been identified in the catalogue, the desired subassembly
diagrams and parts lists can be accessed. However, this process does not include the
identification of additional features in the vehicle such as seat heating or sunroof.
These features have to be screened in the parts list manually. Figure 47 shows how
subassembly diagrams and the corresponding parts lists are illustrated in the database.
The website provides a diagram and corresponding catalogue with the following
information for each part:
•

Number (No.) – A number for identifying a part from the diagram in the
list and vice versa;

•

Description – Name of the part, e.g. “Support Fender Left”;

•

Supplement – Additional information about usage criteria. For example, if
a part comes only in combination of a certain feature;

•

Quantity (Qty) – The used quantity of this part in this subassembly;

•

Production period (From, Up To) – Indicates in which time period a
certain part has been used;

•

Part Number – Unique serial number for every BMW part;

•

Price;

•

Notes;

•

Photo;

STRUCTURE

OF

BMW PARTS LISTS: BMW uses a structure for arranging

subassemblies. This structure shall be illustrated in this section. The whole vehicle is
divided into Main Groups (MG) such as Engine, Transmission, Front Axle etc. These
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MG are further divided into so called Sub Groups (SG) and Sub Sub Groups (SSG).
This structure has been illustrated in Table 54.
Table 54: BMW subassembly structure

PRESENTATION

OF

THE VEHICLES: For this study, two models of BMW cars

including 328i and X6 have been selected. The 328i is chosen by the criteria of highest
market presence of BMW cars. The 3 series is the best-selling model of BMW in
recent years. The X6 is chosen as a high price and luxury car among BMW series. The
exact vehicles which have been chosen for this study are presented as the following:
1. Models: As it was mentioned two BMW models are selected and the
detailed information of the vehicles is listed in Tables 55.
Table 55: BMW 328i Sedan & BMW X6 SUV model information
BMW 328i Sedan (E90)

BMW X6 3.5i (E71)

Exterior

Jet Black

Mineral silver metallic (A14)

Interior

Leather Dakota Gray

Leather Nevada (LUSW)

Transmission

Automatic

Automatic

Fuel Type

Gas

Gas

Mileage (03/05/2012)

37,000

-

Production Date

04/17/2008

11/09/2008

VIN

WBAVA37588NL54270

5UXFG43529L222179
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BMW 328i Sedan (E90)

BMW X6 3.5i (E71)

Type Code

VA37

SC

Steering

Left

Left

Doors

4

4

Engine

N52K

N54

2. Features: The detailed features of two vehicles have been identified and
listed in Tables 56.
Table 56: BMW 328i Sedan & BMW X6 SUV features information
BMW 328i

BMW X6

Code

Description

Code

Description

S205A

Automatic transmission

S1CAA

Dummy-SALAPA

S248A

Steering wheel heater

S2VBA

Tyre pressure control (TPC)

S249A
S2BGA
S2VBA
S2XAA
S319A

Multifunction steering
wheel
BMW alloy wheel, double
spoke 161
Tire pressure control (TPC)

S316A

Sport leather wheel + shift
paddles
Integrated universal remote
control

S319A
S322A

Glass roof, electrical

S403A

S3AGA

Interior/outside mirror with
auto dip
Interior mirror with
automatic-dip

S430A
S431A

S430A
S431A

automatic trunk lid
mechanism
Integrated universal remote
control
Comfort access
Reversing camera
Interior/outside mirror with
auto dip
Interior mirror with
automatic-dip

S441A

Smoker package

S441A

Smoker package

S459A

Seat adjuster, electric, with
memory

S459A

Seat adjuster, electric, with
memory

S465A

Through-loading system

S464A

Ski bag

…

…

…

…

PROCEDURE

FOR

COLLECTING DATA: This section provides a quick overview

about the procedure that has been developed and executed for downloading the
information of thousands parts from the database while maintaining a uniform data
structure.
1. Downloading Data: Before the actual downloading process was started, all
relevant MGs, SGs and SSGs were identified. This was necessary since
211

not all of them are included in the vehicles which were analyzed in this
study. By using a VBA Excel program, it was possible to download all
parts lists of a MG into an Excel file. In these individual files the first
sheet represents the overall results for this MG. This sheet is followed by
sheets for every SG containing all SSGs accordingly.
2. Revising Data: As mentioned before, after the data had been downloaded
from the database, it had to be revised. The following measurements have
been performed:
•

Deleting irrelevant parts such as:
•

Parts that do not fit the production period of the vehicle;

•

Parts that only come in combination with features which are not
included in the vehicle;

•

Sample comparisons of prices with different websites;

•

Entering missing prices by searching the part number on websites
such as:

•

•

http://parts.bmwofsouthatlanta.com/

•

http://www.ecstuning.com/

•

http://www.online-teile.com/bmw/
Entering missing quantities;
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